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Boolean games revisited
 In Proc. ECAI ’06
, 2006
"... Abstract. Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games [7] are two players, zerosum static games where player’s utility functions are binary and described by a single propositional formula, and the strategies available to a player co ..."
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Cited by 23 (4 self)
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Abstract. Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games [7] are two players, zerosum static games where player’s utility functions are binary and described by a single propositional formula, and the strategies available to a player consist of truth assignments to each of a given set of propositional variables (the variables controlled by the player.) We generalize the framework to nplayers games which are not necessarily zerosum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the related problems. 1
SelfAdmissible Sets
, 2004
"... We study a weakdominance analog to Pearce’s [28, 1984] fundamental solution concept of a bestresponse set. The concept, called a selfadmissible set (SAS), arises from an epistemic analysis of weak dominance in BrandenburgerFriedenbergKeisler [12, 2007]. Here, we ‘test’ the SAS concept by: (i) e ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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We study a weakdominance analog to Pearce’s [28, 1984] fundamental solution concept of a bestresponse set. The concept, called a selfadmissible set (SAS), arises from an epistemic analysis of weak dominance in BrandenburgerFriedenbergKeisler [12, 2007]. Here, we ‘test’ the SAS concept by: (i) examining which of the KohlbergMertens [22, 1986] axioms it satisfies; (ii) analyzing its behavior in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Centipede, and the Chain Store Game; and (iii) characterizing it in perfectinformation games.