Results 1  10
of
578
Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols
, 2013
"... We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved ..."
Abstract

Cited by 833 (37 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general protocol composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its securitypreserving composition operation allows for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from relatively simple building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, that allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.
NonMalleable Cryptography
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2000
"... The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 480 (20 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. The same concept makes sense in the contexts of string commitment and zeroknowledge proofs of possession of knowledge. Nonmalleable schemes for each of these three problems are presented. The schemes do not assume a trusted center; a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users. Our cryptosystem is the first proven to be secure against a strong type of chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff and Simon, in which the attacker knows the ciphertext she wishes to break and can query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext other than the target.
Authenticated Key Exchange Secure Against Dictionary Attacks
, 2000
"... Passwordbased protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) are designed to work despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, all possible passwords. While several such protocols have been suggested, the underlying theory has been laggi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 402 (35 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Passwordbased protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) are designed to work despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, all possible passwords. While several such protocols have been suggested, the underlying theory has been lagging. We begin by defining a model for this problem, one rich enough to deal with password guessing, forward secrecy, server compromise, and loss of session keys. The one model can be used to define various goals. We take AKE (with "implicit" authentication) as the "basic" goal, and we give definitions for it, and for entityauthentication goals as well. Then we prove correctness for the idea at the center of the Encrypted KeyExchange (EKE) protocol of Bellovin and Merritt: we prove security, in an idealcipher model, of the twoflow protocol at the core of EKE.
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
, 2000
"... Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 378 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography have developed over the years, in two mostly separate communities. One of the views relies on a simple but effective formal approach; the other, on a detailed computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability.
Mobile Values, New Names, and Secure Communication
, 2001
"... We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (firstorder) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programminglanguage contexts. Specifically, we intro ..."
Abstract

Cited by 372 (17 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (firstorder) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programminglanguage contexts. Specifically, we introduce a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value passing, primitive functions, and equations among terms. We develop semantics and proof techniques for this extended language and apply them in reasoning about some security protocols.
Analysis of keyexchange protocols and their use for building secure channels
, 2001
"... Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with ..."
Abstract

Cited by 330 (20 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any keyexchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of keyexchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversarycontrolled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of keyexchange protocols, DiffieHellman and keytransport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques. 1
A modular approach to the design and analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols
, 1998
"... We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key e ..."
Abstract

Cited by 245 (18 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and keyexchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some wellknown key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated DiffieHellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being
The Security of Cipher Block Chaining
, 1994
"... The Cipher Block Chaining  Message Authentication Code (CBC MAC) specifies that a message x = x 1 \Delta \Delta \Delta xm be authenticated among parties who share a secret key a by tagging x with a prefix of f (m) a (x) def = f a (f a (\Delta \Delta \Delta f a (f a (x 1 )\Phix 2 )\Phi \Delta ..."
Abstract

Cited by 171 (28 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The Cipher Block Chaining  Message Authentication Code (CBC MAC) specifies that a message x = x 1 \Delta \Delta \Delta xm be authenticated among parties who share a secret key a by tagging x with a prefix of f (m) a (x) def = f a (f a (\Delta \Delta \Delta f a (f a (x 1 )\Phix 2 )\Phi \Delta \Delta \Delta \Phix m\Gamma1 )\Phix m ) ; where f is some underlying block cipher (eg. f = DES). This method is a pervasively used international and U.S. standard. We provide its first formal justification, showing the following general lemma: that cipher block chaining a pseudorandom function gives a pseudorandom function. Underlying our results is a technical lemma of independent interest, bounding the success probability of a computationally unbounded adversary in distinguishing between a random mlbit to lbit function and the CBC MAC of a random lbit to lbit function. Advanced Networking Laboratory, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, PO Box 704, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA. em...
HMQV: A HighPerformance Secure DiffieHellman Protocol
 Protocol, Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’05, LNCS 3621
, 2005
"... The MQV protocol of Law, Menezes, Qu, Solinas and Vanstone is possibly the most e#cient of all known authenticated Di#eHellman protocols that use publickey authentication. In addition to great performance, the protocol has been designed to achieve a remarkable list of security properties. As a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 169 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
The MQV protocol of Law, Menezes, Qu, Solinas and Vanstone is possibly the most e#cient of all known authenticated Di#eHellman protocols that use publickey authentication. In addition to great performance, the protocol has been designed to achieve a remarkable list of security properties. As a result MQV has been widely standardized, and has recently been chosen by the NSA as the key exchange mechanism underlying "the next generation cryptography to protect US government information".
Key Agreement Protocols and their Security Analysis
, 1997
"... This paper proposes new protocols for two goals: authenticated key agreement and authenticated key agreement with key confirmation in the asymmetric (publickey) setting. A formal ..."
Abstract

Cited by 166 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper proposes new protocols for two goals: authenticated key agreement and authenticated key agreement with key confirmation in the asymmetric (publickey) setting. A formal