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537
IdentityBased Encryption from the Weil Pairing
, 2001
"... We propose a fully functional identitybased encryption scheme (IBE). The scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model assuming an elliptic curve variant of the computational DiffieHellman problem. Our system is based on bilinear maps between groups. The Weil pairing on elliptic ..."
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Cited by 1699 (29 self)
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We propose a fully functional identitybased encryption scheme (IBE). The scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model assuming an elliptic curve variant of the computational DiffieHellman problem. Our system is based on bilinear maps between groups. The Weil pairing on elliptic curves is an example of such a map. We give precise definitions for secure identity based encryption schemes and give several applications for such systems.
Relations among notions of security for publickey encryption schemes
, 1998
"... Abstract. We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and nonmalleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove e ..."
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Cited by 514 (68 self)
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Abstract. We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and nonmalleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of nonmalleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.
NonMalleable Cryptography
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2000
"... The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. ..."
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Cited by 490 (21 self)
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The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. The same concept makes sense in the contexts of string commitment and zeroknowledge proofs of possession of knowledge. Nonmalleable schemes for each of these three problems are presented. The schemes do not assume a trusted center; a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users. Our cryptosystem is the first proven to be secure against a strong type of chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff and Simon, in which the attacker knows the ciphertext she wishes to break and can query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext other than the target.
Analysis of keyexchange protocols and their use for building secure channels
, 2001
"... Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with ..."
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Cited by 328 (21 self)
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Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of keyexchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversarycontrolled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of keyexchange protocols, DiffieHellman and keytransport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques. 1
An efficient system for nontransferable anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation
, 2001
"... A credential system is a system in which users can obtain credentials from organizations and demonstrate possession of these credentials. Such a system is anonymous when transactions carried out by the same user cannot be linked. An anonymous credential system is of significant practical relevance ..."
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Cited by 312 (14 self)
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A credential system is a system in which users can obtain credentials from organizations and demonstrate possession of these credentials. Such a system is anonymous when transactions carried out by the same user cannot be linked. An anonymous credential system is of significant practical relevance because it is the best means of providing privacy for users. In this paper we propose a practical anonymous credential system that is based on the strong RSA assumption and the decisional DiffieHellman assumption modulo a safe prime product and is considerably superior to existing ones: (1) We give the first practical solution that allows a user to unlinkably demonstrate possession of a credential as many times as necessary without involving the issuing organization. (2) To prevent misuse of anonymity, our scheme is the first to offer optional anonymity revocation for particular transactions. (3) Our scheme offers separability: all organizations can choose their cryptographic keys independently of each other. Moreover, we suggest more effective means of preventing users from sharing their credentials, by introducing allornothing sharing: a user who allows a friend to use one of her credentials once, gives him the ability to use all of her credentials, i.e., taking over her identity. This is implemented by a new primitive, called circular encryption, which is of independent interest, and can be realized from any semantically secure cryptosystem in the random oracle model.
Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures
 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
, 1998
"... Abstract. We present a new protocol that allows two players to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, so that either each player gets the other’s signature, or neither player does. The obvious application is where the signatures represent items of value, for example, an elect ..."
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Cited by 289 (10 self)
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Abstract. We present a new protocol that allows two players to exchange digital signatures over the Internet in a fair way, so that either each player gets the other’s signature, or neither player does. The obvious application is where the signatures represent items of value, for example, an electronic check or airline ticket. The protocol can also be adapted to exchange encrypted data. The protocol relies on a trusted third party, but is “optimistic, ” in that the third party is only needed in cases where one player attempts to cheat or simply crashes. A key feature of our protocol is that a player can always force a timely and fair termination, without the cooperation of the other player. 1
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS1
, 1998
"... This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA privatekey operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to ..."
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Cited by 286 (1 self)
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This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA privatekey operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to some unknown block of data encrypted using PKCS #1. An example of a protocol susceptible to our attackisSSL V.3.0.
ChosenCiphertext Security from IdentityBased Encryption. Adv
 in Cryptology — Eurocrypt 2004, LNCS
, 2004
"... We propose simple and efficient CCAsecure publickey encryption schemes (i.e., schemes secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks) based on any identitybased encryption (IBE) scheme. Our constructions have ramifications of both theoretical and practical interest. First, our schemes give a n ..."
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Cited by 279 (14 self)
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We propose simple and efficient CCAsecure publickey encryption schemes (i.e., schemes secure against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks) based on any identitybased encryption (IBE) scheme. Our constructions have ramifications of both theoretical and practical interest. First, our schemes give a new paradigm for achieving CCAsecurity; this paradigm avoids “proofs of wellformedness ” that have been shown to underlie previous constructions. Second, instantiating our construction using known IBE constructions we obtain CCAsecure encryption schemes whose performance is competitive with the most efficient CCAsecure schemes to date. Our techniques extend naturally to give an efficient method for securing also IBE schemes (even hierarchical ones) against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks. Coupled with previous work, this gives the first efficient constructions of CCAsecure IBE schemes. 1
Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design
, 1999
"... We suggest an architecture for executing protocols for auctions and, more generally, mechanism design. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants (so that no nonessential information about them is divulged, even a posteriori) while maintaining communication and computation ..."
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Cited by 250 (13 self)
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We suggest an architecture for executing protocols for auctions and, more generally, mechanism design. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants (so that no nonessential information about them is divulged, even a posteriori) while maintaining communication and computational efficiency. We achieve this goal by adding another party  the auction issuer  that generates the programs for computing the auctions but does not take an active part in the protocol. The auction issuer is not a trusted party, but is assumed not to collude with the auctioneer. In the case of auctions, barring collusion between the auctioneer and the auction issuer, neither party gains any information about the bids, even after the auction is over. Moreover, bidders can verify that the auction was performed correctly. The protocols do not require any communication between the bidders and the auction issuer and the computational efficiency is very reasonable. This architecture can be used to implement any mechanism design where the important factor is the complexity of the decision procedure.
Revocation and Tracing Schemes for Stateless Receivers
, 2001
"... Abstract. We deal with the problem of a center sending a message to a group of users such that some subset of the users is considered revoked and should not be able to obtain the content of the message. We concentrate on the stateless receiver case, where the users do not (necessarily) update their ..."
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Cited by 248 (5 self)
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Abstract. We deal with the problem of a center sending a message to a group of users such that some subset of the users is considered revoked and should not be able to obtain the content of the message. We concentrate on the stateless receiver case, where the users do not (necessarily) update their state from session to session. We present a framework called the SubsetCover framework, which abstracts a variety of revocation schemes including some previously known ones. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantees the security of a revocation algorithm in this class. We describe two explicit SubsetCover revocation algorithms; these algorithms are very flexible and work for any number of revoked users. The schemes require storage at the receiver of log N and 1 2 log2 N keys respectively (N is the total number of users), and in order to revoke r users the required message lengths are of r log N and 2r keys respectively. We also provide a general traitor tracing mechanism that can be integrated with any SubsetCover revocation scheme that satisfies a “bifurcation property”. This mechanism does not need an a priori bound on the number of traitors and does not expand the message length by much compared to the revocation of the same set of traitors. The main improvements of these methods over previously suggested methods, when adopted to the stateless scenario, are: (1) reducing the message length to O(r) regardless of the coalition size while maintaining a single decryption at the user’s end (2) provide a seamless integration between the revocation and tracing so that the tracing mechanisms does not require any change to the revocation algorithm.