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This paper elaborates a novel hypothesis regarding the observed predictive relation between finger gnosis and mathematical ability. In brief, we suggest that these two cognitive phenomena have overlapping neural substrates, as the result of the re-use (“redeployment”) of part of the finger gnosis circuit for the purpose of representing number. We offer some background on the relation and current explanations for it; an outline of our alternate hypothesis; some evidence supporting redeployment over current views; and a plan for further research.

This paper introduces a very simple analytic method for mining large numbers of brain imaging experiments to discover functional cooperation between regions. We then report some preliminary results of its application, illustrate some of the many future projects in which we expect the technique will be of considerable use (including a way to relate fMRI to EEG), and describe a research resource for investigating functional cooperation in the cortex that will be made publicly available through the lab website. One significant finding is that differences between cognitive domains appear to be attributable more to differences in patterns of cooperation between brain regions, rather than to differences in which brain regions are used in each domain. This is not a result that is predicted by prevailing localization‐based and modular accounts of the organization of the cortex. Introduction and Background Hardly an issue of Science or Nature goes by without creating a stir over the discovery of “the” gene for some disease, trait, or predisposition, or “the ” brain area responsible for some behavior or cognitive capacity. Of course, we know better; the isolable parts of complex systems like the

Abstract: This paper lays out some of the empirical evidence for the importance of neural reuse—the reuse of existing (inherited and/or early-developing) neural circuitry for multiple behavioral purposes—in defining the overall functional structure of the brain. We then discuss in some detail one particular instance of such reuse: the involvement of a local neural circuit in finger awareness, number representation, and other diverse functions. Finally, we consider whether and how the notion of a developmental homology can help us understand the relationships between the cognitive functions that develop out of shared neural supports. How are neural resources deployed to support cognitive functioning in the adult organism, and how does that architecture come about? That is, what evolutionary and developmental pathways does the brain follow in acquiring its repertoire of capacities? Consider two possible options, one that has been largely identified with the embodied/embedded school of cognitive science, and another associated with evolutionary psychology. A long-standing guiding principle of both embodied cognitive science (ECS) and evolutionary psychology (EvoPsy) is that cognition was built within a system primarily fitted to situated action. The central nervous system—the neocortex most definitely included—is first and

Our ancestors begin to speak of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts. What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role.

This chapter analyzes and discusses one of the most important uses of information in the biological world: decision-making. I will first present a fundamental principle introduced by Darwin, the idea of an “economy of nature, ” by which decision-making can be understood. Following this principle, I then argue that biological decision-making should be construed as goal-oriented, value-based information processing. I propose a value-based account of neural information, where information is primarily economic and relative to goal achievement. If living beings (I focus here on animals) are biological decision-makers, we may expect that their behavior would be coherent with the pursuit of certain goals (either ultimate or instrumental) and that their behavioral control mechanisms would be endowed with goal-directed and valuation mechanisms. These expectations, I argue, are supported by behavioral ecology and decision neuroscience. Together, they provide a rich, biological account of decision-making that should be integrated in a wider concept of ‘natural rationality’.

The paper outlines some of the broad architectural implications of the modularity thesis, and reports on an attempt to test for them. The method involved analysing 472 functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments in eight cognitive domains to discover which brain regions co-operated with which others, under what conditions. The results indicate that the same brain regions contribute to functions across various cognitive domains, but in each domain co-operate with one another in different patterns. This does not appear to be compatible with the modularity thesis. The paper discusses the implications of the finding for the best approach to the design and implementation of intelligent systems in general, and of language-using robots in particular. Implications for the best approach to analysing and modelling cognitive functions will also be discussed.

Although it is customary in a talk on embodied cognition to begin with all the reasons we should doubt the more traditional approaches to the study of the mind, I am going to ignore that custom for both merely practical and more substantive reasons. The merely practical reason is the time allotted; the more substantive reason is the fact that we ought by now to be in a position where the embodied, situated and distributed approach(es) to the study of the mind are seen not primarily as criticisms of the prevailing paradigm, but as established, vibrant and fruitful research programs in their own right, needing no justification other than their own success. I intend to make this assumption in all my future work, and I urge you to do the same. Instead I would like to do three main things: 1. First, introduce you to—perhaps even convince you to adopt—an approach to the mind motivated primarily by evolutionary considerations. I’ll do that by laying out four principles for the study of

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Part of understanding the functional organization of the brain is understanding how it evolved. This talk presents evidence suggesting that while the brain may have originally emerged as an organ with functionally