This paper is about the information-theoretic foundations upon which useful explanatory and predictive models of dynamic geographic phenomena can be based. It traces the development over the last decade or so of these foundations, from sequences of temporal snapshots, through object life histories, to event chronicles. A crucial ontological distinction is drawn between “things ” and “happenings”, that is between continuant and occurrent entities. Most of the work up to now has focused on representing the evolution through time of geographic things, whether objects or fields. This paper argues that happenings should be upgraded to an equal status with things in dynamic geographic representations, and suggests ways of doing this. The main research focus of the paper is the application of an algebraic approach, previously developed mainly in the context of computational processes, to real-world happenings. It develops a pure process theory of space and time, and demonstrates its applicability by providing an example of the representation of motion of a vehicle through a region. The paper concludes by noting some of the requirements for scaling this approach to real-world dynamic scenarios, such as might be found, for example, in the automation of coordination of disaster relief.

The paper presents an approach to constructing an ontology of physical objects founded on a theory of the spatio-temporal distribution of matter types. The starting point for this construction is the formal theory O of `space, time, matter and things' given in (Bennett 2001c), in which physical objects are modelled as maximal self-connected portions of some matter type. However, that theory is not compatible with the commonsense view of `physical objects' according to which it is normal to regard an object as persisting (i.e. retaining its identity) despite the loss (or possibly gain) of small parts, which are deemed `insigni cant'. The current paper gives a more elaborate theory of the nature of physical objects and speci es their identity criteria in a way that allows for possible loss of small particles. This is achieved by explicitly taking account of an intrinsic vagueness in the identity criteria for commonsense physical objects. The paper also uses this theory to characterise various degrees of physical damage which an object can undergo.

Foundational ontologies are axiomatic theories about highlevel domain-independent categories of the real world. They constitute toolboxes of eminently reusable information modelling primitives for building application ontologies about specific domains. The design of foundational ontologies confronts the conceptual modeller with completely new challenges in respect of their content as well as their formalisation.

Formal ontology, as the science of the formal relations that structure reality as a whole, aims at a theory of categories corresponding to the most general features of possible objects, whether existing or non-existing. The present paper is an attempt to summarise and extend recent research in analytical metaphysics in a formalised theory of objects. Existence is characterised as a formal property, suggesting that the use of quantifiers alone does not involve any existential assumptions about the objects quantified over. However, the only non-existing objects allowed for in the present account are real or objective possibilities. De re modalities as well as ontological dependence are defined on the basis of a counterpart-theoretic specification of possibilia. The present framework allows for necessary and non-relative identity as well as for a granular parthood relationship satisfying the thesis of composition as partial identity. The paper culminates in the formalisation of an Aristotelian four-category ontology allowing for universals and particulars, substances and particularised properties; in this context, the redundance of higher-order material universals as well as moderate haecceitism is argued for. After a short analysis of relationality and extrinsicness, a theory of spatial and temporal objects is sketched and a temporal counterpart theory is proposed as a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. The paper concludes with some general remarks on the relation between ontology and the theory of subjectivity, defending a modal approach to consciousness and a counterpart theoretic analysis of intentionality.

Material constitution and coincidence are widely discussed but poorly understood. This paper is an attempt to make progress by developing an account of how numerically distinct material objects coincide when one constitutes the other. I address two central issues: first, do material coincidents share their proper spatiotemporal parts, and if so, do they share all of them? Second, how can material coincidents share their spatiotemporal location and matter, so share material properties such as having mass m, shape s, and location l, but not share all of their properties? To answer these questions, I develop a property mereology for objects and argue that coincidents overlap with respect to all of their spatiotemporal parts but not all of their property parts. If we can adequately explicate coincidence, we can begin to answer questions about material constitution and related questions about de re modality, persistence, supervenience, redundant causation, event individuation, personal identity, nonreductive materialism in mind, and reference.

(1) Everything is identical to itself and to nothing else.

Abstract not found

Identity criteria: x = y if and ony if.... — Material objects x and y are identical if and only if... — Events x and y are identical if and only if... — Properties x and y are identical if and only if... Metaphysical criteria vs formal-ontological principles