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Detecting and Eliminating the Cascade Vulnerability Problem from Multi-level Security Networks using Soft Constraints
- Proc. IAAI-04, AAAI
, 2004
"... The security of a network configuration is based, not just on the security of its individual components and their direct interconnections, but it is also based on the potential for systems to interoperate indirectly across network routes. Such interoperation has been shown to provide the potential f ..."
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Cited by 5 (4 self)
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The security of a network configuration is based, not just on the security of its individual components and their direct interconnections, but it is also based on the potential for systems to interoperate indirectly across network routes. Such interoperation has been shown to provide the potential for cascading paths that violate security, in a circuitous manner, across a network. In this paper we show how constraint programming provides a natural approach to expressing the necessary constraints to ensure multilevel security across a network configuration. In particular, soft constraints are used to detect and eliminate the cascading network paths that violate security. Taking this approach results in practical advancements over existing solutions to this problem. In particular, constraint satisfaction highlights the set of all cascading paths, upon which we can compute in polynomial time an optimal reconfiguration of the network and ensure security.
Reasoning about secure interoperation using soft constraints
- In Proceedings of FAST-2004 Workshop on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
, 2004
"... Abstract The security of a network configuration is based not just on the security of its individual components and their direct interconnections, but also on the potential for systems to interoperate indirectly across network routes. Such interoperation has been shown to provide the potential for c ..."
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Cited by 3 (3 self)
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Abstract The security of a network configuration is based not just on the security of its individual components and their direct interconnections, but also on the potential for systems to interoperate indirectly across network routes. Such interoperation has been shown to provide the potential for circuitous paths across a network that violate security. In this paper we propose a constraint-based framework for representing access control configurations of systems. The secure reconfiguration of a system is depicted as a constraint satisfaction problem.
A soft constraint-based approach to the cascade vulnerability problem
, 2005
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Modelling and detecting the cascade vulnerability problem using soft constraints
- in: Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC-2004), ACM
, 2004
"... Establishing network security is based not just on the security of its component systems but also on how they are configured to interoperate. In this paper we consider how soft constraints provide an approach to detecting the cascade vulnerability problem: whether system interoperation provides circ ..."
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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Establishing network security is based not just on the security of its component systems but also on how they are configured to interoperate. In this paper we consider how soft constraints provide an approach to detecting the cascade vulnerability problem: whether system interoperation provides circuitous or cascading routes across the network that increase the risk of violation of multilevel security. Taking the constraints approach means that we are building on techniques that have proven success in solving large-scale problems from other domains.
Soft constraints for security
- In First International Workshop on Views On Designing Complex Architectures (VODCA
, 2004
"... Integrity policies and cryptographic protocols have much in common. They allow for a number of participating principals, and consist of sets of rules controlling the actions that principals should or should not perform. They are intended to uphold various security properties, the crucial ones being ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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Integrity policies and cryptographic protocols have much in common. They allow for a number of participating principals, and consist of sets of rules controlling the actions that principals should or should not perform. They are intended to uphold various security properties, the crucial ones being integrity, confidentiality and authentication. This paper takes a unified view to the analysis of integrity policies and cryptographic protocols: they are artifacts that must be designed to be sufficiently robust to attack given an understood threat model. For example, integrity policy rules provide resilience to the threat of internal fraud, while cryptographic protocols provide resilience to the threat of replay and related attacks. The framework is modelled using (soft) constraints and analysis corresponds to the soft constraint satisfaction problem. Soft constraints facilitate a quantitative approach to analyzing integrity, confidentiality and authentication. Examples will be given: an integrity policy may achieve different levels of integrity under different circumstances; a protocol message may enjoy different levels of confidentiality for different principals; a principal can achieve different levels of authentication with different principals.
Semiring-based soft constraints
"... Abstract. The semiring-based formalism to model soft constraint has been introduced in 1995 by Ugo Montanari and the authors of this paper. The idea was to make constraint programming more flexible and widely applicable. We also wanted to define the extension via a general formalism, so that all its ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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Abstract. The semiring-based formalism to model soft constraint has been introduced in 1995 by Ugo Montanari and the authors of this paper. The idea was to make constraint programming more flexible and widely applicable. We also wanted to define the extension via a general formalism, so that all its instances could inherit its properties and be easily compared. Since then, much work has been done to study, extend, and apply this formalism. This papers gives a brief summary of some of these research activities. 1 Before soft constraints: a brief introduction to constraint programming
Abstract ARSPA 2004 Preliminary Version Believing the Integrity of a System (Invited Talk)
"... An integrity policy defines the situations when modification of information is authorised and is enforced by the protection mechanisms of a system. Traditional models of protection tend to define integrity in terms of ad-hoc authorisation techniques whose effectiveness are justified more on the basi ..."
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An integrity policy defines the situations when modification of information is authorised and is enforced by the protection mechanisms of a system. Traditional models of protection tend to define integrity in terms of ad-hoc authorisation techniques whose effectiveness are justified more on the basis of experience and ”best practice” rather than on any theoretical foundation. In a complex application system it is possible that an integrity policy may have been incorrectly configured, or that the protection mechanisms are inadequate, resulting in an unexpected system compromise. This paper examines the meaning of integrity and and describes a simple belief logic approach for analysing the integrity of a system configuration.
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs
"... Integrity policies and cryptographic protocols have much in common. They allow for a number of participating principals, and consist of sets of rules controlling the actions that principals should or should not perform. They are intended to uphold various security properties, the crucial ones being ..."
Abstract
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Integrity policies and cryptographic protocols have much in common. They allow for a number of participating principals, and consist of sets of rules controlling the actions that principals should or should not perform. They are intended to uphold various security properties, the crucial ones being integrity, confidentiality and authentication. This paper takes a unified view to the analysis of integrity policies and cryptographic protocols: they are artifacts that must be designed to be sufficiently robust to attack given an understood threat model. For example, integrity policy rules provide resilience to the threat of internal fraud, while cryptographic protocols provide resilience to the threat of replay and related attacks. The framework is modelled using (soft) constraints and analysis corresponds to the soft constraint satisfaction problem. Soft constraints facilitate a quantitative approach to analyzing integrity, confidentiality and authentication. Examples will be given: an integrity policy may achieve different levels of integrity under different circumstances; a protocol message may enjoy different levels of confidentiality for different principals; a principal can achieve different levels of authentication with different principals.
A Constraint-based Framework for the Cascade Vulnerability Problem
, 2004
"... Establishing network security is based not just on the security of its component systems but also on how they are configured to interoperate. In this paper we consider how soft constraints provide an approach to detecting the cascade vulnerability problem: whether system interoperation provides circ ..."
Abstract
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Establishing network security is based not just on the security of its component systems but also on how they are configured to interoperate. In this paper we consider how soft constraints provide an approach to detecting the cascade vulnerability problem: whether system interoperation provides circuitous or cascading routes across the network that increase the risk of violation of multilevel security. Taking the constraints approach means that we are building on techniques that have proven success in solving large-scale problems from other domains.
