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A Scanner Darkly: Protecting User Privacy From Perceptual Applications
"... Abstract—Perceptual, “context-aware ” applications that observe their environment and interact with users via cameras and other sensors are becoming ubiquitous on personal computers, mobile phones, gaming platforms, household robots, and augmented-reality devices. This raises new privacy risks. We d ..."
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Abstract—Perceptual, “context-aware ” applications that observe their environment and interact with users via cameras and other sensors are becoming ubiquitous on personal computers, mobile phones, gaming platforms, household robots, and augmented-reality devices. This raises new privacy risks. We describe the design and implementation of DARKLY, a practical privacy protection system for the increasingly common scenario where an untrusted, third-party perceptual application is running on a trusted device. DARKLY is integrated with OpenCV, a popular computer vision library used by such applications to access visual inputs. It deploys multiple privacy protection mechanisms, including access control, algorithmic privacy transforms, and user audit. We evaluate DARKLY on 20 perceptual applications that perform diverse tasks such as image recognition, object tracking, security surveillance, and face detection. These applications run on DARKLY unmodified or with very few modifications and minimal performance overheads vs. native OpenCV. In most cases, privacy enforcement does not reduce the applications’ functionality or accuracy. For the rest, we quantify the tradeoff between privacy and utility and demonstrate that utility remains acceptable even with strong privacy protection. I.
PlaceAvoider: Steering first-person cameras away from sensitive spaces
- In NDSS
, 2014
"... Abstract—Cameras are now commonplace in our social and computing landscapes and embedded into consumer devices like smartphones and tablets. A new generation of wearable devices (such as Google Glass) will soon make ‘first-person ’ cameras nearly ubiquitous, capturing vast amounts of imagery without ..."
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Abstract—Cameras are now commonplace in our social and computing landscapes and embedded into consumer devices like smartphones and tablets. A new generation of wearable devices (such as Google Glass) will soon make ‘first-person ’ cameras nearly ubiquitous, capturing vast amounts of imagery without deliberate human action. ‘Lifelogging ’ devices and applications will record and share images from people’s daily lives with their social networks. These devices that automatically capture images in the background raise serious privacy concerns, since they are likely to capture deeply private information. Users of these devices need ways to identify and prevent the sharing of sensitive images. As a first step, we introduce PlaceAvoider, a technique for owners of first-person cameras to ‘blacklist ’ sensitive spaces (like bathrooms and bedrooms). PlaceAvoider recognizes images captured in these spaces and flags them for review before the images are made available to applications. PlaceAvoider performs novel image analysis using both fine-grained image features (like specific objects) and coarse-grained, scene-level features (like colors and textures) to classify where a photo was taken. PlaceAvoider combines these features in a probabilistic framework that jointly labels streams of images in order to improve accuracy. We test the technique on five realistic first-person image datasets and show it is robust to blurriness, motion, and occlusion. I.
Privacy Behaviors of Lifeloggers using Wearable Cameras
- UbiComp
"... A number of wearable ‘lifelogging ’ camera devices have been released recently, allowing consumers to capture images and other sensor data continuously from a first-person perspec-tive. Unlike traditional cameras that are used deliberately and sporadically, lifelogging devices are always ‘on ’ and a ..."
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A number of wearable ‘lifelogging ’ camera devices have been released recently, allowing consumers to capture images and other sensor data continuously from a first-person perspec-tive. Unlike traditional cameras that are used deliberately and sporadically, lifelogging devices are always ‘on ’ and au-tomatically capturing images. Such features may challenge users ’ (and bystanders’) expectations about privacy and con-trol of image gathering and dissemination. While lifelogging cameras are growing in popularity, little is known about pri-vacy perceptions of these devices or what kinds of privacy challenges they are likely to create. To explore how people manage privacy in the context of lifel-ogging cameras, as well as which kinds of first-person images people consider ‘sensitive, ’ we conducted an in situ user study (N = 36) in which participants wore a lifelogging device for a week, answered questionnaires about the collected images, and participated in an exit interview. Our findings indicate that: 1) some people may prefer to manage privacy through in situ physical control of image collection in order to avoid later burdensome review of all collected images; 2) a combi-nation of factors including time, location, and the objects and people appearing in the photo determines its ‘sensitivity; ’ and 3) people are concerned about the privacy of bystanders, de-spite reporting almost no opposition or concerns expressed by bystanders over the course of the study. Author Keywords Lifelogging; wearable cameras; privacy
Securing embedded user interfaces: Android and beyond.
