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An efficient and anonymous buyer–seller watermarking protocol
 IEEE Trans.Image Process
"... Abstract—For the purpose of deterring unauthorized duplication and distribution of multimedia contents, a seller may insert a unique digital watermark into each copy of the multimedia contents to be sold. When an illegal replica is found in the market sometime later, the seller can determine the r ..."
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Abstract—For the purpose of deterring unauthorized duplication and distribution of multimedia contents, a seller may insert a unique digital watermark into each copy of the multimedia contents to be sold. When an illegal replica is found in the market sometime later, the seller can determine the responsible distributor by examining the watermark embedded. However, the accusation against the charged distributor, who was the buyer in some earlier transaction, is objectionable because the seller also has access to the watermarked copies and, hence, is able to release such a replica on her own. In this paper, a watermarking protocol is proposed to avoid such difficulties, known as the customer’s right problem, in the phase of arbitration. The proposed watermarking protocol also provides a fix to Memon and Wong’s scheme by solving the unbinding problem. In addition, the buyer is no longer required to contact the watermark certification authority during transactions, and the anonymity of the buyer can be retained through a trusted third party. The result is an efficient and anonymous buyerseller watermarking protocol. Index Terms—Copyright protection, digital watermark, privacy, security.
Security Analysis of PublicKey Watermarking Schemes
 In Proceedings of the SPIE, Mathematics of Data/Image Coding, Compression, and Encryption IV
, 2001
"... Traditional watermarking systems require the complete disclosure of the watermarking key in the watermark verification process. In most systems an attacker is able to remove the watermark completely once the key is known, thus subverting the intention of copyright protection. To cope with this probl ..."
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Traditional watermarking systems require the complete disclosure of the watermarking key in the watermark verification process. In most systems an attacker is able to remove the watermark completely once the key is known, thus subverting the intention of copyright protection. To cope with this problem, publickey watermarking schemes were proposed that allow asymmetric watermark detection: while a private key is used to insert watermarks in digital objects, a separate, public key is used to verify the marks' presence. We descibe two publickey watermarking schemes which are similar in spirit to zeroknowledge proofs. The key idea of one system is to verify a watermark in a blinded version of the document, where the scrambling is determined by the private key. A probabilistic protocol is constructed that allows public watermark detection with probability of 1/2; by iteration, the verifier can get any degree of certainty that the watermark is present. The second system is based on watermark attacks, using controlled counterfeiting to conceal real watermark data safely amid data useless to an attacker.
Which Directions for Asymmetric Watermarking?
 Proceedings of the XI European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO 2002
, 2002
"... A perfect asymmetric watermark is what a lot of researchers are looking for. So far, no asymmetric scheme is perfect. We review some the schemes proposed so far. We put an emphasis on classical cryptography to see how it has been and can be used, imitated in the watermarking world. ..."
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A perfect asymmetric watermark is what a lot of researchers are looking for. So far, no asymmetric scheme is perfect. We review some the schemes proposed so far. We put an emphasis on classical cryptography to see how it has been and can be used, imitated in the watermarking world.
Proving Copyright Ownership using Hard Instances Of Computationally Intractable Problems
, 2001
"... In this work wepresent a method for proving copyrightownership based on Zero Knowledge Interactive Proof (ZKIP) protocols for computationally intractable problems. We use the 3coloring problem,which consists in assigning one of three available colors to the vertices of a graph so that no two adjace ..."
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Cited by 4 (2 self)
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In this work wepresent a method for proving copyrightownership based on Zero Knowledge Interactive Proof (ZKIP) protocols for computationally intractable problems. We use the 3coloring problem,which consists in assigning one of three available colors to the vertices of a graph so that no two adjacent vertices have the same color. Using the presumed computational intractability of this problem, we propose the construction of large signatures that represent adjacency matrices of random, 3colorable graphs. Since it is easy to construct large graphs with a prescribed 3coloring of their vertices whereas it is difficult to discover such a 3coloring, the owner of a copyrighted digital piece of work (e.g. image, audio, video) may easily generate a random 3colorable graph, embed it in the digital object and then use the knowledge of the 3coloring in debates over the object's ownership. Due to the intractability of the 3coloring problem, only the owner is able to produce it sufficiently fast in an ownership challenge so as to convince a third party that the graph was indeed embedded in the object by herself/himself. Since we need graphs with maximum possible resistance to wellknown coloring algorithms, we exploit some relatively recent experimental and theoretical findings suggesting that hard 3coloring instances are found among graphs having a vertices to edges ratio around a specific threshold value. The proposed scheme has the additional advantage that disclosing the signature is of no consequences since it is essentially the knowledge of a characteristic of the signature, i.e. the 3coloring of the graph it represents, that enables one to use it as proof of ownership of some digital object that contains it. Even if someone managed to locate and extract the signatu...
ZeroKnowledge Watermark Detection Resistant to Ambiguity Attacks
, 2006
"... A zeroknowledge watermark detector allows an owner to prove to a verifier that an image in question indeed contains the owner’s watermark without revealing much information about the actual watermark. In such a scenario, the owner publishes a committed watermark before watermark detection so as to ..."
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A zeroknowledge watermark detector allows an owner to prove to a verifier that an image in question indeed contains the owner’s watermark without revealing much information about the actual watermark. In such a scenario, the owner publishes a committed watermark before watermark detection so as to show that she knows the watermark before the detection. However, this does not imply that the owner can prove that she knows the watermark before the work appeared in the public. One well known counter example is the invertibility/ambiguity attacks where an adversary can create an ambiguous situation by deriving a forged watermark from a published work, and commits the forged watermark. Furthermore, the adversary may derive a watermark from existing nonwatermarked images in the public domain and later claim ownership of them. One solution is to enforce certain constraints on the valid watermarks. In this paper we propose a zeroknowledge watermark detector that prevents the owner from cheating by ambiguity attacks. In addition, it allows the owner to publish a large number of works with different watermarks, while committing only one secret.
