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Rationalizable PartitionConfirmed Equilibrium
, 2013
"... Rationalizable partitionconfirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; ..."
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Rationalizable partitionconfirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others; We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
AMBIGUITY AND NONEXPECTED UTILITY
, 2013
"... In the theory of decision making in the face of uncertainty, it is commonplace to distinguish between problems that require choice among probability distributions on the outcomes (e.g., betting on the outcome of a spin of the roulette wheel) and problems that require choice among random variables wh ..."
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In the theory of decision making in the face of uncertainty, it is commonplace to distinguish between problems that require choice among probability distributions on the outcomes (e.g., betting on the outcome of a spin of the roulette wheel) and problems that require choice among random variables whose likely outcomes is a matter of opinion (e.g., betting on
Relevance and Symmetry ∗
, 2012
"... This paper provides a method to identify components of preference reflecting information and those reflecting only tastes. Important to this method is the identification of a unique set of revealed probability assignments (called relevant measures) from preferences over acts. We characterize these r ..."
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This paper provides a method to identify components of preference reflecting information and those reflecting only tastes. Important to this method is the identification of a unique set of revealed probability assignments (called relevant measures) from preferences over acts. We characterize these relevant measures and show where they appear in representations of preferences. This method works for a large set of preference models provided that the state space is treated as if it had a symmetric, “i.i.d. with unknown parameters, ” structure. Relevant measures are shown to characterize revealed information and to help in identifying taste components of preference representations. We apply our findings to four wellknown representations of ambiguitysensitive preferences: the αMEU model, the smooth ambiguity model, the extended MEU with contraction model and the vector expected utility model. For each representation, the theory identifies both the set of relevant measures and components of the representation that reflect only tastes.