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seL4: Formal Verification of an OS Kernel
- ACM SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES
, 2009
"... Complete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors. We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of ..."
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Cited by 288 (45 self)
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Complete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors. We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, and hardware, and we used a unique design approach that fuses formal and operating systems techniques. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of functional correctness of a complete, general-purpose operating-system kernel. Functional correctness means here that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also proves much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation. seL4, a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprises 8,700 lines of C code and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels.
The VeriFast Program Verifier
, 2008
"... This note describes a separation-logic-based approach for the specification and verification of safety properties of pointer-manipulating imperative programs. The programmer may declare inductive datatypes and primitive recursive functions for specification. Verification proceeds by symbolic executi ..."
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Cited by 55 (7 self)
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This note describes a separation-logic-based approach for the specification and verification of safety properties of pointer-manipulating imperative programs. The programmer may declare inductive datatypes and primitive recursive functions for specification. Verification proceeds by symbolic execution using an abstract representation of memory as a separation logic assertion. Folding or unfolding abstract predicate assertions is performed through explicit ghost statements. Lemma functions enable inductive proofs of memory representation equivalences and facts about the primitive recursive functions. An SMT solver is used to solve queries over data values; an algorithm is described that prevents non-termination of the SMT solver while enabling reduction of any ground term. Since no significant search is performed by either the verifier or the SMT solver, verification time is predictable and low.
Formal verification of a C-like memory model and its uses for verifying program transformations
- JOURNAL OF AUTOMATED REASONING
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Secure microkernels, state monads and scalable refinement
, 2008
"... Abstract. We present a scalable, practical Hoare Logic and refinement calculus for the nondeterministic state monad with exceptions and failure in Isabelle/HOL. The emphasis of this formalisation is on large-scale verification of imperative-style functional programs, rather than expressing monad cal ..."
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Cited by 32 (17 self)
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Abstract. We present a scalable, practical Hoare Logic and refinement calculus for the nondeterministic state monad with exceptions and failure in Isabelle/HOL. The emphasis of this formalisation is on large-scale verification of imperative-style functional programs, rather than expressing monad calculi in full generality. We achieve scalability in two dimensions. The method scales to multiple team members working productively and largely independently on a single proof and also to large programs with large and complex properties. We report on our experience in applying the techniques in an extensive (100,000 lines of proof) case study—the formal verification of an executable model of the seL4 operating system microkernel. 1
A Precise Yet Efficient Memory Model For C
, 2008
"... Verification for OO programs typically starts from a strongly typed object model in which distinct objects/fields are guaranteed not to overlap. This model simplifies verification by eliminating all “uninteresting” aliasing and allowing the use of more efficient frame axioms. Unfortunately, this mod ..."
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Cited by 29 (10 self)
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Verification for OO programs typically starts from a strongly typed object model in which distinct objects/fields are guaranteed not to overlap. This model simplifies verification by eliminating all “uninteresting” aliasing and allowing the use of more efficient frame axioms. Unfortunately, this model is unsound and incomplete for languages like C, where “objects ” can overlap almost arbitrarily. Sound verification for C therefore typically starts from an untyped memory model, where memory is just an array of bytes). The untyped model, however, adds substantial annotation burden, and reasoning in the untyped model is computationally expensive. We propose a sound typed semantics for C that provides the annotational and computational advantages of the typed object model while remaining sound and complete for C. We maintain in ghost state a predicate identifying where the “valid ” objects are, and introduce invariants and proof obligations that guarantee that the valid objects are suitably antialiased, and that (almost) all objects appearing in the program are valid. We describe the implementation of this approach in VCC (a sound verifier for C being used to verify the Microsoft Hypervisor) and the resulting performance gains.
Separation logic for small-step Cminor
- IN: THEOREM PROVING IN HIGHER ORDER LOGICS, 20TH INT. CONF. TPHOLS 2007
, 2007
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Towards Trustworthy Computing Systems: Taking Microkernels to the Next Level", Operating Systems Review
, 2007
"... As computer systems become increasingly mission-critical, used in life-critical situations, and relied upon to protect intellectual prop-erty, operating-system reliability is becoming an ever growing con-cern. In the past, mission- and life-critical embedded systems con-sisted of simple microcontrol ..."
