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...despite that we do not enforce the policies in runtime. Mobile security issues have gained much attention recently. Malware are not strangers for both the official Android market and alternative ones =-=[36]-=-. Research efforts were made on detecting repackaged apps [35] or apps with known malicious behavior [21, 37]. Recently Google also launched its malware filtering engine [1]. Information leakage is an...

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...ps from the official Android Market to understand their general security and privacy characteristics. Our work has a much stronger emphasis on malware detection than privacy leak detection. MalGenome =-=[55]-=- aims to systematically characterize existing Android malware from various aspects, including their installation methods, activation mechanisms as well as the nature of carried malicious payloads. Not...

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...e events are guarded by permissions, which an app must declare statically and get approved for at the time of installation. Many malicious applications have been found to register for specific events =-=[32]-=-. Based on the permissions declared by the application, we raise specific events in the system. For example, if an application contains the BOOT COMPLETED permission, Playground artificially raises th...

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...6% of code, for an average of 8%, which is attributed to system events that only Dynodroid can trigger. We note that many Android malwares are triggered only when specific system events are triggered =-=[29]-=-; Monkey would not be able to expose such malwares. Monkey exclusively covers 0-61% of code, for an average of 6%, which is attributed to the richer set of UI events that Monkey can trigger (see Table...

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...taset for validation and market evolution analysis. Malware Dataset: Our malware dataset consists of 378 unique .apk files that are known to be malicious. We obtained this dataset from the authors of =-=[31]-=-. For each malware sample, we extract the permissions requested using the AndroidManifest.xml file present inside the package file. For these malicious apps we do not have their category information. ...

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...cterized a large set of Android malwares and a large subset of malwares’ main attack was accumulating fees on the devices by subscribing to premium services by abusing SMS-related Android permissions =-=[32]-=-. Colluding applications could combine their permissions and perform activities beyond their individual privileges. They can communicate directly [8], or exploit covert or overt channels in Android co...

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... tools on Android, these approaches cannot directly apply to these tools presently. Smartphone Malware Research. Many works have been done towards discovery and characterization of smartphone malware =-=[7, 15, 20, 23, 24, 29, 30]-=-. Our work is distinct from these as we try to evaluate the efficacy of existing tools against transformed malware. 8. CONCLUSION We evaluated ten anti-malware products on Android for their resilience...

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...stealthily collected and misused by the ill-intended developers of some apps. A recent study has showed that Android apps frequently transmit private data to unknown destinations without user consent =-=[46]-=-. To protect users, there is a great need for strong analysis tools that Android app markets can use to identify and remove malicious apps. State-of-the-art approaches of privacy leakage detection on ...

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...on, we selected about 11,000 malware apps from Virus Share [21] and analyzed which kinds of sources and sinks these malware samples use. Unsurprisingly, as already found by different researchers [4], =-=[31]-=-, [32] current malware is leaking privacy information such as location information or the address book. Interestingly, however, these samples do not only use the standard source and sink methods commo...