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612
Common Risk Factors in the Returns On Stocks And Bonds
 Journal of Financial Economics
, 1993
"... This paper identities five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. There are three stockmarket factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and booktomarket equity. There are two bondmarket factors. related to maturity and default risks. Stock returns have s ..."
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Cited by 2237 (33 self)
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This paper identities five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. There are three stockmarket factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and booktomarket equity. There are two bondmarket factors. related to maturity and default risks. Stock returns have shared variation due to the stockmarket factors, and they are linked to bond returns through shared variation in the bondmarket factors. Except for lowgrade corporates. the bondmarket factors capture the common variation in bond returns. Most important. the five factors seem to explain average returns on stocks and bonds. 1.
Illiquidity and stock returns: crosssection and timeseries effects,
 Journal of Financial Markets
, 2002
"... Abstract This paper shows that over time, expected market illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess return, suggesting that expected stock excess return partly represents an illiquidity premium. This complements the crosssectional positive returnilliquidity relationship. Also, stock ret ..."
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Cited by 864 (9 self)
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Abstract This paper shows that over time, expected market illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess return, suggesting that expected stock excess return partly represents an illiquidity premium. This complements the crosssectional positive returnilliquidity relationship. Also, stock returns are negatively related over time to contemporaneous unexpected illiquidity. The illiquidity measure here is the average across stocks of the daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume, which is easily obtained from daily stock data for long time series in most stock markets. Illiquidity affects more strongly small firm stocks, thus explaining time series variations in their premiums over time. r
Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles
 JOURNAL OF FINANCE
, 1994
"... We model consumption and dividend growth rates as containing (i) a small longrun predictable component and (ii) fluctuating economic uncertainty (consumption volatility). These dynamics, for which we provide empirical support, in conjunction with Epstein and Zin’s (1989) preferences, can explain ke ..."
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Cited by 761 (63 self)
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We model consumption and dividend growth rates as containing (i) a small longrun predictable component and (ii) fluctuating economic uncertainty (consumption volatility). These dynamics, for which we provide empirical support, in conjunction with Epstein and Zin’s (1989) preferences, can explain key asset markets phenomena. In our economy, financial markets dislike economic uncertainty and better longrun growth prospects raise equity prices. The model can justify the equity premium, the riskfree rate, and the volatility of the market return, riskfree rate, and the pricedividend ratio. As in the data, dividend yields predict returns and the volatility of returns is timevarying.
Term Premia and Interest Rate Forecasts in Affine Models
, 2001
"... I find that the standard class of a#ne models produces poor forecasts of future changes in Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: The compensation that investors receive for faci ..."
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Cited by 454 (13 self)
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I find that the standard class of a#ne models produces poor forecasts of future changes in Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: The compensation that investors receive for facing risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. This means that risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe and empirically estimate a class of models that is broader than the standard a#ne class. These "essentially a#ne" models retain the tractability of the usual models, but allow the compensation for interest rate risk to vary independently of interest rate volatility. This additional flexibility proves useful in forming accurate forecasts of future yields. Address correspondence to the University of California, Haas School of Business, 545 Student Services Building #1900, Berkeley, CA 94720. Phone: 5106421435. Email address: du#ee@haas.b...
Investing for the long run when returns are predictable
 Journal of Finance
, 2000
"... We examine how the evidence of predictability in asset returns affects optimal portfolio choice for investors with long horizons. Particular attention is paid to estimation risk, or uncertainty about the true values of model parameters. We find that even after incorporating parameter uncertainty, th ..."
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Cited by 444 (0 self)
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We examine how the evidence of predictability in asset returns affects optimal portfolio choice for investors with long horizons. Particular attention is paid to estimation risk, or uncertainty about the true values of model parameters. We find that even after incorporating parameter uncertainty, there is enough predictability in returns to make investors allocate substantially more to stocks, the longer their horizon. Moreover, the weak statistical significance of the evidence for predictability makes it important to take estimation risk into account; a longhorizon investor who ignores it may overallocate to stocks by a sizeable amount. ONE OF THE MORE STRIKING EMPIRICAL FINDINGS in recent financial research is the evidence of predictability in asset returns. 1 In this paper we examine the implications of this predictability for an investor seeking to make sensible portfolio allocation decisions. We approach this question from the perspective of horizon effects: Given the evidence of predictability in returns, should a longhorizon investor allocate his wealth differently from a shorthorizon investor? The motivation for thinking about the problem in these terms is the classic work of Samuelson ~1969! and Merton ~1969!. They show that if asset returns are i.i.d., an investor with power utility who rebalances his portfolio optimally should choose the same asset allocation, regardless of investment horizon. In light of the growing body of evidence that returns are predictable, the investor’s horizon may no longer be irrelevant. The extent to which the horizon does play a role serves as an interesting and convenient way of thinking about how predictability affects portfolio choice. Moreover, the results may shed light on the common but controversial advice that investors with long horizons should allocate more heavily to stocks. 2
The Determinants of Credit Spread Changes.
