Results 1 
3 of
3
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
, 2000
"... We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain "cheap pseudonyms", something which is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational con ..."
Abstract

Cited by 270 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain "cheap pseudonyms", something which is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which newcomers "pay their dues" by accepting poor treatment from players who have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the duespaying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes. Although one could remove the ineffici...
Paths and Consistency in Additive Cost Sharing
, 1999
"... Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (AumannShapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple sufficient condition for consist ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (AumannShapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple sufficient condition for consistency: being generated by associative paths, which can be used to show consistency for many other methods. We introduce a new axiom, dummy consistency, which is quite mild. Nonetheless there is an important relationship between dummy consistency and consistency. For example, we show that all additive cost sharing methods which are dummy consistent and demand monotonic are consistent. Using dummy consistency, we also show that the AumannShapley and Serial Cost methods are the unique (additive) consistent extension of their restriction on all two agent problems, while the ShapleyShubik method has multiple consistent extensions but a unique symmetric one. In fact, these results are unchanged w...
Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing
 Mathematical Social Sciences (forthcoming
, 2000
"... We show that serial cost sharing for heterogeneous goods [4], and a large number of other cost sharing mechanisms, have the same strong strategic properties as serial cost sharing for homogenous goods [10], including uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for all utility proles and cost functions, do ..."
Abstract

Cited by 8 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
We show that serial cost sharing for heterogeneous goods [4], and a large number of other cost sharing mechanisms, have the same strong strategic properties as serial cost sharing for homogenous goods [10], including uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for all utility proles and cost functions, dominance solvability, solvability in overwhelmed actions, and robustness to coalitional deviations. We describe several applications to cost/surplus sharing and the Internet. 1 Introduction In [10, 13], Moulin and Shenker introduced a cost sharing mechanisms with extremely strong strategic properties. Dubbed serial cost sharing (or fair share in the network context) this mechanism leads to games in which the Nash equilibrium is unique, robust to coalitional deviations and the only rationalizable strategy prole. In addition, this Nash equilibrium is the unique outcome of adaptive learning [7] and reasonable learning in asynchronous low information environments [5]. I would like to th...