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A general model of preventive and interventive self-control
- Social & Personality Psychology Compass
, 2012
"... The field of self-control has witnessed an unprecedented boom, not least due to the immense implications of successful and unsuccessful self-control for people’s lives. However, successful and unsuccessful self-control can take many different forms, and many conceptual problems have been raised as t ..."
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The field of self-control has witnessed an unprecedented boom, not least due to the immense implications of successful and unsuccessful self-control for people’s lives. However, successful and unsuccessful self-control can take many different forms, and many conceptual problems have been raised as to what self-control is about and how to best study it. Integrating different literatures, we provide a general model of self-control which distinguishes between preventive (i.e., anticipatory) and interventive (i.e., momentary) forms of self-control. The proposed Preventive-Interventive Model (PI-Model) of Self-Control combines seven basic components: preventive strategies, desire, conflict, control motivation, volition, opportunity constraints, and behavior enactment. The resulting taxonomy helps to distinguish self-control from standard motivational processes, to define the concept of temptation, and to identify different types of self-control failure including self-monitoring failure, motivational self-control failure, and volitional self-control failure. Further, the model helps to outline five broad mechanisms through which people may be able to proactively boost self-control success. Self-control refers to a person’s motivation and capacity to refrain from enacting a prob-
Modelling Prior and Retrospective Awareness of Actions
"... Abstract. Agents often may prepare for and perform actions without being conscious of these processes. However, in other cases, at some point in time the agent can develop some awareness state relating to the action. This can be an awareness state prior to the execution of the action. An awareness s ..."
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Abstract. Agents often may prepare for and perform actions without being conscious of these processes. However, in other cases, at some point in time the agent can develop some awareness state relating to the action. This can be an awareness state prior to the execution of the action. An awareness state can also develop in retrospect, after the action was performed. In this paper a neurologically inspired agent model is introduced that is able to make such distinctions. Scenarios are covered in which actions are prepared without being conscious at any point in time. Also scenarios are covered in which the agent develops proir awareness or retrospective awareness, or both. When prior awareness is developed it may be the case that this awareness has a decisive effect on actually executing the action, but it may equally well be the case that the awareness state has no effect on whether the action is performed. All these variations have been illustrated by a wide variety of simulation experiments.
1 Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences Moral Psychology, vol. 4: Freedom and Responsibility, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
"... [pre-publication draft; please do not cite without permission of author] Questions about free will and responsibility have long been considered the purview of philosophers. If philosophers paid attention to any science, it was physics, since physics might tell us about whether or not the traditional ..."
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[pre-publication draft; please do not cite without permission of author] Questions about free will and responsibility have long been considered the purview of philosophers. If philosophers paid attention to any science, it was physics, since physics might tell us about whether or not the traditional threat of determinism is true. This is changing, though too slowly. Philosophers considering human autonomy and responsibility need to pay more attention to the relevance of the sciences that study humans, in part because neuroscientists and psychologists are increasingly discussing free will, usually to argue that their research shows that it is an illusion. For instance, Neuroscientist Patrick Haggard says: “We certainly don’t have free will. Not in the sense we think ” (Chivers 2011). Psychologist John Bargh writes: “The phenomenological feeling of free will is very real … but this strong feeling is an illusion, just as much as we experience the sun moving through the sky, when in fact it is we who are doing the moving ” (2008, p. 148-9). Psychologist Daniel Wegner concludes The Illusion of Conscious Will: “It seems we are agents. It seems we cause what we do…. It is sobering and ultimately accurate to call all
Metacognitive model of mindfulness
- Consciousness and cognition
, 2014
"... a b s t r a c t Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) ..."
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a b s t r a c t Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) mindfulness is related to the highest level of metacognition; (2) mindfulness depends on dynamic cooperation of three main components of the metacognition (metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences and metacognitive skills); (3) a mindful meta-level is always conscious while the other meta-cognitive processes can occur implicitly; (4) intentionally practiced mindfulness decreases dissociations between awareness and meta-awareness; (5) components of mindful meta-level develop and change during continuous practice. The current model is discussed in the light of empirical data and other theoretical approaches to mindfulness concept. We believe that presented model provides some helpful avenues for future research and theoretical investigations into mindfulness and the mechanisms of its actions.
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"... Abstract Human beings have a sophisticated ability to reason about the minds of others, often referred to as using one’s theory of mind or mentalizing. Just like any other cognitive ability, people engage in reasoning about other minds when it seems useful for achieving particular goals, but this ab ..."
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Abstract Human beings have a sophisticated ability to reason about the minds of others, often referred to as using one’s theory of mind or mentalizing. Just like any other cognitive ability, people engage in reasoning about other minds when it seems useful for achieving particular goals, but this ability remains disengaged otherwise. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our ability to reason about the minds of others helps to explain anthropomorphism: cases in which people attribute minds to a wide range of nonhuman agents, including animals, mechanical and technological objects, and supernatural entities such as God. We suggest that engagement is guided by two basic motivations: (1) the motivation to explain and predict others ’ actions, and (2) the motivation to connect socially with others. When present, these motivational forces can lead people to attribute minds to almost any agent. When absent, the likelihood of attributing a mind to others, even other human beings, decreases. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our theory of mind can help to explain the inverse process of dehumanization, and also why people might be indifferent to other people even when connecting to them would improve their momentary wellbeing. Everyone needs someone to cling to, a source of support to ease anxiety when feeling upended and alone. For Julia Hill during such times, that source was Luna (Hill 2000). “Whenever I felt [anxious] during those first days, I’d just hug Luna, and I’d feel rooted. ” For a little over 2 years, Julia spent every waking and sleeping moment with Luna, caring for her, defending her, encouraging her, and fighting
© The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0956797613504964
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The Primordial Psyche
"... Abstract: Scientific materialism is still influential in certain academic spheres. In this article, I examine multiple lines of empirical evidence showing that this ideology, while partially true, is woefully incomplete and, therefore, obsolete. This evidence indicates that we humans can-not be redu ..."
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Abstract: Scientific materialism is still influential in certain academic spheres. In this article, I examine multiple lines of empirical evidence showing that this ideology, while partially true, is woefully incomplete and, therefore, obsolete. This evidence indicates that we humans can-not be reduced to powerless, biophysical machines since the psyche greatly influences the activity of the brain and the body, and can oper-ate telosomatically. Based on this evidence, I introduce the Theory of Psychelementarity (TOP) and present a few predictions. This theory proposes that the psyche plays a role as primordial as that of matter, energy, and space-time. Another central premise of this theory is that the psyche cannot be reduced to physical processes. The TOP accounts for a number of well-studied psychophysical phenomena, which are reinterpreted in light of a post-materialist perspective. This theory also accounts for anomalous phenomena that are currently rejected by materialists.
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"... integrate information (IIT). We describe computer simulations to show that SPC surpasses IIT in providing better explanations of key aspects of consciousness: qualitative features, es su emantic pointers, state. Whe ountries, a ssess suffi complex kinds of neural processes. We will show that SPC sur ..."
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integrate information (IIT). We describe computer simulations to show that SPC surpasses IIT in providing better explanations of key aspects of consciousness: qualitative features, es su emantic pointers, state. Whe ountries, a ssess suffi complex kinds of neural processes. We will show that SPC surpasses IIT in providing better explanations of key asp consciousness, including: qualitative features, onset and cessation, shifts in experiences, differences in kinds across d
