Abstract not found

When robots work together as a team, the members that perform each task should be the ones that promise to use the least resources to do the job.

Effective coordination of robots, agents and people promises to improve the safety, robustness and quality with which shared goals are achieved by harnessing the highly heterogeneous entities' diverse capabilities. Proxy-based integration architectures are emerging as a standard method for coordinating teams of heterogeneous entities. Such architectures are designed to meet imposing challenges such as ensuring that the diverse capabilities of the group members are effectively utilized, avoiding miscoordination in a noisy, uncertain environment and reacting flexibly to changes in the environment. However, we contend that previous architectures have gone too far in taking coordination responsibility away from entities and giving it to proxies. Our goal is to create a proxy-based integration infrastructure where there is a beneficial symbiotic relationship between the proxies and the team members. By leveraging the coordination abilities of both proxies and socially capable team members the quality of the coordination can be improved. We present two key new ideas to achieve this goal. First, coordination tasks are represented as explicit roles, hence the responsibilities not the actions are specified, thus allowing the team to leverage the coordination skills of the most capable team members. Second, building on the first idea, we have developed a novel role allocation and reallocation algorithm. These ideas have been realized in a prototype software proxy architecture and used to create heterogeneous teams for an urban disaster recovery domain. Using the rescue domain as a testbed, we have experimented with the role allocation algorithm and observed results to support the hypothesis that leveraging the coordination capabilities of people can help the performance of the te...

Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple levels, with important interdependencies among inputs and outputs at each level. Combinatorial auctions address this problem by global optimization over expressed offers to engage in compound exchanges. A one-shot combinatorial auction that optimizes the reported value of the bids results in optimal allocations with truthful bids. But autonomous self-interested agents have an incentive to bid strategically in an attempt to gain extra surplus. We investigate a particular combinatorial protocol consisting of a one-shot auction and a strategic bidding policy. We experimentally analyze the efficiency and producer surplus obtained in five networks, and compare this performance to that of a distributed, progressive auction protocol with non-strategic bidding. We find that producers can sometimes gain significantly by bi...

Despite the success of the BDI approach to agent teamwork, initial role allocation (i.e. deciding which agents to allocate to key roles in the team) and role reallocation upon failure remain open challenges. What remain missing are analysis techniques to aid human developers in quantitatively comparing different initial role allocations and competing role reallocation algorithms. To remedy this problem, this paper makes three key contributions. First, the paper introduces RMTDP (Role-based Markov Team Decision Problem), an extension to MTDP [9], for quantitative evaluations of role allocation and reallocation approaches. Second, the paper illustrates an RMTDP-based methodology for not only comparing two competing algorithms for role reallocation, but also for identifying the types of domains where each algorithm is suboptimal, how much each algorithm can be improved and at what computational cost (complexity). Such algorithmic improvements are identified via a new automated procedure that generates a family of locally optimal policies for comparative evaluations. Third, since there are combinatorially many initial role allocations, evaluating each in RMTDP to identify the best is extremely difficult. Therefore, we introduce methods to exploit task decompositions among subteams to significantly prune the search space of initial role allocations. We present experimental results from two distinct domains.

We are interested in supporting multi-agent contracting, in which customer agents solicit the resources and capabilities of other, self-interested agents in order to accomplish their goals. Goals may

Extreme teams, large-scale agent teams operating in dynamic environments, are on the horizon. Such environments are problematic for current task allocation algorithms due to the lack of locality in agent interactions. We propose a novel distributed task allocation algorithm for extreme teams, called LA-DCOP, that incorporates three key ideas. First, LA-DCOP's task allocation is based on a dynamically computed minimum capability threshold which uses approximate knowledge of overall task load. Second, LA-DCOP uses tokens to represent tasks and further minimize communication. Third, it creates potential tokens to deal with inter-task constraints of simultaneous execution. We show that LA-DCOP convincingly outperforms competing distributed task allocation algorithms while using orders of magnitude fewer messages, allowing a dramatic scale-up in extreme teams, upto a fully distributed, proxybased team of 200 agents. Varying threshold are seen as a key to outperforming competing distributed algorithms in the domain of simulated disaster rescue.

Efficient coordination among large numbers of heterogeneous agents promises to revolutionize the way in which some complex tasks, such as responding to urban disasters can be performed. However, state of the art coordination algorithms are not capable of achieving efficient and effective coordination when a team is very large. Building on recent successful token-based algorithms for task allocation and information sharing, we have developed an integrated and efficient approach to effective coordination of large scale teams. We use tokens to encapsulate anything that needs to be shared by the team, including information, tasks and resources. The tokens are efficiently routed through the team via the use of local decision theoretic models. Each token is used to improve the routing of other tokens leading to a dramatic performance improvement when the algorithms work together. We present results from an implementation of this approach which demonstrates its ability to coordinate large teams. 1.

Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. To decentralize the formation process, we introduce a market price system over the resources produced along the chain. In a competitive equilibrium for this system, agents choose locally optimal allocations with respect to prices, and outcomes are optimal overall. To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, non-strategic agent bidding policies. In the presence of resource contention, this protocol produces better solutions than the greedy protocols common in the artificial intelligence and multiagent systems literature. The protocol often converges to high-value supply chains, and when competitive equilibria exist, typically to approximate competitive equilibria. However, complementarities in agent production technologies can cause the protocol to wastefully allocate inputs to agents that do not produce their outputs. A subsequent decommitment phase recovers a significant fraction of the lost surplus.

Mechanism design (MD) provides a useful method to implement outcomes with desirable properties in systems with self-interested computational agents. One drawback, however, is that computation is implicitly centralized in MD theory, with a central planner taking all decisions. We consider distributed implementations, in which the outcome is determined by the self-interested agents themselves. Clearly this introduces new opportunities for manipulation. We propose a number of principles to guide the distribution of computation, focusing in particular on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms for implementing outcomes that maximize total value across agents. Our solutions bring the complete implementation into an ex post Nash equilibrium.