Abstract not found

Abstract not found

Even in the absence of sensory inputs, cortical and thalamic neurons can show structured patterns of ongoing spontaneous activity, whose origins and functional significance are not well understood. We use computer simulations to explore the conditions under which spontaneous activity emerges from a simplified model of multiple interconnected thalamocortical columns linked by long-range, top-down excitatory axons, and to examine its interactions with stimulus-induced activation. Simulations help characterize two main states of activity. First, spontaneous gamma-band oscillations emerge at a precise threshold controlled by ascending neuromodulator systems. Second, within a spontaneously active network, we observe the sudden ‘‘ignition’ ’ of one out of many possible coherent states of high-level activity amidst cortical neurons with long-distance projections. During such an ignited state, spontaneous activity can block external sensory processing. We relate those properties to experimental observations on the neural bases of endogenous states of consciousness, and particularly the blocking of access to consciousness that occurs in the psychophysical phenomenon of ‘‘inattentional blindness,’ ’ in which normal subjects intensely engaged in mental activity fail to notice salient but irrelevant sensory stimuli. Although highly simplified, the generic properties of a minimal network may help clarify some of the basic cerebral phenomena underlying the autonomy of consciousness. Citation: Dehaene S, Changeux JP (2005) Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness. PLoS Biol 3(5): e141.

Rational models of cognition typically consider the abstract computational problems posed by the environment, assuming that people are capable of optimally solving those problems. This differs from more traditional formal models of cognition, which focus on the psychological processes responsible for behavior. A basic challenge for rational models is thus explaining how optimal solutions can be approximated by psychological processes. We outline a general strategy for answering this question, namely to explore the psychological plausibility of approximation algorithms developed in computer science and statistics. In particular, we argue that Monte Carlo methods provide a source of “rational process models” that connect optimal solutions to psychological processes. We support this argument through a detailed example, applying this approach to Anderson’s (1990, 1991) Rational Model of Categorization (RMC), which involves a particularly challenging computational problem. Drawing on a connection between the RMC and ideas from nonparametric Bayesian statistics, we propose two alternative algorithms for approximate inference in this model. The algorithms we consider include Gibbs sampling, a procedure

To successfully accomplish a behavioral goal such as reaching for an object, an animal must solve two related problems: to decide which object to reach and to plan the specific parameters of the movement. Traditionally, these two problems have been viewed as separate, and theories of decision making and motor planning have been developed primarily independently. However, neural data suggests that these processes involve the same brain regions and are performed in an integrated manner. Here, a computational model is described that addresses both the question of how different potential actions are specified and how the brain decides between them. In the model, multiple potential actions are simultaneously represented as continuous regions of activity within populations of cells in frontoparietal cortex. These representations engage in a competition for overt execution that is biased by modulatory influences from prefrontal cortex. The model neural populations exhibit activity patterns that correlate with both the spatial metrics of potential actions and their associated decision variables, in a manner similar to activities in parietal, prefrontal, and premotor cortex. The model therefore suggests an explanation for neural data that have been hard to account for in terms of serial theories that propose that decision making occurs before action planning. In addition to simulating the activity of individual neurons during decision tasks, the model also reproduces key aspects of the spatial and temporal statistics of human choices and makes a number of testable predictions.

... framework of cognitive psychology in favor of the framework of nonlinear dynamical systems theory. Van Orden et al. presented evidence that“purposive behavior originates in self-organized criticality ” (p. 333). Here, the authors show that Van Orden et al.’s analyses do not test their hypotheses. Further, the authors argue that a confirmation of Van Orden et al.’s hypotheses would not have constituted firm evidence in support of their framework. Finally, the absence of a specific model for how self-organized criticality produces the observed behavior makes it very difficult to derive testable predictions. The authors conclude that the proposed paradigm shift is presently unwarranted.

Humans can be instructed verbally to perform computationally complex cognitive tasks; their performance then improves relatively slowly over the course of practice. Many skills underlie these abilities; in this paper, we focus on the particular question of a uniform architecture for the instantiation of habitual performance and the storage, recall, and execution of simple rules. Our account builds on models of gated working memory, and involves a bilinear architecture for representing conditional input-output maps and for matching rules to the state of the input and working memory. We demonstrate the performance of our model on two paradigmatic tasks used to investigate prefrontal and basal ganglia function.

Extensive animal studies indicate that the neuromodulator norepinephrine plays an important role in specific aspects of vigilance, attention and learning, putatively serving as a neural interrupt or reset function. The activity of norepinephrine-releasing neurons in the locus coeruleus during attentional tasks is modulated not only by the animal’s level of engagement and the sensory inputs, but also by temporally rich aspects of internal decision-making processes. Here, we propose that it is unexpected changes in the world within the context of a task that activate the noradrenergic interrupt signal. We quantify this idea in a Bayesian model of a well-studied visual discrimination task, demonstrating that the model captures a rich repertoire of noradrenergic responses at the sub-second temporal resolution.

Perceptual decisions can be made when sensory input affords an inference about what generated that input. Here, we report findings from two independent perceptual experiments conducted during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a sparse event-related design. The first experiment, in the visual modality, involved forced-choice discrimination of coherence in random dot kinematograms that contained either subliminal or periliminal motion coherence. The second experiment, in the auditory domain, involved free response detection of (non-semantic) near-threshold acoustic stimuli. We analysed fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, as indexed by fMRI, and found that neuronal activity in sensory areas (extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct inference and not towards a specific percept. Hits (detection of near-threshold stimuli) were preceded by significantly higher activity than both misses of identical stimuli or false alarms, in which percepts arise in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In accord with predictive coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical activity in sensory brain areas

Recent single-cell studies in monkeys (Romo et al., 2004) show that the activity of neurons in the ventral premotor cortex covaries with the animal’s decisions in a perceptual comparison task regarding the frequency of vibrotactile events. The firing rate response of these neurons was dependent only on the frequency differences between the two applied vibrations, the sign of that difference being the determining factor for correct task performance. We present a biophysically realistic neurodynamical model that can account for the most relevant characteristics of this decision-making-related neural activity. One of the nontrivial predictions of this model is that Weber’s law will underlie the perceptual discrimination behavior. We confirmed this prediction in behavioral tests of vibrotactile discrimination in humans and propose a computational explanation of perceptual discrimination that accounts naturally for the emergence of Weber’s law. We conclude that the neurodynamical mechanisms and computational principles underlying the decision-making processes in this perceptual discrimination task are consistent with a fluctuation-driven scenario in a multistable regime. Key words: somatosensory; vibrotactile discrimination; decision making; Weber’s law; multistability; stochastic neurodynamics; probabilistic behavior