Results 1  10
of
27
A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors. Psychology Revue Letter
, 2010
"... A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory mod ..."
Abstract

Cited by 56 (12 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced—the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum informationprocessing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.
Subjective probability assessment in decision analysis: Partition dependence and bias toward the ignorance prior, Management Science
, 2005
"... doi 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0409 ..."
(Show Context)
Modeling patterns of probability calibration with random support theory: Diagnosing casebased judgment
, 2005
"... ..."
Are risk assessments of a terrorist attack coherent
 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
, 2005
"... Four experiments examined 3 types of violations of coherence criteria in risk assessments of a terrorist attack. First, the requirement that extensionally equivalent descriptions be assigned the same probability (i.e., additivity) was violated. Unpacking descriptions of an attack into subtypes led t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 10 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Four experiments examined 3 types of violations of coherence criteria in risk assessments of a terrorist attack. First, the requirement that extensionally equivalent descriptions be assigned the same probability (i.e., additivity) was violated. Unpacking descriptions of an attack into subtypes led to an increase in assessed risk. Second, additivity was also violated when risk assessments were obtained by subtracting the probability of no attack from 1.0. This refocusing procedure inflated assessed risk. Third, refocusing also increased the proportion of monotonicity violations in assessing risk across increasing or decreasing timeframes. Task structuring that promoted consideration of complementary possibilities increased coherence, suggesting that incoherence is due primarily to errors in applying rather than comprehending the relevant criteria.
Partition dependence in decision analysis, resource allocation, and consumer
 Experimental Business Research
, 2005
"... In this chapter we explore a wide range of judgment and decision tasks in which people are called on to allocate a scarce resource (e.g., money, choices, belief) over a fixed set of possibilities (e.g., investment opportunities, consumption options, events). We observe that in these situations peopl ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (7 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
In this chapter we explore a wide range of judgment and decision tasks in which people are called on to allocate a scarce resource (e.g., money, choices, belief) over a fixed set of possibilities (e.g., investment opportunities, consumption options, events). We observe that in these situations people tend to invoke maximum entropy heuristics in which they are biased toward even allocation. Moreover, we argue that before applying these heuristics, decision makers subjectively partition the set of options into groups over which they apply even allocation. As a result, allocations vary systematically with the particular partition that people happen to invoke, a phenomenon called partition dependence. We review evidence for maximum entropy heuristics and partition dependence in the following domains: (1) decision analysis in which degree of belief and importance weights must be distributed among possible events and attributes, respectively; (2) managerial decision making in which money and other organizational resources are allocated among risky projects, divisions, and organizational stakeholders; and (3) consumer choice in which individuals make selections among various consumption goods and consumption time periods. 1.
Probabilistic theories of reasoning need pragmatics too: modulating relevance . . .
, 2010
"... ..."
On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability.
 Cognition,
, 2009
"... a b s t r a c t In standard treatments of probability, Pr ðAjBÞ is defined as the ratio of Pr ðA \ BÞ to Pr ðBÞ, provided that Pr ðBÞ > 0. This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of Pr ðAjBÞ arise in the mind via implicit calculation o ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
a b s t r a c t In standard treatments of probability, Pr ðAjBÞ is defined as the ratio of Pr ðA \ BÞ to Pr ðBÞ, provided that Pr ðBÞ > 0. This account of conditional probability suggests a psychological question, namely, whether estimates of Pr ðAjBÞ arise in the mind via implicit calculation of Pr ðA \ BÞ=Pr ðBÞ. We tested this hypothesis (Experiment 1) by presenting brief visual scenes composed of forms, and collecting estimates of relevant probabilities. Direct estimates of conditional probability were not well predicted by Pr ðA \ BÞ=Pr ðBÞ. Direct estimates were also closer to the objective probabilities defined by the stimuli, compared to estimates computed from the foregoing ratio. The hypothesis that Pr ðAjBÞ arises from the ratio Pr ðA \ BÞ=½Pr ðA \ BÞ þ Pr ðA \ BÞ fared better (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, the same hypotheses were evaluated in the context of subjective estimates of the chance of future events.
Temporal distance moderates description dependence of subjective probability
 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
, 2008
"... Abstract Probability judgment is descriptiondependent; different descriptions of the same event can elicit different judged probabilities. We propose that the temporal proximity of an event moderates the degree of description dependence in probability judgment. According to construal level theory, ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Abstract Probability judgment is descriptiondependent; different descriptions of the same event can elicit different judged probabilities. We propose that the temporal proximity of an event moderates the degree of description dependence in probability judgment. According to construal level theory, near future events are represented more concretely than distant future events. These more concrete representations are predicted to be more stable, and therefore less susceptible to description dependence effects. Consistent with this prediction, changing an event's description by unpacking it into constituent parts influenced its judged probability more when the event took place in the distant rather than the near future. Specifically, greater description dependence was found for distant events regardless of whether the unpacking manipulation increased (Experiment 1) or decreased (Experiment 2) judged probability.
Psychological Science 23(8) 848 –854 © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission:
"... long been a topic of interest (e.g., French, 1986; Griffiths & ..."
Psychological Science XX(X) 1 –7 © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission:
"... long been a topic of interest (e.g., French, 1986; Griffiths & ..."