- In USENIX Security Symposium
, 2013
"... Abstract Web and smartphone applications commonly embed third-party user interfaces like advertisements and social media widgets. However, this capability comes with security implications, both for the embedded interfaces and the host page or application. While browsers have evolved over time to ad ..."
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Abstract Web and smartphone applications commonly embed third-party user interfaces like advertisements and social media widgets. However, this capability comes with security implications, both for the embedded interfaces and the host page or application. While browsers have evolved over time to address many of these issues, mobile systems like Android -which do not yet support true cross-application interface embedding -present an opportunity to redesign support for secure embedded user interfaces from scratch. In this paper, we explore the requirements for a system to support secure embedded user interfaces by systematically analyzing existing systems like browsers, smartphones, and research systems. We describe our experience modifying Android to support secure interface embedding and evaluate our implementation using case studies that rely on embedded interfaces, such as advertisement libraries, Facebook social plugins (e.g., the "Like" button), and access control gadgets. We provide concrete techniques and reflect on lessons learned for secure embedded user interfaces.
Reactive Security: Responding to Visual Stimuli from Wearable Cameras
"... or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with cred ..."
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or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions
Single-stroke Language-Agnostic Keylogging using Stereo-Microphones and Domain Specific Machine Learning
"... Mobile phones are equipped with an increasingly large number of precise and sophisticated sensors. This raises the risk of direct and indirect privacy breaches. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of keystroke inference when user taps on a soft keyboard are captured by the stereoscopic mic ..."
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Mobile phones are equipped with an increasingly large number of precise and sophisticated sensors. This raises the risk of direct and indirect privacy breaches. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of keystroke inference when user taps on a soft keyboard are captured by the stereoscopic microphones on an Android smartphone. We developed algorithms for sensor-signals processing and domain specific machine learning to infer key taps using a combination of stereo-microphones and gyroscopes. We implemented and evaluated the performance of our system on two popular mobile phones and a tablet: Samsung S2, Samsung Tab 8 and HTC One. Based on our experiments, and to the best of our knowledge, our system (1) is the first to exceed 90 % accuracy requiring a single attempt, (2) operates on the standard Android QWERTY and number keyboards, and (3) is language agnostic. We show that stereo-microphones are a much more effective side channel as compared to the gyroscope, however, their data can be combined to boost the accuracy of prediction. While previous studies focused on larger key sizes and repetitive attempts, we show that by focusing on the specifics of the keyboard and creating machine learning models and algorithms based on keyboard areas combined with adequate filtering, we can achieve an accuracy of 90%- 94 % for much smaller key sizes in a single attempt. We also demonstrate how such attacks can be instrumentalized by a malicious application to log the keystrokes of other sensitive applications. Finally, we describe some techniques to mitigate these attacks.
Your Voice Assistant is Mine: How to Abuse Speakers to Steal Information and Control Your Phone ∗ †
"... Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These ap-proaches get data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking permissions. This paper presents a ..."
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Previous research about sensor based attacks on Android platform focused mainly on accessing or controlling over sensitive device components, such as camera, microphone and GPS. These ap-proaches get data from sensors directly and need corresponding sensor invoking permissions. This paper presents a novel approach (GVS-Attack) to launch permission bypassing attacks from a zero permission Android application (VoicEmployer) through the speaker. The idea of GVS-Attack utilizes an Android system built-in voice assistant module – Google Voice Search. Through Android Intent mechanism, VoicEmployer triggers Google Voice Search to the foreground, and then plays prepared audio files (like “call number 1234 5678”) in the background. Google Voice Search can recognize this voice command and execute corresponding operations. With ingenious designs, our GVS-Attack can forge SMS/Email, access privacy information, transmit sensitive data and achieve remote control without any permission. Also we found a vulnerability of status checking in Google Search app, which can be utilized by GVS-Attack to dial arbitrary numbers even when the phone is securely locked with password. A prototype of VoicEmployer has been implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of GVS-Attack in real world. In theory, nearly all Android devices equipped with Google Services Framework can be affected by GVS-Attack. This study may inspire application developers and researchers rethink that zero permission doesn’t mean safety and the speaker can be treated as a new attack surface. 1.
Open access to the Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX FlowFence: Practical Data Protection for Emerging IoT Application Frameworks FlowFence: Practical Data Protection for Emerging IoT Application Frameworks
, 2016
"... Abstract Emerging IoT programming frameworks enable building apps that compute on sensitive data produced by smart homes and wearables. However, these frameworks only support permission-based access control on sensitive data, which is ineffective at controlling how apps use data once they gain acce ..."
