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Neural representations of self versus other: Visualspatial perspective taking and agency in a virtual ball-tossing game. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18:898–910. [AT
- Review of Shaun Gallagher’s How the body shapes the mind. Psyche 12:1. (Online journal publication.) [FdV] De
, 2006
"... & Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought to explore the neural correlates involved in self–other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking and agency. Although recent research has shed light on the neu ..."
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& Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought to explore the neural correlates involved in self–other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking and agency. Although recent research has shed light on the neural processes underly-ing these phenomena, little is known about how they overlap or interact at the neural level. In a two-factorial functional mag-netic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, participants played a ball-tossing game with two virtual characters (‘‘avatars’’). During an active/agency (ACT) task, subjects threw a ball to one of the avatars by pressing a button. During a passive/ nonagency (PAS) task, they indicated which of the other avatars threw the ball. Both tasks were performed from a first-person perspective (1PP), in which subjects interacted from their own perspective, and a third-person perspective (3PP), in which sub-jects interacted from the perspective of an avatar with another location in space. fMRI analyses revealed overlapping activity in medial prefrontal regions associated with representations of one’s own perspective and actions (1PP and ACT), and overlap-ping activity in temporal–occipital, premotor, and inferior frontal, as well as posterior parietal regions associated with representa-tion of others ’ perspectives and actions (3PP and PAS). These findings provide evidence for distinct neural substrates under-lying representations of the self and others and provide support for the idea that the medial prefrontal cortex crucially contrib-utes to a neural basis of the self. The lack of a statistically sig-nificant interaction suggests that perspective taking and agency represent independent constituents of self-consciousness. &
Far from action-blind: Representation of others’ actions in individuals with autism
- Cognitive Neuropsychology
, 2005
"... It has been suggested that theory of mind may rely on several precursors including gaze processing, joint attention, the ability to distinguish between actions of oneself and others, and the ability to repre-sent goal-directed actions. Some of these processes have been shown to be impaired in indivi ..."
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It has been suggested that theory of mind may rely on several precursors including gaze processing, joint attention, the ability to distinguish between actions of oneself and others, and the ability to repre-sent goal-directed actions. Some of these processes have been shown to be impaired in individuals with autism, who experience difficulties in theory of mind. However, little is known about action representa-tion in autism. Using two variants of a spatial compatibility reaction time (RT) task, we addressed the question of whether high-functioning individuals with autism have difficulties in controlling their own actions and in representing those of others. Participants with autism showed automatic response activa-tion and had no difficulties with response inhibition. When two action alternatives were distributed among pairs of participants, participants with autism represented a co-actor’s task, showing the same pattern of results as the matched control group. We discuss the possibility that in high-functioning individuals with autism, the system matching observed actions onto representations of one’s own actions is intact, whereas difficulties in higher-level processing of social information persist.
Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing: Wegner on the Conscious
- Does Consciousness Cause Behavior
"... Please consult the published version for purposes of quotation. ..."
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Cited by 17 (3 self)
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Please consult the published version for purposes of quotation.
The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agency
- Disorders of Volition
, 2006
"... purposes of quotation. 1. Introduction1 One of the most exciting developments in the cognitive sciences in recent years has been a rediscovery of the phenomenology of agency (see e.g. Graham 2004; Horgan et al. 2003; Nahmias et al. 2004). That the phenomenology of agency has received renewed attenti ..."
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Cited by 16 (3 self)
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purposes of quotation. 1. Introduction1 One of the most exciting developments in the cognitive sciences in recent years has been a rediscovery of the phenomenology of agency (see e.g. Graham 2004; Horgan et al. 2003; Nahmias et al. 2004). That the phenomenology of agency has received renewed attention is due in no small part to claims that it is at odds with what the cognitive sciences are revealing about the structure of agency
Perception of forces exerted by objects in collision events.
- Psychological Review,
, 2009
"... Impressions of force are commonplace in the visual perception of objects interacting. It is proposed that these impressions have their source in haptically mediated experiences of exertion of force in actions on objects. Visual impressions of force in interactions between objects occur by a kind of ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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Impressions of force are commonplace in the visual perception of objects interacting. It is proposed that these impressions have their source in haptically mediated experiences of exertion of force in actions on objects. Visual impressions of force in interactions between objects occur by a kind of generalization of the proprioceptive impression of force to interactions between objects on the basis of matching to stored representations of actions on objects carried out by the perceiver. Such experiences give rise to a distinctive perceptual interpretation of interactions between objects as involving force exerted by one object acting against resistance offered by the other object. Active, moving objects are seen as exerting force; inactive objects are seen as offering varying degrees of resistance and not as exerting force unless there is reason to think that they acted back on the active object. The results of 3 experiments in which people viewed simple animations of objects colliding and made judgments of force and resistance supported several predictions made by this account.
The experience of mental causation
- Behaviour and Philosophy
"... ABSTRACT: Most of us have a very firm belief in mental causation; that is, we firmly believe that our own distinctly mental properties are causally efficacious in the production of our behavior. This belief is dominating in contemporary philosophy of mind as a part of the causal explanatory exclusio ..."
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ABSTRACT: Most of us have a very firm belief in mental causation; that is, we firmly believe that our own distinctly mental properties are causally efficacious in the production of our behavior. This belief is dominating in contemporary philosophy of mind as a part of the causal explanatory exclusion problem for non-reductive materialists. I do not discuss the exclusion problem; rather, I assess the conception of mental causation that is presupposed in the current debate. I propose that in order to make sense of our firm belief in mental causation we need to operate with a broader conception of it than is normally seen, focusing on common-sense aspects concerning the timing, awareness, control, and tracking of mental causation. However, prominent studies in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience show that mental causation is not as self-evident, robust, and pervasive as our firm belief in it would suggest. There is therefore a tension between the common-sense, broad conception of mental causation and our empirical evidence for mental causation. A full defense of mental causation is not just a matter of securing causal efficacy but also of situating our notion of mental properties in relation to difficult issues concerning awareness, control, and judgment.
Perspective Schizophrenia and the mirror system: an essay
- NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA
, 2005
"... We analyze how data on the mirror system for grasping in macaque and human ground the mirror system hypothesis for the evolution of the language-ready human brain, and then focus on this putative relation between hand movements and speech to contribute to the understanding of how it may be that a sc ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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We analyze how data on the mirror system for grasping in macaque and human ground the mirror system hypothesis for the evolution of the language-ready human brain, and then focus on this putative relation between hand movements and speech to contribute to the understanding of how it may be that a schizophrenic patient generates an action (whether manual or verbal) but does not attribute the generation of that action to himself. We make a crucial discussion between self-monitoring and attribution of agency. We suggest that vebal hallucinations occur when an utterance progresses through verbal creation pathways and returns as a vocalization observed, only to be dismissed as external since no record of its being created has been kept. Schizophrenic patients on this theory then confabulate the agent.
studies
, 2006
"... Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging ..."
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Any queries or remarks that have arisen during the processing of your manuscript are listed below and highlighted by flags in the proof. Please check your proof carefully and mark all corrections at the appropriate place in the proof (e.g., by using on-screen annotation in the PDF file) or compile them in a separate list. For correction or revision of any artwork, please consult
