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A Little Logic Goes a Long Way: Basing Experiment on Semantic Theory in the Cognitive Science of Conditional Reasoning
, 2002
"... this paper is to show that this misunderstanding of the nature of logic by these and other prominent programs of research into human reasoning, has led to an impoverishment of empirical investigation into what subjects are doing in the selection task and to a wholly unnecessary and damaging rift bet ..."
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Cited by 16 (5 self)
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this paper is to show that this misunderstanding of the nature of logic by these and other prominent programs of research into human reasoning, has led to an impoverishment of empirical investigation into what subjects are doing in the selection task and to a wholly unnecessary and damaging rift between logically based cognitive theories of natural language interpretation on the one hand, and psychological experimentation on reasoning on the other. We will show that when empirical exploration is based on an informed understanding of logically based cognitive theory, the evidence strongly suggests a nearly opposite evolutionary account of the relation between the emergence of human communication capacities and economic exchange, and that logical semantics already has accounts of context senstivity to o#er far in advance of mental models theory's new creations
The Epigenesis of Meaning in Human Beings, and Possibly in Robots
- MINDS AND MACHINES
, 1999
"... This article addresses a classical question: Can a machine use language meaningfully and if so, how can this be achieved? The first part of the paper is mainly philosophical. Since meaning implies intentionality on the part of the language user, artificial systems which obviously lack intentionality ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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This article addresses a classical question: Can a machine use language meaningfully and if so, how can this be achieved? The first part of the paper is mainly philosophical. Since meaning implies intentionality on the part of the language user, artificial systems which obviously lack intentionality will be `meaningless' (pace e.g. Dennett). There is, however, no good reason to assume that intentionality is an exclusively biological property (pace e.g. Searle) and thus a robot with bodily structures, interaction patterns and development similar to those of human beings would constitute a system possibly capable of meaning -- a conjecture supported through a Wittgensteininspired thought experiment. The second part of the paper focuses on the empirical and constructive questions. Departing from the principle of epigenesis stating that during every state of development new structure arises on the basis of existing structure plus various sorts of interaction, a model of human cognitive and linguistic development is proposed according to which physical, social and linguistic interactions between the individual and the environment have their respective peaks in three consecutive stages of development: episodic, mimetic and symbolic. The transitions between these stages are qualitative, and bear a similarity to the stages in phylogenesis proposed by Donald (1991) and Deacon (1997). Following the principle of epigenetic development, robotogenesis could possibly recapitulate ontogenesis, leading to the emergence of intentionality, consciousness and meaning.
Consciousness, emotion, and imagination: A brain-inspired architecture for cognitive robotics
- In Proceedings of the AISB ’05 Workshop: Next Generation Approaches to Machine Consciousness
, 2005
"... This paper proposes a brain-inspired cognitive architecture that incorporates approximations to the concepts of consciousness, emotion, and imagination. To emulate the empirically established cognitive efficacy of conscious as opposed to unconscious information processing in the mammalian brain, the ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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This paper proposes a brain-inspired cognitive architecture that incorporates approximations to the concepts of consciousness, emotion, and imagination. To emulate the empirically established cognitive efficacy of conscious as opposed to unconscious information processing in the mammalian brain, the architecture adopts a model of information flow from global workspace theory. Cognitive functions such as anticipation and planning are realised through internal simulation of interaction with the environment. Action selection, in both actual and internally simulated interaction with the environment, is mediated by affect. An implementation of the architecture is described which is based on weightless neurons and is used to control a simulated robot. 1
Colour Constancy as Counterfactual
"... There is nothing in this world constant, but inconstancy. ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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There is nothing in this world constant, but inconstancy.
The permanence of mental objects: Testing magical thinking on perceived and imaginary realities
"... Four experiments compared the permanence of imagined and perceived objects. A new method for assessing object permanence in older children and adults was used that tested participants ’ preparedness to acknowledge that an object could change as a result of magical intervention. In Experiment 1, 6- a ..."
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Four experiments compared the permanence of imagined and perceived objects. A new method for assessing object permanence in older children and adults was used that tested participants ’ preparedness to acknowledge that an object could change as a result of magical intervention. In Experiment 1, 6- and 9-year-old children and adults treated perceived and imagined objects (pieces of paper) as being equally permanent. In Experiment 2, adults treated a fantastic object (a flying dog) as significantly less permanent than either perceived or imagined objects, but children failed to distinguish between fantastic and imagined objects. Experiment 3 employed a different type of mental-physical causality (an attempt to change objects with the help of a participant’s own wish). Results were similar to those of Experiment 2. In Experiment 4, adults were tested on permanence of personally significant imagined objects (participants ’ images of their future lives). Although almost all participants claimed that they did not believe in magic, in test trials they were not prepared to rule out the possibility that their future lives could be affected by a magical curse. The results are used to explain psychological roots of magical thinking and practices. Implications of these findings for cognitive development and more specifically children’s theory of mind reasoning are discussed. Key words: object permanence, magical thinking, mental-physical causality, imaginary reality. 2
What do four-year-olds have in common with Frege? A theoretical and practical investigation of the false-belief task
, 2002
"... this paper included) . Why these experiments? Well, if in fact, these tasks do provide a measure of our ability to attribute mistaken beliefs to others, then they are really a key indicator of a developing `theory of mind' (usually called commonsense or folk psychology in the philosophical literatur ..."
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this paper included) . Why these experiments? Well, if in fact, these tasks do provide a measure of our ability to attribute mistaken beliefs to others, then they are really a key indicator of a developing `theory of mind' (usually called commonsense or folk psychology in the philosophical literature). Specifically, they indicate emergent understanding that what goes on in our minds often takes precedence over how things are in the world, in determining our behaviour. So anyone investigating the developmental sequence by which we come to understand ourselves and others as intentional agents, can find in the research around this subject a gold-mine of relevant data
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"... Validation of an affective model: A “possible world ” model for emotional conflict ..."
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Validation of an affective model: A “possible world ” model for emotional conflict
Interpreting autism: a critique of Davidson on thought and language
"... ABSTRACT Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori, though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the exi ..."
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ABSTRACT Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori, though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one need not be a speaker in order to be a thinker. The falsity of these theses has consequences for other parts of Davidson's world-view; for example, it undermines his argument against animal thought. Donald Davidson's work on thought and language strikes me as a paradigm example of the limitations of an exclusively conceptual approach to the philosophy of mind. A lack of concern for the claims of experimental psychology can lead one down a path towards developing a philosophical theory of the mind which, though coherent, is disconnected from the world as understood through the sciences. In order to defend the claim that one's theory corresponds to the actual state of affairs in the world, there must be at least some evidence that the world is the way presupposed by the theory. Merely showing that a theory is consistent is not sufficient justification. My concern is that Davidson does not have the strings
Evolutionary Context of Human Development The Cooperative Breeding Model
"... is provided in screen-viewable form for personal use only by members ..."
(eds.), Philosophical Knowledge — Its Possibility and Scope, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals *
"... Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a sp ..."
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Metaphysical modalities are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an account of which is sketched. Thus scepticism about metaphysical modality entails a more far-reaching scepticism about counterfactuals. The account is used to question the significance of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. 1 §0. Philosophers characteristically ask not just whether things are some way but whether they could have been otherwise. What could have been otherwise is metaphysically contingent; what could not is metaphysically necessary. We have some knowledge of such matters. We know that Henry VIII could have had more than six wives, but that three plus three could not have been more than six. So there should be an epistemology of metaphysical modality.

