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A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
- Information and Computation
, 1999
"... We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the ..."
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Cited by 898 (50 self)
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We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the spi calculus enables us to consider cryptographic issues in more detail. We represent protocols as processes in the spi calculus and state their security properties in terms of coarsegrained notions of protocol equivalence.
DART: Directed automated random testing
- In Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI
, 2005
"... We present a new tool, named DART, for automatically testing software that combines three main techniques: (1) automated extraction of the interface of a program with its external environment using static source-code parsing; (2) automatic generation of a test driver for this interface that performs ..."
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Cited by 838 (42 self)
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We present a new tool, named DART, for automatically testing software that combines three main techniques: (1) automated extraction of the interface of a program with its external environment using static source-code parsing; (2) automatic generation of a test driver for this interface that performs random testing to simulate the most general environment the program can operate in; and (3) dynamic analysis of how the program behaves under random testing and automatic generation of new test inputs to direct systematically the execution along alternative program paths. Together, these three techniques constitute Directed Automated Random Testing,or DART for short. The main strength of DART is thus that testing can be performed completely automatically on any program that compiles – there is no need to write any test driver or harness code. During testing, DART detects standard errors such as program crashes, assertion violations, and non-termination. Preliminary experiments to unit test several examples of C programs are very encouraging.
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
, 2000
"... Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability. ..."
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Cited by 378 (11 self)
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Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability.
Mobile Values, New Names, and Secure Communication
, 2001
"... We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (first-order) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts. Specifically, we intro ..."
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Cited by 372 (17 self)
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We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (first-order) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts. Specifically, we introduce a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value passing, primitive functions, and equations among terms. We develop semantics and proof techniques for this extended language and apply them in reasoning about some security protocols.
Automated Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols Using Murphi
, 1997
"... A methodology is presented for using a generalpurpose state enumeration tool, Murphi, to analyze cryptographic and security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder protocol, finding a known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and anal ..."
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Cited by 296 (25 self)
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A methodology is presented for using a generalpurpose state enumeration tool, Murphi, to analyze cryptographic and security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder protocol, finding a known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and analyzing variants of Kerberos and the faulty TMN protocol used in another comparative study. The efficiency of Murphi allows us to examine multiple runs of relatively short protocols, giving us the ability to detect replay attacks, or errors resulting from confusion between independent execution of a protocol by independent parties.
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
, 1997
"... Many security protocols have the aim of authenticating one agent to another. Yet there is no clear consensus in the academic literature about precisely what “authentication” means. In this paper we suggest that the appropriate authentication requirement will depend upon the use to which the protocol ..."
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Cited by 240 (5 self)
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Many security protocols have the aim of authenticating one agent to another. Yet there is no clear consensus in the academic literature about precisely what “authentication” means. In this paper we suggest that the appropriate authentication requirement will depend upon the use to which the protocol is put, and identify several possible definitions of “authentication”. We formalize each definition using the process algebra CSP, use this formalism to study their relative strengths, and show how the model checker FDR can be used to test whether a system running the protocol meets such a specification. 1
Constraint Solving for Bounded-Process Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
- CCS'01
, 2001
"... The reachability problem for cryptographic protocols with nonatomic keys can be solved via a simple constraint satisfaction procedure. ..."
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Cited by 176 (3 self)
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The reachability problem for cryptographic protocols with nonatomic keys can be solved via a simple constraint satisfaction procedure.
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
- In 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 1997
"... Informal justifications of security protocols involve arguing backwards that various events are impossible. Inductive definitions can make such arguments rigorous. The resulting proofs are complicated, but can be generated reasonably quickly using the proof tool Isabelle/HOL. There is no restriction ..."
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Cited by 167 (8 self)
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Informal justifications of security protocols involve arguing backwards that various events are impossible. Inductive definitions can make such arguments rigorous. The resulting proofs are complicated, but can be generated reasonably quickly using the proof tool Isabelle/HOL. There is no restriction to finite-state systems and the approach is not based on belief logics. Protocols are inductively defined as sets of traces, which may involve many interleaved protocol runs. Protocol descriptions model accidental key losses as well as attacks. The model spy can send spoof messages made up of components decrypted from previous traffic. Several key distribution protocols have been studied, including NeedhamSchroeder, Yahalom and Otway-Rees. The method applies to both symmetrickey and public-key protocols. A new attack has been discovered in a variant of Otway-Rees (already broken by Mao and Boyd). Assertions concerning secrecy and authenticity have been proved. CONTENTS i Contents 1 Intro...
A meta-notation for protocol analysis
- in: Proc. CSFW’99
, 1999
"... Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the “Dolev-Yao model. ” In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the w ..."
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Cited by 166 (38 self)
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Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the “Dolev-Yao model. ” In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the way that existential quantification provides a succinct way of choosing new values, such as new keys or nonces. We define a class of theories in this formalism that correspond to finite-length protocols, with a bounded initialization phase but allowing unboundedly many instances of each protocol role (e.g., client, server, initiator, or responder). Undecidability is proved for a restricted class of these protocols, and PSPACE-completeness is claimed for a class further restricted to have no new data (nonces). Since it is a fragment of linear logic, we can use our notation directly as input to linear logic tools, allowing us to do proof search for attacks with relatively little programming effort, and to formally verify protocol transformations and optimizations. 1