 Journal of Finance
, 2001
"... ABSTRACT Using dealer's quotes and transactions prices on straight industrial bonds, we investigate the determinants of credit spread changes. Variables that should in theory determine credit spread changes have rather limited explanatory power. Further, the residuals from this regression are ..."
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Cited by 422 (2 self)
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ABSTRACT Using dealer's quotes and transactions prices on straight industrial bonds, we investigate the determinants of credit spread changes. Variables that should in theory determine credit spread changes have rather limited explanatory power. Further, the residuals from this regression are highly crosscorrelated, and principal components analysis implies they are mostly driven by a single common factor. Although we consider several macroeconomic and financial variables as candidate proxies, we cannot explain this common systematic component. Our results suggest that monthly credit spread changes are principally driven by local supply/demand shocks that are independent of both creditrisk factors and standard proxies for liquidity. * CollinDufresne is at Carnegie Mellon University. Goldstein is at Washington University in St. Louis. Martin is at Arizona State University. A significant portion of this paper was written while Goldstein and Martin were at The Ohio State University. We thank Rui Albuquerque, Gurdip Bakshi, Greg Bauer, Dave Brown, Francesca Carrieri, Peter Christoffersen, Susan Christoffersen, Greg Duffee, Darrell Duffie, Vihang Errunza, Gifford Fong, Mike Gallmeyer, Laurent Gauthier, Rick Green, John Griffin, Jean Helwege, Kris Jacobs, Chris Jones, Andrew Karolyi, Dilip Madan, David Mauer, Erwan Morellec, Federico Nardari, NR Prabhala, Tony Sanders, Sergei Sarkissian, Bill Schwert, Ken Singleton, Chester Spatt, René Stulz (the editor), Suresh Sundaresan, Haluk Unal, Karen Wruck, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We thank Ahsan Aijaz, John Puleo, and Laura Tuttle for research assistance. We are also grateful to seminar participants at Arizona State University, University of Maryland, McGill University, The Ohio State University, University of Rochester, and Southern Methodist University. The relation between stock and bond returns has been widely studied at the aggregate level (see, for example, Campbell and Ammer (1993), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1989), and Fama and French (1993)). Recently, a few studies have investigated that relation at both the individual firm level (see, for example, Kwan (1996)) and portfolio level (see, for example, Blume, Keim and Patel (1991), and Cornell and Green (1991)). These studies focus on corporate bond returns, or yield changes. The main conclusions of these papers are: (1) highgrade bonds behave like Treasury bonds, and (2) lowgrade bonds are more sensitive to stock returns. The implications of these studies may be limited in many situations of interest, however. For example, hedge funds often take highly levered positions in corporate bonds while hedging away interest rate risk by shorting treasuries. As a consequence, their portfolios become extremely sensitive to changes in credit spreads rather than changes in bond yields. The distinction between changes in credit spreads and changes in corporate yields is significant: while an adjusted R 2 of 60 percent is obtained when regressing highgrade bond yield changes on Treasury yield changes and stock returns (see Kwan (1996)) we find that the R 2 falls to five percent when the dependent variable is credit spread changes. Hence, while much is known about yield changes, we have very limited knowledge about the determinants of credit spread changes. Below, we investigate the determinants of credit spread changes. From a contingentclaims, or noarbitrage standpoint, credit spreads obtain for two fundamental reasons: 1) there is a risk of default, and 2) in the event of default, the bondholder receives only a portion of the promised payments. Thus, we examine how changes in credit spreads respond to proxies for both changes in the probability of future default and for changes in the recovery rate. Separately, recent empirical studies find that the corporate bond market tends to have relatively high transactions costs and low volume. 1 These findings suggest looking beyond the pure contingentclaims viewpoint when searching for the determinants of credit spread changes, since one might expect to observe a liquidity premium. Thus, we also examine the extent to which credit spread changes can be explained by proxies for liquidity changes. Our results are, in summary: although we consider numerous proxies that should measure both changes in default probability and changes in recovery rate, regression analysis can only explain about 25 percent of the observed credit spread changes. We find, however, that the residuals from these regressions are highly crosscorrelated, and principal components analysis implies that they are mostly driven by a single common factor. An important implication of this finding is that if any explanatory variables have been omitted, they are likely not firmspecific. We therefore rerun the regression, but 1 this time include several liquidity, macroeconomic, and financial variables as candidate proxies for this factor. We cannot, however, find any set of variables that can explain the bulk of this common systematic factor. Our findings suggest that the dominant component of monthly credit spread changes in the corporate bond market is driven by local supply/demand shocks that are independent of both changes in creditrisk and typical measures of liquidity. We note that a similar, but significantly smaller effect has been documented in the mortgage backed (Ginnie Mae) securities market by Boudoukh, Richardson, Stanton, and Whitelaw (1997), who find that a 3factor model explains over 90 percent of Ginnie Mae yields, but that the remaining variation apparently cannot be explained by the changes in the yield curve. 