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Abstract Emerging IoT programming frameworks enable building apps that compute on sensitive data produced by smart homes and wearables. However, these frameworks only support permission-based access control on sensitive data, which is ineffective at controlling how apps use data once they gain access. To address this limitation, we present FlowFence, a system that requires consumers of sensitive data to declare their intended data flow patterns, which it enforces with low overhead, while blocking all other undeclared flows. FlowFence achieves this by explicitly embedding data flows and the related control flows within app structure. Developers use FlowFence support to split their apps into two components: (1) A set of Quarantined Modules that operate on sensitive data in sandboxes, and (2) Code that does not operate on sensitive data but orchestrates execution by chaining Quarantined Modules together via taint-tracked opaque handles-references to data that can only be dereferenced inside sandboxes. We studied three existing IoT frameworks to derive key functionality goals for FlowFence, and we then ported three existing IoT apps. Securing these apps using FlowFence resulted in an average increase in size from 232 lines to 332 lines of source code. Performance results on ported apps indicate that FlowFence is practical: A face-recognition based doorcontroller app incurred a 4.9% latency overhead to recognize a face and unlock a door.
PIN Skimmer: Inferring PINs Through The Camera and Microphone
"... Today’s smartphones provide services and uses that required a panoply of dedicated devices not so long ago. With them, we listen to music, play games or chat with our friends; but we also read our corporate email and documents, manage our online banking; and we have started to use them directly as a ..."
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Today’s smartphones provide services and uses that required a panoply of dedicated devices not so long ago. With them, we listen to music, play games or chat with our friends; but we also read our corporate email and documents, manage our online banking; and we have started to use them directly as a means of payment. In this paper, we aim to raise awareness of side-channel attacks even when strong isolation protects sensitive applications. Previous works have studied the use of the phone accelerometer and gyroscope as side channel data to infer PINs. Here, we describe a new side-channel attack that makes use of the video camera and microphone to infer PINs entered on a number-only soft keyboard on a smartphone. The microphone is used to detect touch events, while the camera is used to estimate the smartphone’s orientation, and correlate it to the position of the digit tapped by the user. We present the design, implementation and early evaluation of PIN Skimmer, which has a mobile application and a server component. The mobile application collects touch-event orientation patterns and later uses learnt patterns to infer PINs entered in a sensitive application. When selecting from a test set of 50 4-digit PINs, PIN Skimmer correctly infers more than 30 % of PINs after 2 attempts, and more than 50 % of PINs after 5 attempts on android-powered Nexus S and Galaxy S3 phones. When selecting from a set of 200 8-digit PINs, PIN Skimmer correctly infers about 45 % of the PINs after 5 attempts and 60% after 10 attempts. It turns out to be difficult to prevent such side-channel attacks, so we provide guidelines for developers to mitigate present and future side-channel attacks on PIN input.
PIN Skimmer: Inferring PINs Through The Camera and Microphone
"... Today’s smartphones provide services and uses that required a panoply of dedicated devices not so long ago. With them, we listen to music, play games or chat with our friends; but we also read our corporate email and documents, manage our online banking; and we have started to use them directly as a ..."
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Today’s smartphones provide services and uses that required a panoply of dedicated devices not so long ago. With them, we listen to music, play games or chat with our friends; but we also read our corporate email and documents, manage our online banking; and we have started to use them directly as a means of payment. In this paper, we aim to raise awareness of side-channel attacks even when strong isolation protects sensitive applications. Previous works have studied the use of the phone accelerometer and gyroscope as side channel data to infer PINs. Here, we describe a new side-channel attack that makes use of the video camera and microphone to infer PINs entered on a number-only soft keyboard on a smartphone. The microphone is used to detect touch events, while the camera is used to estimate the smartphone’s orientation, and correlate it to the position of the digit tapped by the user. We present the design, implementation and early evaluation of PIN Skimmer, which has a mobile application and a server component. The mobile application collects touch-event orientation patterns and later uses learnt patterns to infer PINs entered in a sensitive application. When selecting from a test set of 50 4-digit PINs, PIN Skimmer correctly infers more than 30 % of PINs after 2 attempts, and more than 50 % of PINs after 5 attempts on android-powered Nexus S and Galaxy S3 phones. When selecting from a set of 200 8-digit PINs, PIN Skimmer correctly infers about 45 % of the PINs after 5 attempts and 60% after 10 attempts. It turns out to be difficult to prevent such side-channel attacks, so we provide guidelines for developers to mitigate present and future side-channel attacks on PIN input.