Abstract not found

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model’s performance by making the firm’s flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

We explore the role of real wage dynamics in a New Keynesian business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Both job creation and destruction are endogenous. We show that the model generates counterfactual inflation and labor market dynamics. In particular, it fails to generate a Beveridge curve: vacancies and unemployment are positively correlated. Introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation, and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values. However, inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity. This is because of the presence of labor market frictions, which generate long-run employment relationships. The measure of real marginal cost that is relevant for inflation dynamics via the Phillips curve contains a dynamic component that does not necessarily move with real wages. JEL CLASSIFICATION: KEYWORDS:

We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities and unemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy. We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that, under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect on unemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on the implications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigidities in determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment. We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting by firms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discuss how it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wage rigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemploy-

A number of authors have recently emphasized that the conventional model of unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen and Pissarides has difficulty accounting for the relatively volatile behavior of labor market activity over the business cycle. We address this issue by modifying the MP framework to allow for staggered multiperiod wage contracting. What emerges is a tractable relation for wage dynamics that is a natural generalization of the period-by-period Nash bargaining outcome in the conventional formulation. An interesting side-product is the emergence of spillover effects of average wages on the bargaining process. We then show that a reasonable calibration of the model can account well for the cyclical behavior of wages and labor market activity observed in the data. The spillover effects turn out to be important in this respect.

I study the cyclical behavior of an equilibrium search model with endogenous job creation and destruction and extract from it a wage equation that can be compared with the econometric evidence. Job creation in the model is influenced by wages in new matches. I summarize microeconometric evidence on wages in new matches and show that the key model elasticities are consistent with the evidence. Therefore sticky wages is not the answer to the unemployment volatility puzzle. I discuss some alternative mechanisms that can increase volatility, in particular extensions of the model and alternative driving mechanisms. Jobs in the search and matching model command monopoly rents that are shared between the firm and the worker by a wage contract. The most common wage contract found in the literature is derived from Nash, and yields a wage rate that is a linear combination of the productivity of the match and the worker’s returns from search and nonmarket activities. Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) have shown that because nonmarket returns are less cyclical than labor productivity, employment in the model exhibits more cyclicality than in a competitive market-clearing model. The question that I address in this paper is the role of wages in the cyclical volatil-ities implied by this model. Shimer (2005a), in an influential paper, has shown that

This paper uses readily accessible data to measure the probability that an employed worker becomes unemployed and the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job, the ins and outs of unemployment. The job finding probability is strongly procyclical and the separation probability is nearly acyclical, particularly during the last two decades. Using the underlying microeconomic data, the paper shows that these results are not due to compositional changes in the pool of searching workers, nor are they due to movements of workers in and out of the labor force. These results contradict the conventional wisdom that has guided the development of macroeconomic models of the labor market during the last fifteen years. ∗ My title borrows from Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1986). I am grateful for comments

Abstract not found

The standard neo-classical model of wage setting predicts short-term effects of temporary labor market shocks on careers and low costs of recessions for both more and less advantaged workers. In contrast, a vast range of alternative career models based on frictions in the labor market suggests that labor market shocks can have persistent effects on the entire earnings profile. This paper analyzes the long-term effects of graduating in a recession on earnings, job mobility, and employer characteristics for a large sample of Canadian college graduates with different predicted earnings using matched university-employer-employee data from 1982 to 1999, and uses its results to assess the importance of alternative career models. We find that young graduates entering the labor market in a recession suffer significant initial earnings losses that eventually fade, but after 8 to 10 years. We also document substantial heterogeneity in the costs of recessions and important effects on job mobility and employer characteristics, but small effects on time worked. These adjustment patterns are neither consistent with a neo-classical spot market nor a complete scarring effect, but could be explained by a combination of time intensive search for better employers and long-term wage contracting. All results are robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis including controls for correlated business cycle shocks after labor market entry, endogenous timing of graduation, permanent cohort

Standard search and matching models of equilibrium unemployment, once properly calibrated, can generate only a small amount of frictional wage dispersion, i.e., wage differentials among ex-ante similar workers induced purely by search frictions. We derive this result for a specific measure of wage dispersion—the ratio between the average wage and the lowest (reservation) wage paid. We show that in a large class of search and matching models this statistic (the “mean-min ratio”) can be obtained in closed form as a function of observable variables (i.e., the interest rate, the value of leisure, and statistics of labor market turnover). Various independent data sources suggest that actual residual wage dispersion (i.e., inequality among observationally similar workers) exceeds the model’s prediction by a factor of 20. We discuss three extensions of the model (risk aversion, volatile wages during employment, and on-the-job search) and find that, in their simplest versions, they can improve its performance, but only modestly. We conclude that either frictions account for a tiny fraction of residual wage dispersion, or the standard model needs to be augmented to confront the data. In particular, the last generation of models with on-the-job search appears promising.