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1,730
Promoting the Use of End-to-End Congestion Control in the Internet
- IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING
, 1999
"... This paper considers the potentially negative impacts of an increasing deployment of non-congestion-controlled best-effort traffic on the Internet.’ These negative impacts range from extreme unfairness against competing TCP traffic to the potential for congestion collapse. To promote the inclusion ..."
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Cited by 876 (14 self)
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This paper considers the potentially negative impacts of an increasing deployment of non-congestion-controlled best-effort traffic on the Internet.’ These negative impacts range from extreme unfairness against competing TCP traffic to the potential for congestion collapse. To promote the inclusion of end-to-end congestion control in the design of future protocols using best-effort traffic, we argue that router mechanisms are needed to identify and restrict the bandwidth of selected high-bandwidth best-effort flows in times of congestion. The paper discusses several general approaches for identifying those flows suitable for bandwidth regulation. These approaches are to identify a high-bandwidth flow in times of congestion as unresponsive, “not TCP-friendly,” or simply using disproportionate bandwidth. A flow that is not “TCP-friendly ” is one whose long-term arrival rate exceeds that of any conformant TCP in the same circumstances. An unresponsive flow is one failing to reduce its offered load at a router in response to an increased packet drop rate, and a disproportionate-bandwidth flow is one that uses considerably more bandwidth than other flows in a time of congestion.
Practical network support for IP traceback
, 2000
"... This paper describes a technique for tracing anonymous packet flooding attacks in the Internet back towards their source. This work is motivated by the increased frequency and sophistication of denial-of-service attacks and by the difficulty in tracing packets with incorrect, or “spoofed”, source ad ..."
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Cited by 666 (14 self)
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This paper describes a technique for tracing anonymous packet flooding attacks in the Internet back towards their source. This work is motivated by the increased frequency and sophistication of denial-of-service attacks and by the difficulty in tracing packets with incorrect, or “spoofed”, source addresses. In this paper we describe a general purpose traceback mechanism based on probabilistic packet marking in the network. Our approach allows a victim to identify the network path(s) traversed by attack traffic without requiring interactive operational support from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Moreover, this traceback can be performed “post-mortem ” – after an attack has completed. We present an implementation of this technology that is incrementally deployable, (mostly) backwards compatible and can be efficiently implemented using conventional technology. 1.
Keying hash functions for message authentication
, 1996
"... The use of cryptographic hash functions like MD5 or SHA for message authentication has become a standard approach inmanyInternet applications and protocols. Though very easy to implement, these mechanisms are usually based on ad hoc techniques that lack a sound security analysis. We present new cons ..."
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Cited by 617 (42 self)
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The use of cryptographic hash functions like MD5 or SHA for message authentication has become a standard approach inmanyInternet applications and protocols. Though very easy to implement, these mechanisms are usually based on ad hoc techniques that lack a sound security analysis. We present new constructions of message authentication schemes based on a cryptographic hash function. Our schemes, NMAC and HMAC, are proven to be secure as long as the underlying hash function has some reasonable cryptographic strengths. Moreover we show, in a quantitativeway, that the schemes retain almost all the security of the underlying hash function. In addition our schemes are e cient and practical. Their performance is essentially that of the underlying hash function. Moreover they use the hash function (or its compression function) as a black box, so that widely available library code or hardware can be used to implement them in a simple way, and replaceability of the underlying hash function is easily supported.
Stream Control Transmission Protocol
, 2007
"... This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Interne ..."
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Cited by 570 (22 self)
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This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ‘‘work in progress.’’ The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11
, 2001
"... The 802.11 standard for wireless networks includes a Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol, used to protect link-layer communications from eavesdropping and other attacks. We have discovered several serious security flaws in the protocol, stemming from misapplication of cryptographic primitives. T ..."
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Cited by 438 (2 self)
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The 802.11 standard for wireless networks includes a Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol, used to protect link-layer communications from eavesdropping and other attacks. We have discovered several serious security flaws in the protocol, stemming from misapplication of cryptographic primitives. The flaws lead to a number of practical attacks that demonstrate that WEP fails to achieve its security goals. In this paper, we discuss in detail each of the flaws, the underlying security principle violations, and the ensuing attacks. 1.
Insertion, evasion, and denial of service: Eluding network intrusion detection
, 1998
"... \Not everything that is counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted." ..."
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Cited by 344 (0 self)
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\Not everything that is counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted."
Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels
, 2001
"... Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with ..."
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Cited by 328 (21 self)
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Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links. We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques. 1
An End-to-End Approach to Host Mobility
- 6TH ACM/IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MOBILE COMPUTING AND NETWORKING (MOBICOM '00)
, 2000
"... We present the design and implementation of an end-to-end architecture for Internet host mobility using dynamic updates to the Domain Name System (DNS) to track host location. Existing TCP connections are retained using secure and efficient connection migration, enabling established connections to s ..."
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Cited by 318 (9 self)
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We present the design and implementation of an end-to-end architecture for Internet host mobility using dynamic updates to the Domain Name System (DNS) to track host location. Existing TCP connections are retained using secure and efficient connection migration, enabling established connections to seamlessly negotiate a change in endpoint IP addresses without the need for a third party. Our architecture is secure---name updates are effected via the secure DNS update protocol, while TCP connection migration uses a novel set of Migrate options---and provides a pure end-system alternative to routing-based approaches such as Mobile IP. Mobile IP was
SOS: Secure overlay services
- In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
, 2002
"... angelos,misra,danr¥ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This lea ..."
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Cited by 253 (16 self)
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angelos,misra,danr¥ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more sophisticated methods to mask their traffic. We propose an architecture called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) that proactively prevents DoS attacks, geared toward supporting Emergency Services or similar types of communication. The architecture is constructed using a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. We reduce the probability of successful attacks by (i) performing intensive filtering near protected network edges, pushing the attack point perimeter into the core of the network, where high-speed routers can handle the volume of attack traffic, and (ii) introducing randomness and anonymity into the architecture, making it difficult for an attacker to target nodes along the path to a specific SOS-protected destination. Using simple analytical models, we evaluate the likelihood that an attacker can successfully launch a DoS attack against an SOSprotected network. Our analysis demonstrates that such an architecture reduces the likelihood of a successful attack to minuscule levels.
