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276
The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field
- Journal of Financial Economics
, 2001
"... We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. Large firms rely heavily on present value techniques and the capital asset pricing model, while small firms are relatively likely to use the payback criterion. We find that a surprising number of firms use their ..."
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Cited by 725 (23 self)
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We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. Large firms rely heavily on present value techniques and the capital asset pricing model, while small firms are relatively likely to use the payback criterion. We find that a surprising number of firms use their firm risk rather than project risk in evaluating new investments. Firms are concerned about maintaining financial flexibility and a good credit rating when issuing debt, and earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation when issuing equity. We find some support for the pecking-order and trade-off capital structure hypotheses but little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric information, transactions costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes. Key words: capital structure, cost of capital, cost of equity, capital budgeting, discount rates, project valuation, survey. 1 We thank Franklin Allen for his detailed comments on the survey instrument and the overall project. We
Testing the pecking order theory of capital structure
, 2003
"... We test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. Contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues trackthe financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecki ..."
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Cited by 247 (5 self)
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We test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. Contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues trackthe financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behavior, the evidence is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in explaining net debt issues over time for firms of all sizes.
Does the source of capital affect capital structure
- Review of Financial Studies
"... Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm’s source of capital. Examining this intuition, we find firms that have access to the public bond ma ..."
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Cited by 196 (13 self)
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Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm’s source of capital. Examining this intuition, we find firms that have access to the public bond markets, as measured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage. Although firms with a rating are fundamen-tally different, these differences do not explain our findings. Even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure, and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating, firms with access have 35 % more debt. Under the tradeoff theory of capital structure, firms determine their preferred leverage ratio by calculating the tax advantages, costs of financial distress, mispricing, and incentive effects of debt versus equity. The empirical literature has searched for evidence that firms choose their capital structure, as this theory predicts, by estimating firm leverage as a function of firm characteristics. Firms for whom the tax shields of debt are greater, the costs of financial distress lower, and the mispricing of debt relative to equity more favorable are expected to be more highly levered. When these firms discover that the net benefit of debt is positive, they will move toward their preferred capital structure by issuing additional debt and/or reducing their equity. The implicit assumption has been that a firm’s leverage is completely a function of a firm’s demand for debt. In
How Costly is External Financing? Evidence from a Structural Estimation
- Journal of Finance
, 2007
"... This paper applies simulated method of moments to a dynamic structural model to infer the magnitude of external financing costs. The model features endogenous investment, cash distributions, leverage, and default. The corporation faces taxation, costly bankruptcy, and linear-quadratic equity flotati ..."
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Cited by 189 (20 self)
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This paper applies simulated method of moments to a dynamic structural model to infer the magnitude of external financing costs. The model features endogenous investment, cash distributions, leverage, and default. The corporation faces taxation, costly bankruptcy, and linear-quadratic equity flotation costs. For large firms, parameter estimates imply marginal equity flotation costs starting at 5.0%, and bankruptcy costs equal to 8.4 % of capital. For small firms, marginal equity flotation costs start at 10.7%, and bankruptcy costs equal 15.1 % of capital. Estimated financing frictions are also higher for low-dividend firms and those identified as constrained by the Cleary and Whited-Wu indexes. In simulated data many commonly used proxies for financing constraints decrease when we increase financing cost parameters.
Do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say
- Journal of Finance
, 2007
"... In the presence of frictions, firms adjust their capital structure infrequently. As a consequence, in a dynamic economy the leverage of most firms is likely to differ from the “optimum ” leverage at the time of readjustment. This paper explores the empirical implications of this observation. I use a ..."
