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NEGOTIATION AND MULTI-ATTRIBUTE AUCTION 1
"... Uncertainty cost of the sellers is a big challenge the buyer(the government) encounters in public procurement setting. An implementation framework of an e-procurement system integrating multi-round negotiation and multi-attribute auction is proposed to help the buyer deal with the problem. A negotia ..."
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Uncertainty cost of the sellers is a big challenge the buyer(the government) encounters in public procurement setting. An implementation framework of an e-procurement system integrating multi-round negotiation and multi-attribute auction is proposed to help the buyer deal with the problem. A negotiation procedure is firstly introduced to make the sellers reveal their cost information little by little. Then the sellers with lower cost are screened out to participate in the subsequent multi-attribute auction. The research shows that the procurement mechanism is optimal from the perspective of not only the social surplus but also the buyer’s payoff.
IO
, 2013
"... To deal with elevators accidents the French ’Robien law ’ mandated a modernization of ’old ’ elevators until 2008. Although available statistics suggest that the law led to a reduc-tion of mortal accidents, a seemingly paradoxical side eects occurred: the modernization coincides with a unprecedented ..."
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To deal with elevators accidents the French ’Robien law ’ mandated a modernization of ’old ’ elevators until 2008. Although available statistics suggest that the law led to a reduc-tion of mortal accidents, a seemingly paradoxical side eects occurred: the modernization coincides with a unprecedented deterioration in service quality, doubling the average el-evator downtime and tripling the number of breakdowns. We exploit a 10 years-panel database of more than 3500 elevators to investigate the impact of the law on quality. Using the elevators not targeted by the law as a control group (’new ’ elevators), our dierence-in-dierence approach shows that the law increased the number of failures by 15 % and downtime by 45%. We consider these estimates to represent the lower bound of the over-all eect, however, because we also identify an adverse quality spillover on our control group. This paper demonstrates how well intended safety regulations, involving substantial amounts of investment, can have unintended knock-on eects in the regulated area and even beyond.
1 Model of favoritism in outcry and electronic auctions 1
"... Since the 2000s e-auctions have been actively used in public and private procurement in many countries. Although e-auction reduces participation costs of companies as compared with outcry auction, it may also encourage companies to bribe the electronic intermediary in order to intervene in e-auction ..."
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Since the 2000s e-auctions have been actively used in public and private procurement in many countries. Although e-auction reduces participation costs of companies as compared with outcry auction, it may also encourage companies to bribe the electronic intermediary in order to intervene in e-auction process and block bids of their competitors. The purpose of our model is to examine how the auction format affects the favoritism and the efficiency of public procurement. Unlike the public procurer, the intermediary does not have the favored company and takes bribes from each company. Therefore, if the intermediary sets rather low bribe, that equalizes chances of getting the public contract for companies with different production costs. As a result, incentives for favoritism depend on the costs efficiency of the favored company. The model shows that if the favored company has high production costs, a corrupt intermediary encourages favoritism. On the contrary, if the favored company has low production costs, favoritism becomes less probable in e-auction, than in outcry auction. Hence, even if the intermediary is corrupt, e-auction may provide lower incentives to favoritism and increase social welfare.
The Influence of Selection Bias on Effort Overruns in Software Development Projects
"... Context: A potentially important, but neglected, reason for effort overruns in software projects is related to selection bias. Selection bias–induced effort overruns occur when proposals are more likely to be accepted and lead to actual projects when based on effort estimates that are too low rather ..."
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Context: A potentially important, but neglected, reason for effort overruns in software projects is related to selection bias. Selection bias–induced effort overruns occur when proposals are more likely to be accepted and lead to actual projects when based on effort estimates that are too low rather than on realistic estimates or estimates that are too high. The effect of this bias may be particularly important in bidding rounds, but is potentially relevant in all situations where there is effort or costbased selection between alternatives. Objective: To better understand the relevance and management of selection bias effects in software development contexts. Method: First, we present a statistical model illustrating the relation between selection bias in bidding and other contexts and effort overruns. Then, we examine this relation in an experiment with software professionals who estimated and completed a set of development tasks and examine relevant field study evidence. Finally, we use a selection bias scenario to assess awareness of the effect of selection bias among software providers. Results: The results from the statistical model and the experiment demonstrated that selection bias is capable of explaining much of the effort overruns. The field evidence was also consistent with a substantial effect of selection bias on effort overruns, although there are alternative explanations for the findings. We found a low awareness of selection bias among the software providers. Conclusion: Selection bias is likely to be an important source of effort overruns and should be addressed to reduce problems related to over-optimistic effort estimates.
DOI 10.1007/s11151-009-9226-z Public–Private Agreements, Institutions, and Competition: When Economic Theory Meets Facts
, 2009
"... Abstract While, in practice, the participation of private actors at the local and national government levels through various types of contractual agreements has been increasing over the last decades, there are still few studies on the functioning and performances of such relationships. Our aim is to ..."
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Abstract While, in practice, the participation of private actors at the local and national government levels through various types of contractual agreements has been increasing over the last decades, there are still few studies on the functioning and performances of such relationships. Our aim is to highlight some significant theoret-ical and empirical issues concerning Public–Private Agreements. We first assess the potential sources of efficiency of such contractual agreements. We then examine the selection issue which is a crucial stage for the efficiency of such agreement. Finally, The papers in this special issue of the Review of Industrial Organization originated with an international conference on “Public Private Contracts, Competition and Institutions ” held at the University of Paris I Sorbonne, in December 2007. The purpose of this conference was to confront alternative theoretical approaches and empirical developments on this topic. This special issue reflects this objective of balancing normative and positive approaches. It indeed provides a collection of papers dealing with how public–private contracts are shaped, their advantages and drawbacks, why and when they should be used, and how they affect performances. To some extent, it is a useful complement to another special issue on public–private partnerships already edited in this journal
