Results 1 - 10
of
625
Risk as Feelings
, 2001
"... Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive a ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 458 (19 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.
A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality
- American psychologist
, 2003
"... Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive th ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 393 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Early studies of intuitive judgment and decision making conducted with the late Amos Tversky are reviewed in the context of two related concepts: an analysis of accessibility, the ease with which thoughts come to mind; a distinction between effortless intuition and deliberate reasoning. Intuitive thoughts, like percepts, are highly accessible. Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes. Variations in the accessibility of rules explain the occasional corrections of intuitive judgments. The study of biases is compatible with a view of intuitive thinking and decision making as generally skilled and successful.
Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
, 2004
"... This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behavior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The reflective system generates behav ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 333 (5 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behavior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative links and motivational orientations. The proposed model describes how the 2 systems interact at various stages of processing, and how their outputs may determine behavior in a synergistic or antagonistic fashion. It extends previous models by integrating motivational components that allow more precise predictions of behavior. The implications of this reflective–impulsive model are applied to various phenomena from social psychology and beyond. Extending previous dual-process accounts, this model is not limited to specific domains of mental functioning and attempts to integrate cognitive, motivational, and behavioral mechanisms. In the history of attempts to discover the causes of human behavior, the most widespread explanations are based on the assumption that human beings do what they believe is good for them. Thus, they are construed as “rational animals ” capable of recognizing the value or utility of their actions. At the same time, however, it is obvious that human beings do not always act this way; that is, under certain circumstances people behave in ways that do not reflect their values. To account for this phenomenon, to which the Greek philosophers gave the name akrasia (e.g., Mele, 1992), several strategies have been pursued. The first strategy assumes ignorance or lack of knowledge on the part of the actor. Socrates, for example, claimed that if people only knew what is good for them, they would act accordingly. A similar position is held by modern economists who imply that irrational decisions This article received the 2003 Theoretical Innovation Price of the
A neuropsychological theory of multiple systems in category learning
- PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
, 1998
"... A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior ci ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 328 (30 self)
- Add to MetaCart
A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices are critical to the verbal system. In addition to making predictions for normal human adults, the theory makes specific predictions for children, elderly people, and patients suffering from Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, major depression, amnesia, or lesions of the prefrontal cortex. Two separate formal descriptions of the theory are also provided. One describes trial-by-trial learning, and the other describes global dynamics. The theory is tested on published neuropsychological data and on category learning data with normal adults.
Temporal construal
- Psychological Review
, 2003
"... Construal level theory proposes that temporal distance changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. The greater the temporal distance, the more likely are events to be represented in terms of a few abstract features that convey the perceived ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 298 (25 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Construal level theory proposes that temporal distance changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. The greater the temporal distance, the more likely are events to be represented in terms of a few abstract features that convey the perceived essence of the events (high-level construals) rather than in terms of more concrete and incidental details of the events (low-level construals). The informational and evaluative implications of high-level construals, compared with those of low-level construals, should therefore have more impact on responses to distant-future events than near-future events. This article explores the implications of construal level theory for temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice. The authors suggest that construal level underlies a broad range of evaluative and behavioral consequences of psychological distance from events.
Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
, 2000
"... On behalf of: ..."
(Show Context)
Risk as analysis and risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality
- Risk Analysis
, 2004
"... Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The “analytic system ” uses algorithms and normative rules, such as the probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortf ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 218 (12 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The “analytic system ” uses algorithms and normative rules, such as the probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The “experiential system ” is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it’s safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of
Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change
- Psychological Bulletin
, 2006
"... A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, “explicit ” attitudes and automatic, “implicit ” attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction bet ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 198 (6 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, “explicit ” attitudes and automatic, “implicit ” attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative–propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.
Rules and Exemplars in Category Learning
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
, 1998
"... haracterized by descriptions of each module and how each serves in those tasks for which it is best suited. However, these theories often do not emphasize how modules interact in producing responses and in learning. In this article we will develop a modular theory of categorization that follows fro ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 195 (11 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
haracterized by descriptions of each module and how each serves in those tasks for which it is best suited. However, these theories often do not emphasize how modules interact in producing responses and in learning. In this article we will develop a modular theory of categorization that follows from two distinct accounts of this behavior. The first account is that of rule-based theories of categorization. These theories emerge from a philosophical tradition in which concepts and categorization are described in terms of definitional rules. For example, if a living thing has a wide, flat tail and constructs dams by cutting down trees with its This work was supported by Indiana University Cognitive Science Program Fellowships and by NIMH ResearchTraining Grant PHS-T32-MH19879-03 to Erickson, and in part by NIMH FIRST Award 1-R29-MH51572-01 to Kruschke. This research was reported as a poster at the 1996 Cognitive Science Society Conference in San Diego, CA. We than