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Cited by 158 (11 self)
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In the presence of frictions, firms adjust their capital structure infrequently. As a consequence, in a dynamic economy the leverage of most firms is likely to differ from the “optimum ” leverage at the time of readjustment. This paper explores the empirical implications of this observation. I use a calibrated dynamic trade-off model to simulate firms ’ capital structure paths. The results of standard cross-sectional tests on these data are consistent with those reported in the empirical literature. In particular, the standard interpretation of some test results leads to the rejection of the underlying model. Taken together, the results suggest a rethinking of the way capital structure tests are conducted. RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN CAPITAL STRUCTURE focuses on regularities in the cross section of leverage to discriminate between various theories of financing policy. In this research, book and market leverage are related to profitabil-ity, book-to-market, and firm size. Changes in market leverage are largely ex-plained by changes in equity value. Past book-to-market ratios predict current
Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity
- Journal of Finance
, 2007
"... wish to thank Andre Haris, Lozan Bakayatov, and Davron Yakubov for their excellent data collection efforts. In addition, we thank the financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors remain the responsibility of the authors. Corporate Yield Spreads an ..."
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Cited by 145 (3 self)
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wish to thank Andre Haris, Lozan Bakayatov, and Davron Yakubov for their excellent data collection efforts. In addition, we thank the financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors remain the responsibility of the authors. Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity We examine whether liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a battery of liquidity measures covering over 4000 corporate bonds and spanning investment grade and speculative categories, we find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads; and that an improvement of liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. These results hold after controlling for common bond-specific, firm-specific, and macroeconomic variables, and are robust to issuers ’ fixed effect and potential endogeneity bias. Our finding mitigates the concern in the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamic of yield spreads can be fully explained by default risk determinants, and suggests that liquidity plays an important role in corporate bond valuation.
Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?
- JOURNAL OF FINANCE
, 2002
"... There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of ta ..."
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Cited by 130 (6 self)
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There are two tax incentives for corporations to hedge: to increase debt capacity and interest tax deductions, and to reduce expected tax liability if the tax function is convex. We test whether these incentives affect the extent of corporate hedging with derivatives. Using an explicit measure of tax function convexity, we find no evidence that firms hedge in response to tax convexity. Our analysis does, however, indicate that firms hedge to increase debt capacity, with increased tax benefits averaging 1.1 percent of firm value. Our results also indicate that firms hedge because of expected financial distress costs and firm size.
Capital Structure and Stock Returns
- Journal of Political Economy
, 2003
"... Cochrane, in particular, gave me the best paper comments I have received in my career. Gerard Hoberg provided terrific research assistance. The author’s current web page is ..."
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Cited by 129 (3 self)
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Cochrane, in particular, gave me the best paper comments I have received in my career. Gerard Hoberg provided terrific research assistance. The author’s current web page is
Macroeconomic conditions and the puzzles of credit spreads and capital structure
, 2008
"... Investors demand high risk premia for defaultable claims, because (i) defaults tend to concentrate in bad times when marginal utility is high; (ii) default losses are high during such times. I build a structural model of financing and default decisions in an economy with business-cycle variations in ..."
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Cited by 106 (13 self)
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Investors demand high risk premia for defaultable claims, because (i) defaults tend to concentrate in bad times when marginal utility is high; (ii) default losses are high during such times. I build a structural model of financing and default decisions in an economy with business-cycle variations in expected growth rates and volatility, which endogenously generate countercyclical comovements in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses. Credit risk premia in the calibrated model not only can quantitatively account for the high corporate bond yield spreads and low leverage ratios in the data, but have rich implications for firms’ financing decisions.
Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies, London Business School IFA Working Paper Series
, 2004
"... We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge against future income shortfalls, reducing debt – “saving borrowing capacity ” – is a more effective way of securing future investment in h ..."
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Cited by 98 (12 self)
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We model the interplay between cash and debt policies in the presence of financial constraints. While saving cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge against future income shortfalls, reducing debt – “saving borrowing capacity ” – is a more effective way of securing future investment in high cash flow states. This trade-off implies that constrained firms will allocate excess cash flows into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high (i.e., if the correlation between operating cash flows and investment opportunities is low). However, constrained firms will use excess cash flows to reduce current debt if their hedging needs are low. The empirical examination of cash and debt policies of a large sample of constrained and unconstrained firms reveals evidence that is consistent with our theory. In particular, our evidence shows that financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash out of cash flows, while showing no propensity to reduce outstanding debt. In contrast, constrained firms with low hedging needs systematically channel free cash flows towards debt reduction, as opposed to cash savings. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind standard financial policies such as cash and debt management. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt.