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We present data and argument to show that in Tetris-a real-time, interactive video game-certain cognitive and perceptual problems ore more quicktv, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world than by performing com-putational actions in the head atone. We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic octions--actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal-from epistemic actions-actions performed to uncover informatioan that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris cognition and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game-even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. How-ever, we show that such actions are actually far from superfluous; they play a valuable role in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having o single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action-an epistemic func-tion-we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Al-though our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the new category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally. In this article, we introduce the general idea of an epistemic action and discuss its role in Tetris, a real-time, interactive video game. Epistemic actions-physical actions that make mental computation easier, faster, or more We thank Steve Haehnichen for his work on the initial implementations of Tetris and

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SUSTAIN (Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental Network) is a model of how humans learn categories from examples. SUS-TAIN initially assumes a simple category structure. If simple solutions prove inadequate and SUSTAIN is confronted with a surprising event (e.g., it is told that a bat is a mammal instead of a bird), SUSTAIN recruits an additional cluster to represent the surprising event. Newly recruited clusters are available to explain future events and can themselves evolve into

Neurophysiological evidence is described, showing that some neurons in the macaque temporal cortical visual areas have responses that are invariant with respect to the position, size and view of faces and objects, and that these neurons show rapid processing and rapid learning. A theory is then described of how such invariant representations may be produced in a hierarchically organized set of visual cortical areas with convergent connectivity. The theory proposes that neurons in these visual areas use a modified Hebb synaptic modification rule with a short-term memory trace to capture whatever can be captured at each stage that is invariant about objects as the object changes in retinal position, size, rotation and view. Simulations are then described which explore the operation of the architecture. The simulations show that such a processing system can build invariant representations of objects.

Is human object recognition viewpoint dependent or viewpointinvariant under #everyday " conditions? Biederman and Gerhardstein #1993# argue that viewpoint-invariant mechanisms are used almost exclusively.However, our analysis indicates that: 1# their conditions for immediate viewpointinvariance lack the generalitytocharacterize a wide range of recognition phenomena; 2# the extensive body of viewpoint-dependent results cannot be dismissed as processing #by-products" or #experimental artifacts"; 3# geon structural descriptions cannot coherently account for category recognition, the domain they are intended to explain. We conclude that the weight of current evidence supports an exemplar-based multiple-views mechanism as an important component of both exemplar-speci#c and categorical recognition. # Many of the ideas in this paper were developed during visits by MJT to the Max#Planck#Institut f#ur biologische Kybernetik in T#ubingen, Germany.We thank Dan Kersten for his insightful comments...

Two types of theories have been advanced to account for how attention is allocated in performing goal-directed visual tasks. According to location-based theories, visual attention is allocated to spatial locations in the image; according to object-based theories, attention is allocated to perceptual objects. Evidence for the latter view comes from experiments demonstrating the importance of perceptual grouping in selective-attention tasks. This article provides further evidence concerning the importance of perceptual organization in attending to objects. In seven experiments, observers tracked multiple randomly moving visual elements under a variety of conditions. Ten elements moved continuously about the display for several seconds; one to five of them were designated as targets before movement initiation. At the end of movement, one element was highlighted, and subjects indicated whether or not it was a target. The ease with which the elements in the target set could be perceptually grouped was systematically manipulated. In Experiments l-3, factors that influenced the initial formation of a perceptual group were manipulated; this affected performance, but only early in practice. In

Theories of visual object recognition must solve the problem of recognizing 3D objects given that perceivers only receive 2D patterns of light on their retinae. Recent findings from human psychophysics, neurophysiology and machine vision provide converging evidence for `image-based' models in which objects are represented as collections of viewpoint-specific local features. This approach is contrasted with `structural-description' models in which objects are represented as configurations of 3D volumes or parts. We then review recent behavioral results that address the biological plausibility of both approaches, as well as some of their computational advantages and limitations. We conclude that, although the image-based approach holds great promise, it has potential pitfalls that may be best overcome by including structural information. Thus, the most viable model of object recognition may be one that incorporates the most appealing aspects of both image-based and structural-description theories. 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved Keywords: Object recognition; Image-based model; Structural description 1.

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Much indirect evidence supports the hypothesis that transformations of mental images are