Zeroknowledge watermark detector robust to sensitivity attacks
 in 8th ACM Multimedia and Security Workshop
"... Current zeroknowledge watermark detectors are based on a linear correlation between the asset features and a given secret sequence. This detection function is susceptible of being attacked by sensitivity attacks, for which zeroknowledge does not provide protection. In this paper a new zeroknowled ..."
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Current zeroknowledge watermark detectors are based on a linear correlation between the asset features and a given secret sequence. This detection function is susceptible of being attacked by sensitivity attacks, for which zeroknowledge does not provide protection. In this paper a new zeroknowledge watermark detector robust to sensitivity attacks is presented, using the Generalized Gaussian Maximum Likelihood (ML) detector as basis. The inherent robustness that this detector presents against sensitivity attacks, together with the security provided by the zeroknowledge protocol that conceals the keys that could be used to remove the watermark or to produce forged assets, results in a robust and secure protocol. Additionally, two new zeroknowledge proofs for modulus and square root calculation are presented; they serve as building blocks for the zeroknowledge implementation of the Generalized Gaussian ML detector, and also open new possibilities in the design of high level protocols.
On the possibility of noninvertible watermarking schemes
 In International Workshop on Digital Watermarking, volume 3200 of LNCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. Recently, there are active discussions on the possibility of noninvertible watermarking scheme. A noninvertible scheme prevents an attacker from deriving a valid watermark from a cover work. Recent results suggest that it is difficult to design a provably secure noninvertible scheme. In ..."
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Abstract. Recently, there are active discussions on the possibility of noninvertible watermarking scheme. A noninvertible scheme prevents an attacker from deriving a valid watermark from a cover work. Recent results suggest that it is difficult to design a provably secure noninvertible scheme. In contrast, in this paper, we show that it is possible. We give a scheme based on a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) and show that it is secure with respect to wellaccepted notion of security. We employ the spread spectrum method as the underlying watermarking scheme to embed the watermark. The parameters chosen for the underlying scheme give reasonable robustness, false alarm and distortion. We prove the security by showing that, if there is a successful attacker, then there exists a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm that can distinguish the uniform distribution from sequences generated by the CSPRNG, and thus contradicts the assumption that the CSPRNG is secure. Furthermore, in our scheme the watermark is statistically independent from the original work, which shows that it is not necessary to enforce a relationship between them to achieve noninvertibility. 1
On the Integration of Watermarks and Cryptography
 Proceedings of IWDW ’03, LNCS 2939
, 2004
"... Applications that involve watermarking schemes are typically composed of both watermarks and cryptographic primitives. The entire application is required to meet speci c applicationdependant security properties, which critically depend on both the properties of the watermarking scheme and the ..."
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Applications that involve watermarking schemes are typically composed of both watermarks and cryptographic primitives. The entire application is required to meet speci c applicationdependant security properties, which critically depend on both the properties of the watermarking scheme and the security of cryptographic primitives. Although the design of secure cryptographic protocols is more or less wellunderstood, the combination of watermarks and cryptographic primitives poses new problems. This paper reviews some of the fallacies and pitfalls that occur during the design of secure watermarking applications, and provides some practical guidelines for secure watermarking protocols.
Better privacy and security in ecommerce: Using elliptic curvebased zeroknowledge proofs
 In CEC ’04: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on ECommerce Technology (CEC’04
, 2004
"... We propose an approach using elliptic curvebased zeroknowledge proofs in ecommerce applications. We demonstrate that using elliptic curvedbased zeroknowledge proofs provide privacy and more security than other existing techniques. The improvement of security is due to the complexity of solving t ..."
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We propose an approach using elliptic curvebased zeroknowledge proofs in ecommerce applications. We demonstrate that using elliptic curvedbased zeroknowledge proofs provide privacy and more security than other existing techniques. The improvement of security is due to the complexity of solving the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. Index terms – Ecommerce, security, privacy, zeroknowledge proofs, elliptic curves.
Robust noninteractive zeroknowledge watermarking scheme against cheating prover
 In ACM Multimedia and Security Workshop
, 2005
"... Most watermarking methods presented so far belong to the category of symmetric watermarking in that the secret key is undesirably revealed during the watermark detection process. In view of this security leakage, zeroknowledge watermark detection (ZKWD) has been introduced without obviously reveali ..."
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Most watermarking methods presented so far belong to the category of symmetric watermarking in that the secret key is undesirably revealed during the watermark detection process. In view of this security leakage, zeroknowledge watermark detection (ZKWD) has been introduced without obviously revealing the secret information. However, the existing ZKWD protocols still suffer from some challenging problems, which will be addressed in this paper. First, a zeroknowledge watermark detection protocol is presented based on our robust image watermark scheme so that robustness against removal and geometric attacks can still be retained. The aim is to extend the capability of our own system to satisfy more watermarking requirements as possible. Second, the watermarks revealed for zeroknowledge detection are still secured by a secret keybased shuffling function so that the verifier cannot have the knowledge about the hidden watermarks. Third, we show how our protocol can be operated in a noninteractive way. Finally, in order to prevent from cheating prover, the Hamiltonian cycle is introduced in a media data before its publication. Thus, the overall characteristics distinguish our protocol from the existing protocols significantly.