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Metacognitive model of mindfulness
- Consciousness and cognition
, 2014
"... a b s t r a c t Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) ..."
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a b s t r a c t Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) mindfulness is related to the highest level of metacognition; (2) mindfulness depends on dynamic cooperation of three main components of the metacognition (metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences and metacognitive skills); (3) a mindful meta-level is always conscious while the other meta-cognitive processes can occur implicitly; (4) intentionally practiced mindfulness decreases dissociations between awareness and meta-awareness; (5) components of mindful meta-level develop and change during continuous practice. The current model is discussed in the light of empirical data and other theoretical approaches to mindfulness concept. We believe that presented model provides some helpful avenues for future research and theoretical investigations into mindfulness and the mechanisms of its actions.
Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency
"... Note: this is the penultimate draft, not the final version. According to the Kantian theory of action, desires do not determine the actions of selfconscious agents. Self-conscious agents have the capacity to check the motivational impulses associated with their desires, and to decide, freely and rat ..."
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Note: this is the penultimate draft, not the final version. According to the Kantian theory of action, desires do not determine the actions of selfconscious agents. Self-conscious agents have the capacity to check the motivational impulses associated with their desires, and to decide, freely and rationally, which desires to act upon. Thus, Kant tells us that the will “can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses... Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses ” (Metaphysics of Morals 6:213-214). 1 According to a standard reading of the Nietzschean theory of action, the opposite is the case. Our actions are the products of a chaotic mix of largely non-conscious desires and drives. 2 Our conscious thoughts are causally impotent, buffeted about by forces that we neither discern nor understand. Appearances of self-conscious decision are illusory. 3 Thus, Nietzsche claims that when
