While the benefits of bank financing are relatively well understood, the costs are not. This paper argues that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.

We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely held corporations is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. * Harvard University. We are grateful to Alexander Aganin, Carlos Berdejo-Izquierdo, David Grossman, Bernardo Lopez-Morton, Tatiana Nenova, Ekaterina Trizlova and David Witkin for help with assembling the data, to Lucian Bebchuk, Marco Becht, Mihir Desai, Oliver Hart, Louis Kaplow, Ren Stulz, Robert Vishny, Luigi Zingales, and two anonymous referees for advice, and to the NSF for financial support. In their 1932 classic, "The Modern Corporation and Private Property," Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means called attention to the prevalence of widely held corporations in the United States, in which ownership of capital was dispersed between small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. For at least two generations, their book fixed the image of the modern corporation as one run by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders. The book stimulated an enormous "managerialist" literature on the objectives of such managers, including the important work of Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Penrose (1959), and Williamson (1964), as well as Galbr...

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We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division mangers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra com- pensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.

We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them. THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN THE THEORY of the firm, raised by Coase ~1937! more than 60 years ago, is how decisions taken inside a hierarchy differ from those taken in the marketplace. Coase suggested that decisions within a hierarchy are determined by power considerations rather than relative prices. If this is indeed the case, why, and when, does the hierarchy dominate

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This paper assesses different organizational forms in terms of their ability to generate information about investment projects and allocate capital to these projects efficiently. A decentralized approach–with small, single-manager firms–is most likely to be attractive when information about individual projects is “soft ” and cannot be credibly transmitted. Moreover, holding fixed firm size, soft information also favors flatter organizations with fewer layers of management. In contrast, large hierarchical firms with multiple layers of management are at a comparative advantage when information can be costlessly “hardened ” and passed along within the hierarchy. As a concrete application of the theory, the paper discusses the consequences of consolidation in the banking industry. It has been documented that when large banks acquire small banks, there is a pronounced decline in lending to small businesses. To the extent that smallbusiness lending relies heavily on soft information, this is exactly what the theory would lead one to expect.

Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations may do better than large organizations in activities that require the processing of soft information. We explore this idea in the context of bank lending to small firms, an activity that is typically thought of as relying heavily on soft information. We find that large banks are less willing than small banks to lend to informationally “difficult ” credits, such as firms that do not keep formal financial records. Moreover, controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively. All of this is consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks.

Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the "dynamic vitality" of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s failed to see the dangers of socialism in part because they focused on the role of prices under socialism and capitalism, and ignored the enormous importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate. Moreover, many of the concerns that private firms fail to address "social goals" can be addressed through government contracting and regulation, without resort to government ownership. The case for private provision only becomes stronger when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, the possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and corruption, are brought into play.

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