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Cited by 25 (1 self)
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As computer systems become increasingly mission-critical, used in life-critical situations, and relied upon to protect intellectual prop-erty, operating-system reliability is becoming an ever growing con-cern. In the past, mission- and life-critical embedded systems con-sisted of simple microcontrollers running a small amount of soft-ware that could be validated using traditional and informal tech-niques. However, with the growth of software complexity, tradi-tional techniques for ensuring software reliability have not been able to keep up, leading to an overall degradation of reliability. This paper argues that microkernels are the best approach for deliv-ering truly trustworthy computer systems in the foreseeable future. It presents the NICTA operating-systems research vision, centred around the L4 microkernel and based on four core projects. The seL4 project is designing an improved API for a secure microker-nel, L4.verified will produce a full formal verification of the micro-kernel, Potoroo combines execution-time measurements with static analysis to determine the worst case execution profiles of the ker-nel, and CAmkES provides a component architecture for building systems that use the microkernel. Through close collaboration with Open Kernel Labs (a NICTA spinoff) the research output of these projects will make its way into products over the next few years. 1.
seL4: from general purpose to a proof of information flow enforcement
- In IEEE Symp. Security & Privacy
, 2013
"... Abstract—In contrast to testing, mathematical reasoning and formal verification can show the absence of whole classes of security vulnerabilities. We present the, to our knowledge, first complete, formal, machine-checked verification of information flow security for the implementation of a general-p ..."
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Cited by 21 (6 self)
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Abstract—In contrast to testing, mathematical reasoning and formal verification can show the absence of whole classes of security vulnerabilities. We present the, to our knowledge, first complete, formal, machine-checked verification of information flow security for the implementation of a general-purpose microkernel; namely seL4. Unlike previous proofs of information flow security for operating system kernels, ours applies to the actual 8,830 lines of C code that implement seL4, and so rules out the possibility of invalidation by implementation errors in this code. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, hardware, and boot code. We prove everything else. This proof is strong evidence of seL4’s utility as a separation kernel, and describes precisely how the general purpose kernel should be configured to enforce isolation and mandatory information flow control. We describe the information flow security statement we proved (a variant of intransitive noninterference), including the assumptions on which it rests, as well as the modifications that had to be made to seL4 to ensure it was enforced. We discuss the practical limitations and implications of this result, including covert channels not covered by the formal proof. I.
Formal pervasive verification of a paging mechanism
- TACAS, volume 4963 of LNCS
, 2008
"... Abstract. Memory virtualization by means of demand paging is a crucial com-ponent of every modern operating system. The formal verification is challenging since reasoning about the page fault handler has to cover two concurrent com-putational sources: the processor and the hard disk. We accurately m ..."
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Cited by 21 (7 self)
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Abstract. Memory virtualization by means of demand paging is a crucial com-ponent of every modern operating system. The formal verification is challenging since reasoning about the page fault handler has to cover two concurrent com-putational sources: the processor and the hard disk. We accurately model the in-terleaved executions of devices and the page fault handler, which is written in a high-level programming language with inline assembler portions. We describe how to combine results from sequential Hoare logic style reasoning about the page fault handler on the low-level concurrent machine model. To the best of our knowledge this is the first example of pervasive formal verification of software communicating with devices. 1
Implicit Dynamic Frames
, 2011
"... An important, challenging problem in the verification of imperative programs with shared, mutable state is the frame problem in the presence of data abstraction. That is, one must be able to specify and verify upper bounds on the set of memory locations a method can read and write without exposing t ..."
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Cited by 20 (6 self)
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An important, challenging problem in the verification of imperative programs with shared, mutable state is the frame problem in the presence of data abstraction. That is, one must be able to specify and verify upper bounds on the set of memory locations a method can read and write without exposing that method’s implementation. Separation logic is now widely considered the most promising solution to this problem. However, unlike conventional verification approaches, separation logic assertions cannot mention heap-dependent expressions from the host programming language such as method calls familiar to many developers. Moreover, separation logic-based verifiers are often based on symbolic execution. These symbolic execution-based verifiers typically do not support non-separating conjunction, and some of them rely on the developer to explicitly fold and unfold predicate definitions. Furthermore, several researchers have wondered whether it is possible to use verification condition generation and standard first-order provers instead of symbolic execution to automatically verify conformance with a separation logic specification. In this paper, we propose a variant of separation logic, called implicit dynamic frames, that supports heap-dependent expressions inside assertions. Conformance with an implicit dynamic frames specification can be checked by proving validity of a number of first-order verification conditions. To show that these verification
