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273
A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision
, 2005
"... Trust and reputation systems represent a significant trend in decision support for Internet mediated service provision. The basic idea is to collect information about potential service providers in order to select the most reliable and trustworthy provider of services and information and to avoid th ..."
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Cited by 632 (15 self)
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Trust and reputation systems represent a significant trend in decision support for Internet mediated service provision. The basic idea is to collect information about potential service providers in order to select the most reliable and trustworthy provider of services and information and to avoid the less trustworthy. A natural side effect is that it also provides an incentive for good behaviour and therefore tends to have a positive effect on market quality. Reputation systems can be called collaborative sanctioning systems to reflect their collaborative nature, and are related to collaborative filtering systems. Reputation systems are already being used in successful commercial online applications. There is also a rapidly growing literature around trust and reputation systems, but unfortunately this activity is not very coherent. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of existing and proposed systems that can be used to derive measures of trust and reputation for Internet transactions, to analyse the current trends and developments in this area, and to propose a research agenda for trust and reputation systems.
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
- IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING
, 2004
"... Peer-to-peer (P2P) online communities are commonly perceived as an environment offering both opportunities and threats. One way to ..."
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Cited by 402 (17 self)
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) online communities are commonly perceived as an environment offering both opportunities and threats. One way to
A Reputation-based Approach for Choosing Reliable Resources IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS
- PROC. OF THE 9TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (CCS
, 2002
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Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks
, 2004
"... Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and tr ..."
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Cited by 256 (3 self)
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Lack of cooperation (free riding) is one of the key problems that confronts today's P2P systems. What makes this problem particularly difficult is the unique set of challenges that P2P systems pose: large populations, high turnover, asymmetry of interest, collusion, zero-cost identities, and traitors. To tackle these challenges we model the P2P system using the Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma (GPD), and propose the Reciprocative decision function as the basis of a family of incentives techniques. These techniques are fully distributed and include: discriminating server selection, maxflowbased subjective reputation, and adaptive stranger policies. Through simulation, we show that these techniques can drive a system of strategic users to nearly optimal levels of cooperation.
The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment
- Experimental Economics
, 2003
"... The latest version of this working paper can be found at ..."
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Cited by 177 (9 self)
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The latest version of this working paper can be found at
A Robust Reputation System for P2P and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
, 2004
"... Reputation systems can be tricked by the spread of false reputation ratings, be it false accusations or false praise. Simple solutions such as exclusively relying on one's own direct observations have drawbacks, as they do not make use of all the information available. We propose a fully distri ..."
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Cited by 170 (0 self)
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Reputation systems can be tricked by the spread of false reputation ratings, be it false accusations or false praise. Simple solutions such as exclusively relying on one's own direct observations have drawbacks, as they do not make use of all the information available. We propose a fully distributed reputation system that can cope with false disseminated information. In our approach, everyone maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about everyone else that they care about. From time to time first-hand reputation information is exchanged with others; using a modified Bayesian approach we designed and present in this paper, only second-hand reputation information that is not incompatible with the current reputation rating is accepted. Thus, reputation ratings are slightly modified by accepted information. Trust ratings are updated based on the compatibility of second-hand reputation information with prior reputation ratings. Data is entirely distributed: someone's reputation and trust is the collection of ratings maintained by others. We enable redemption and prevent the sudden exploitation of good reputation built over time by introducing re-evaluation and reputation fading.
Free-Riding and Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems
- ANNUALWORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SECURITY
, 2004
"... We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's generosity. The user decides w ..."
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Cited by 170 (2 self)
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We devise a simple model to study the phenomenon of free-riding and the effect of free identities on user behavior in peer-to-peer systems. At the heart of our model is a strategic user of a certain type, an intrinsic and private parameter that reflects the user's generosity. The user decides whether to contribute or free-ride based on how the current burden of contributing in the system compares to her type. We derive the emerging cooperation level in equilibrium and quantify the effect of providing free-riders with degraded service on the emerging cooperation. We find that this penalty mechanism is beneficial mostly when the "generosity level" of the society (i.e., the average type) is low. To quantify the social cost of free identities, we extend the model to account for dynamic scenarios with turnover (users joining and leaving) and with whitewashers: users who strategically leave the system and re-join with a new identity. We find that the imposition of penalty on all legitimate newcomers incurs a significant social loss only under high turnover rates in conjunction with intermediate societal generosity levels.
The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Reputation Systems
, 2001
"... Online reputation mechanisms are emerging as a promising alternative to more traditional trust building mechanisms, such as branding and formal contracting, in settings where the latter may be ineffective or prohibitively expensive; a lot of electronic trading communities fall under these categories ..."
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Cited by 167 (8 self)
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Online reputation mechanisms are emerging as a promising alternative to more traditional trust building mechanisms, such as branding and formal contracting, in settings where the latter may be ineffective or prohibitively expensive; a lot of electronic trading communities fall under these categories. Although a number of commercial websites already employ various forms of reputation mechanisms, rigorous research into their properties is still in its infancy. This fledgling field can benefit from past results in economics and game theory. Moreover, in order to translate the stylized results of game theory into concrete managerial guidance for implementing and participating in effective reputation mechanisms further advances are needed in a number of important areas: First, the design space of such mechanisms needs to be scoped and the effects of different design choices on performance need to be better understood. Second, the economic efficiency of various classes of reputation mechanisms needs to be quantified and compared to that of alternative mechanisms for building trust. Third, the robustness of those mechanisms against boundedly rational players, noisy ratings and strategic manipulation needs to be studied and improved. This paper surveys past results that have been derived in a variety of contexts, but which are relevant as a basis for building online reputation systems, presents two analytical models that illustrate the role of such systems in electronic markets and identifies opportunities for further MS/OR research in this fascinating area.
Taxonomy of trust: Categorizing p2p reputation systems
- Computer Networks
, 2006
"... The field of peer-to-peer reputation systems has exploded in the last few years. Our goal is to organize existing ideas and work to facilitate system design. We present a taxonomy of reputation system components, their properties, and discuss how user behavior and technical constraints can conflict. ..."
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Cited by 111 (0 self)
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The field of peer-to-peer reputation systems has exploded in the last few years. Our goal is to organize existing ideas and work to facilitate system design. We present a taxonomy of reputation system components, their properties, and discuss how user behavior and technical constraints can conflict. In our discussion, we describe research that exemplifies compromises made to deliver a useable, implementable system. Ó 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks
, 2003
"... this paper, our contributions are to generalize from the traditional symmetric EPD to the asymmetric transactions of P2P applications, map out the design space of EPD-based incentive techniques, and simulate a subset of these techniques. Our findings are as follows: Incentive techniques relying on ..."
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Cited by 111 (1 self)
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this paper, our contributions are to generalize from the traditional symmetric EPD to the asymmetric transactions of P2P applications, map out the design space of EPD-based incentive techniques, and simulate a subset of these techniques. Our findings are as follows: Incentive techniques relying on private history (where entites only use their private histories of entities' actions) fail as the population size increases
