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Pathfinder is an expert system that assists surgical pathologists with the diagnosis of lymph-node diseases. The program is one of a growing number of normative expert systems that use probability and decision theory to acquire, represent, manipulate, and explain uncertain medical knowledge. In this article, we describe Pathfinder and our research in uncertain-reasoning paradigms that was stimulated by the development of the program. We discuss limitations with early decision-theoretic methods for reasoning under uncertainty and our initial attempts to use non-decision-theoretic methods. Then, we describe experimental and theoretical results that directed us to return to reasoning methods based in probability and decision theory.

The theory of belief functions provides one way to use mathematical probability in subjective judgment. It is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of subjective probability. When we use the Bayesian theory to quantify judgments about a question, we must assign probabilities to the possible answers to that question. The theory of belief functions is more flexible; it allows us to derive degrees of belief for a question from probabilities for a related question. These degrees of belief may or may not have the mathematical properties of probabilities; how much they differ from probabilities will depend on how closely the two questions are related. Examples of what we would now call belief-function reasoning can be found in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, well before Bayesian ideas were developed. In 1689, George Hooper gave rules for combining testimony that can be recognized as special cases of Dempster's rule for combining belief functions (Shafer 1986a). Similar rules were formulated by Jakob Bernoulli in his Ars Conjectandi, published posthumously in 1713, and by Johann-Heinrich Lambert in his Neues Organon, published in 1764 (Shafer 1978). Examples of belief-function reasoning can also be found in more recent work, by authors

: Belief functions are mathematical objects defined to satisfy three axioms that look somewhat similar to the Kolmogorov axioms defining probability functions. We argue that there are (at least) two useful and quite different ways of understanding belief functions. The first is as a generalized probability function (which technically corresponds to the inner measure induced by a probability function). The second is as a way of representing evidence. Evidence, in turn, can be understood as a mapping from probability functions to probability functions. It makes sense to think of updating a belief if we think of it as a generalized probability. On the other hand, it makes sense to combine two beliefs (using, say, Dempster's rule of combination) only if we think of the belief functions as representing evidence. Many previous papers have pointed out problems with the belief function approach; the claim of this paper is that these problems can be explained as a consequence of confounding the...

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We present PULCinella and its use in comparing uncertainty theories. PULCinella is a general tool for Propagating Uncertainty based on the Local Computation technique of Shafer and Shenoy. It may be specialized to different uncertainty theories: at the moment, Pulcinella can propagate probabilities, belief functions, Boolean values, and possibilities. Moreover, Pulcinella allows the user to easily define his own specializations. To illustrate Pulcinella, we analyze two examples by using each of the four theories above. In the first one, we mainly focus on intrinsic differences between theories. In the second one, we take a knowledge engineer viewpoint, and check the adequacy of each theory to a given problem. 1. INTRODUCTION A new interest has grown up recently in the uncertainty management community. Moving from consideration of efficiency, ease of representation, and generality, a number of techniques for representing and propagating uncertainty in networks have been proposed (e.g....

Bayesian methods are becoming increasingly popular in the development of intelligent machines. Bayesian Belief Networks (bbns) are nowaday a prominent reasoning method and, during the past few years, several efforts have been addressed to develop methods able to learn bbns directly from databases. However, all these methods assume that the database is complete or, at least, that unreported data are missing at random. Unfortunately, real-world databases are rarely complete and the "Missing at Random" assumption is often unrealistic. This paper shows that this assumption can dramatically affect the reliability of the learned bbn and introduces a robust method to learn conditional probabilities in a bbn, which does not rely on this assumption. In order to drop this assumption, we have to change the overall learning strategy used by traditional Bayesian methods: our method bounds the set of all posterior probabilities consistent with the database and proceed by refining this set as more i...

Since introduction of the theory of rough set in early eighties, considerable work has been done on the development and application of this new theory. The paper provides a review of the Pawlak rough set model and its extensions, with emphasis on the formulation, characterization, and interpretation of various rough set models. 1

The term Soft Computing (SC) represents the combination of emerging problem-solving technologies such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), Probabilistic Reasoning (PR), Neural Networks (NNs), and Genetic Algorithms (GAs). Each of these technologies provide us with complementary reasoning and searching methods to solve complex, real-world problems. After a brief description of each of these technologies, we will analyze some of their most useful combinations, such as the use of FL to control GAs and NNs parameters; the application of GAs to evolve NNs (topologies or weights) or to tune FL controllers; and the implementation of FL controllers as NNs tuned by backpropagation-type algorithms.

: We define a new notion of conditional belief, which plays the same role for Dempster-Shafer belief functions as conditional probability does for probability functions. Our definition is different from the standard definition given by Dempster, and avoids many of the well-known problems of that definition. Just as the conditional probability P r(\DeltajB) is a probability function which is the result of conditioning on B being true, so too our conditional belief function Bel(\DeltajB) is a belief function which is the result of conditioning on B being true. We define the conditional belief as the lower envelope (that is, the inf) of a family of conditional probability functions, and provide a closed-form expression for it. An alternate way of understanding our definition of conditional belief is provided by considering ideas from an earlier paper [FH91], where we connect belief functions with inner measures. In particular, we show here how to extend the definition of conditional pro...