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Weighted Electoral Control
"... www.cs.rochester.edu/∼lane Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important natural settings. In this paper, we stu ..."
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www.cs.rochester.edu/∼lane Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important natural settings. In this paper, we study the complexity of controlling the outcome of weighted elections through adding and deleting voters. We obtain polynomialtime algorithms, NPcompleteness results, and for many NPcomplete cases, approximation algorithms. Our work shows that for quite a few important cases, either polynomialtime exact algorithms or polynomialtime approximation algorithms exist.
Normalized range voting broadly resists control
 Computing Research Repository
, 2011
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Robust winners and winner determination policies under candidate uncertainty
 In Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC2012
, 2012
"... We consider voting situations in which a group considers a set of options or candidates, but where some candidates may turn out to be unavailable. If determining availability is costly (e.g., in terms of money, time, or computation), it may be beneficial for the group to vote prior to determining ca ..."
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We consider voting situations in which a group considers a set of options or candidates, but where some candidates may turn out to be unavailable. If determining availability is costly (e.g., in terms of money, time, or computation), it may be beneficial for the group to vote prior to determining candidate availability, and only test the winner’s availability after the vote. However, since few voting rules are robust to candidate deletion, winner determination usually involves a number of such availability tests. We outline a model for analyzing such problems. We define robust winners relative to potential candidate unavailability, a notion that is tightly related to control by candidate addition. Then assuming a distribution over availability and costs for availability tests (or queries), we define an optimal query policy for a vote profile to be one with minimal expected query cost that determines the true winner. We describe a dynamic programming algorithm for computing optimal query policies, as well as a myopic heuristic approach using information gain to choose queries. Finally, we outline a number of theoretical and practical questions raised by our model. 1
Elections with Few Candidates: Prices, Weights, and Covering Problems
"... Abstract. We show that a number of electionrelated problems with prices (such as, for example, bribery) are fixedparameter tractable (in FPT) when parameterized by the number of candidates. For bribery, this resolves a nearly 10year old family of open problems. Our results follow by a general te ..."
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Abstract. We show that a number of electionrelated problems with prices (such as, for example, bribery) are fixedparameter tractable (in FPT) when parameterized by the number of candidates. For bribery, this resolves a nearly 10year old family of open problems. Our results follow by a general technique that formulates voting problems as covering problems and extends the classic approach of using integer linear programming and the algorithm of Lenstra [19]. In this context, our central result is that WEIGHTED SET MULTICOVER parameterized by the universe size is fixedparameter tractable. Our approach is also applicable to weighted electoral control for Approval voting. We improve previously known XPmemberships to FPTmemberships. Our preliminary experiments on realworldbased data show the practical usefulness of our approach for instances with few candidates. 1
Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy∗
"... We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters (that is, we take the number of voters as a parameter). We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks if a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive c ..."
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We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters (that is, we take the number of voters as a parameter). We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks if a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding/deleting some candidates, and a combinatorial scenario where adding/deleting a candidate automatically means adding/deleting a whole group of candidates. Our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control (with the number of voters as the parameter) is much more varied than in the setting with many voters.