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996
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
 In Proc. STOC
, 2009
"... We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme – i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result – that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitra ..."
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Cited by 664 (17 self)
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We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme – i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result – that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable. Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable. Latticebased cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1. Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a publickey ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits. Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable – i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypter to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypter, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypter in a serveraided cryptosystem.
Privacy Preserving Data Mining
 JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY
, 2000
"... In this paper we address the issue of privacy preserving data mining. Specifically, we consider a scenario in which two parties owning confidential databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases, without revealing any unnecessary information. Our work is motivated b ..."
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Cited by 523 (8 self)
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In this paper we address the issue of privacy preserving data mining. Specifically, we consider a scenario in which two parties owning confidential databases wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases, without revealing any unnecessary information. Our work is motivated by the need to both protect privileged information and enable its use for research or other purposes. The
Design and Analysis of Practical PublicKey Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2001
"... A new public key encryption scheme, along with several variants, is proposed and analyzed. The scheme and its variants are quite practical, and are proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. These appear to be the first publickey encryption sc ..."
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Cited by 231 (11 self)
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A new public key encryption scheme, along with several variants, is proposed and analyzed. The scheme and its variants are quite practical, and are proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. These appear to be the first publickey encryption schemes in the literature that are simultaneously practical and provably secure.
Universal Hash Proofs and a Paradigm for Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Secure PublicKey Encryption
, 2001
"... We present several new and fairly practical publickey encryption schemes and prove them secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. One scheme is based on Paillier's Decision Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption [7], while another is based in the classical Quadratic Residuosity (QR) ..."
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Cited by 189 (7 self)
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We present several new and fairly practical publickey encryption schemes and prove them secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. One scheme is based on Paillier's Decision Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption [7], while another is based in the classical Quadratic Residuosity (QR) assumption. The analysis is in the standard cryptographic model, i.e., the security of our schemes does not rely on the Random Oracle model. We also introduce the notion of a universal hash proof system. Essentially, this is a special kind of noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system for an NP language. We do not show that universal hash proof systems exist for all NP languages, but we do show how to construct very efficient universal hash proof systems for a general class of grouptheoretic language membership problems. Given an ecient universal hash proof system for a language with certain natural cryptographic indistinguishability properties, we show how to construct an efficient publickey encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model. Our construction only uses the universal hash proof system as a primitive: no other primitives are required, although even more efficient encryption schemes can be obtained by using hash functions with appropriate collisionresistance properties. We show how to construct efficient universal hash proof systems for languages related to the DCR and QR assumptions. From these we get corresponding publickey encryption schemes that are secure under these assumptions. We also show that the CramerShoup encryption scheme (which up until now was the only practical encryption scheme that could be proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under a reasonable assumption, namely, the Decision...
Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete Logarithms
, 2003
"... This paper addresses the problem of designing practical protocols for proving properties about encrypted data. To this end, it presents a variant of the new public key encryption of Cramer and Shoup based on Paillier’s decision composite residuosity assumption, along with efficient protocols for ve ..."
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Cited by 168 (24 self)
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This paper addresses the problem of designing practical protocols for proving properties about encrypted data. To this end, it presents a variant of the new public key encryption of Cramer and Shoup based on Paillier’s decision composite residuosity assumption, along with efficient protocols for verifiable encryption and decryption of discrete logarithms (and more generally, of representations with respect to multiple bases). This is the first verifiable encryption system that provides chosen ciphertext security and avoids inefficient cutandchoose proofs. The presented protocols have numerous applications, including key escrow, optimistic fair exchange, publicly verifiable secret and signature sharing, universally composable commitments, group signatures, and confirmer signatures.
PrivacyPreserving KMeans Clustering over Vertically Partitioned Data
 IN SIGKDD
, 2003
"... Privacy and security concerns can prevent sharing of data, derailing data mining projects. Distributed knowledge discovery, if done correctly, can alleviate this problem. The key is to obtain valid results, while providing guarantees on the (non)disclosure of data. We present a method for kmeans cl ..."
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Cited by 167 (10 self)
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Privacy and security concerns can prevent sharing of data, derailing data mining projects. Distributed knowledge discovery, if done correctly, can alleviate this problem. The key is to obtain valid results, while providing guarantees on the (non)disclosure of data. We present a method for kmeans clustering when different sites contain different attributes for a common set of entities. Each site learns the cluster of each entity, but learns nothing about the attributes at other sites.
Privacypreserving set operations
 in Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO 2005, LNCS
, 2005
"... In many important applications, a collection of mutually distrustful parties must perform private computation over multisets. Each party’s input to the function is his private input multiset. In order to protect these private sets, the players perform privacypreserving computation; that is, no part ..."
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Cited by 161 (0 self)
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In many important applications, a collection of mutually distrustful parties must perform private computation over multisets. Each party’s input to the function is his private input multiset. In order to protect these private sets, the players perform privacypreserving computation; that is, no party learns more information about other parties ’ private input sets than what can be deduced from the result. In this paper, we propose efficient techniques for privacypreserving operations on multisets. By employing the mathematical properties of polynomials, we build a framework of efficient, secure, and composable multiset operations: the union, intersection, and element reduction operations. We apply these techniques to a wide range of practical problems, achieving more efficient results than those of previous work.
CoercionResistant Electronic Elections
 In WPES ’05
, 2002
"... We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme ..."
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Cited by 155 (0 self)
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We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be coercion resistant if it is impossible for the adversary to determine whether a coerced voter complies with the demands. Furthermore, we relax the requirements made in some previous proposals from an untappable channel to only requiring the existence of an anonymous channel.