Results 1 - 10
of
603
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- ECONOMETRICA
, 1990
"... ..."
Spectrum Sharing for Unlicensed Bands
- in IEEE DySPAN 2005
, 2005
"... We study a spectrum sharing problem in an unlicensed band where multiple sys-tems coexist and interfere with each other. Due to asymmetries and selfish system behavior, unfair and inefficient situations may arise. We investigate whether efficiency and fairness can be obtained with self-enforcing spe ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 302 (4 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
We study a spectrum sharing problem in an unlicensed band where multiple sys-tems coexist and interfere with each other. Due to asymmetries and selfish system behavior, unfair and inefficient situations may arise. We investigate whether efficiency and fairness can be obtained with self-enforcing spectrum sharing rules. These rules have the advantage of not requiring a central authority that verifies compliance to the protocol. Any self-enforcing protocol must correspond to an equilibrium of a game. We first analyze the possible outcomes of a one shot game, and observe that in many cases an inefficient solution results. However, systems often coexist for long periods and a repeated game is more appropriate to model their interaction. In this repeated game the possibility of building reputations and applying punishments allows for a larger set of self-enforcing outcomes. When this set includes the optimal operating point, efficient, fair, and incentive compatible spectrum sharing becomes possible. We present examples that illustrate that in many cases the performance loss due to selfish behavior is small. We also prove that our results are tight and quantify the best achievable performance in a non-cooperative scenario.
Debt-Constrained Asset Markets
- Review of Economic Studies
, 1993
"... We develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature. If an agent defaults on a contract, he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his asset ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 285 (7 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature. If an agent defaults on a contract, he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized. He cannot be excluded from spot markets trading, however, and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized. t\1l information is publicly held and common knowledge, and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets. Since there is complete information, an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state. In general there is only partial insurance: variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents; interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints; and equilibria may be Pareto ranked. 1.
Social preferences and reciprocity
, 2000
"... Much of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 228 (11 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Much of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this
Trust as a Commodity
, 2000
"... Trust is central to all transactions and yet economists rarely discuss the notion. It is treated... ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 215 (7 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Trust is central to all transactions and yet economists rarely discuss the notion. It is treated...
Social Capital
, 2004
"... This paper surveys research on social capital. We explore the concepts that motivate the social capital literature, efforts to formally model social capital using economic theory, the econometrics of social capital, and empirical studies of the role of social capital in various socioeconomic outcome ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 213 (6 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This paper surveys research on social capital. We explore the concepts that motivate the social capital literature, efforts to formally model social capital using economic theory, the econometrics of social capital, and empirical studies of the role of social capital in various socioeconomic outcomes. While our focus is primarily on the place of social capital in economics, we do consider its broader social science context. We argue that while the social capital literature has produced many insights, a number of conceptual and statistical problems exist with the current use of social capital by social scientists. We propose some ways to strengthen the social capital literature.
An Economic Approach to Social Capital
- Economic Journal
, 2002
"... A standard optimal investment model can be used to analyse an individual’s decision to ac-cumulate social capital. We analyse six facts that support the predictions of this individual-based approach: (1) social capital first rises and then falls with age, (2) social capital declines with expected mo ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 209 (1 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
A standard optimal investment model can be used to analyse an individual’s decision to ac-cumulate social capital. We analyse six facts that support the predictions of this individual-based approach: (1) social capital first rises and then falls with age, (2) social capital declines with expected mobility, (3) social capital rises in occupations with greater returns to social skills, (4) social capital is higher among homeowners, (5) social connections fall sharply with physical distance, (6) people who invest in human capital also invest in social capital. We fail to find robust evidence that social capital investments fall with the value of time or that geo-graphic/religious groups generate social capital complementarities. A growing body of research documents significant correlations between ‘social capital ’ variables, such as membership in organisations, and important economic outcomes.1 Putnam (1993) jump-started the research on social capital when he found a strong correlation between measures of civic engagement and government quality across regions in Italy. Many authors have contributed to this literature. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that a one-standard deviation increase in a survey-based measure of country-level trust increases economic growth by more
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
- Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organisation 53/1, Special
, 2004
"... In constructing improved models of human behavior, both experimental and behavioral economists have increasingly turned to evolutionary theory for insights into human psychology and preferences. Unfortunately, the existing genetic evolutionary approaches can explain neither the degree of prosocialit ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 199 (15 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
In constructing improved models of human behavior, both experimental and behavioral economists have increasingly turned to evolutionary theory for insights into human psychology and preferences. Unfortunately, the existing genetic evolutionary approaches can explain neither the degree of prosociality (altruism and altruistic punishment) observed in humans, nor the patterns of variation in these behaviors across different behavioral domains and social groups. Ongoing misunderstandings about why certain models work, what they predict, and what the place is of “group selection ” in evolutionary theory have hampered the use of insights from biology and anthropology. This paper clarifies some of these issues and proposes an approach to the evolution of prosociality rooted in the interaction between cultural and genetic transmission. I explain how, in contrast to non-cultural species, the details of our evolved cultural learning capacities (e.g., imitative abilities) create the conditions for the cultural evolution of prosociality. By producing multiple behavioral equilibria, including group-beneficial equilibria, cultural evolution endogenously generates a mechanism of equilibrium selection that can favor prosociality. Finally, in the novel social environments left in the wake of these cultural evolutionary processes, natural selection is likely to favor prosocial genes
Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas
- J. THEOR BIOL
, 2001
"... In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission*a tendency to copy the most successful individual; and (2) conformist transmission*a tendency to copy the most frequent beha ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 154 (31 self)
- Add to MetaCart
In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission*a tendency to copy the most successful individual; and (2) conformist transmission*a tendency to copy the most frequent behavior in the population. We first show that if a finite number of punishment stages is permitted (e.g. two stages of punishment occur if some individuals punish people who fail to punish non-cooperators), then an arbitrarily small amount of conformist transmission will stabilize cooperative behavior by stabilizing punishment at some n-th stage. We then explain how, once cooperation is stabilized in one group, it may spread through a multi-group population via cultural group selection. Finally, once cooperation is prevalent, we show how prosocial genes favoring cooperation and punishment may invade in the wake of cultural group selection.
Evolutionary games on graphs
, 2007
"... Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 152 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Rock–Scissors–Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.