2 In contrast, our multiplefactor model explains only about onequarter of the variation in credit spreads, with most of the remainder attributable to a single systematic factor. Similarly, Duffie and Singleton (1999) find that both creditrisk and liquidity factors are necessary to explain innovations in U.S. swap rates. However, when analyzing the residuals they are unable to find explanatory factors. They conclude that swap marketspecific supply/demand shocks drive the unexplained changes in swap rates. Existing literature on credit spread changes is limited. 3 Pedrosa and Roll (1998) document considerable comovement of credit spread changes among index portfolios of bonds from various industry, quality, and maturity groups. Note that this result by itself is not surprising, since theory predicts that all credit spreads should be affected by aggregate variables such as changes in the interest rate, changes in business climate, changes in market volatility, etc. The particularly surprising aspect of our results is that, after controlling for these aggregate determinants, the systematic movement of credit spread changes still remains, and indeed, is the dominant factor. Brown The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we examine the theoretical determinants of credit spread changes from a contingentclaims framework. In Section II, we discuss the data and define the proxies used. In Section III, we analyze our results. In Section IV, we provide evidence for the robustness of our results on several fronts. First, we repeat the analysis using transactions (rather than quotes) data to obtain credit spread changes. Second, we consider a host of new explanatory variables that proxy for changes in liquidity and other macroeconomic effects. Finally, we perform a regression analysis on simulated data to demonstrate that our empirical findings are not being driven by the econometric techniques used. We conclude in Section V. 2 I. Theoretical Determinants of Credit Spread Changes Socalled structural models of default provide an intuitive framework for identifying the determinants of credit spread changes. 4 These models build on the original insights of Black and Scholes (1973), who demonstrate that equity and debt can be valued using contingentclaims analysis. Introduced by Merton (1974) and further investigated by, among others, Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Bryis and de Varenne (1997), and CollinDufresne and Goldstein Mathematically, contingentclaims pricing is most readily accomplished by pricing derivatives under the socalled riskneutral measure, where all traded securities have an expected return equal to the riskfree rate (see Cox and Ross (1976) and Harrison and Kreps (1979)). In particular, the value of the debt claim is determined by computing its expected (under the riskneutral measure) future cash flows discounted at the riskfree rate. As the credit spread CS(t) is uniquely defined through: (1) the price of a debt claim, (2) this debt claim's contractual cash flows, and (3) the (appropriate) riskfree rate, we can write CS(t) = CS(V t , r t , {X t }), where V is firm value, r is the spot rate, and {X t } represents all of the other "state variables" needed to specify the model. 6 Since credit spreads are uniquely determined given the current values of the state variables, it follows that credit spread changes are determined by changes in these state variables. Hence, structural models generate predictions for what the theoretical determinants of credit spread changes should be, and moreover offer a prediction for whether changes in these variables should be positively or negatively correlated with changes in credit spreads. We discuss these proposed determinants individually. Changes in the Spot Rate As pointed out by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), the static effect of a higher spot rate is to increase the riskneutral drift of the firm value process. A higher drift reduces the incidence of default, and in turn, reduces the credit spreads. This prediction is borne out in their data. Further evidence is provided by Duffee (1998), who uses a sample restricted to noncallable bonds and 3 finds a significant, albeit weaker, negative relationship between changes in credit spreads and interest rates. Changes in Slope of Yield Curve Although the spot rate is the only interestratesensitive factor that appears in the firm value process, the spot rate process itself may depend upon other factors as well. 7 For example, Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) find that the two most important factors driving the term structure of interest rates are the level and slope of the term structure. If an increase in the slope of the Treasury curve increases the expected future short rate, then by the same argument as above, it should also lead to a decrease in credit spreads. From a different perspective, a decrease in yield curve slope may imply a weakening economy. It is reasonable to believe that the expected recovery rate might decrease in times of recession. 8 Once again, theory predicts that an increase in the Treasury yield curve slope will create a decrease in credit spreads. Changes in Leverage Within the structural framework, default is triggered when the leverage ratio approaches unity. Hence, it is clear that credit spreads are expected to increase with leverage. Likewise, credit spreads should be a decreasing function of the firm's return on equity, all else equal. Changes in Volatility The contingentclaims approach implies that the debt claim has features similar to a short position in a put option. Since option values increase with volatility, it follows that this model predicts credit spreads should increase with volatility. This prediction is intuitive: increased volatility increases the probability of default. Changes in the Probability or Magnitude of a Downward Jump in Firm Value Implied volatility smiles in observed option prices suggest that markets account for the probability of large negative jumps in firm value. Thus, increases in either the probability or the magnitude of a negative jump should increase credit spreads. Changes in the Business Climate Even if the probability of default remains constant for a firm, changes in credit spreads can occur due to changes in the expected recovery rate. The expected recovery rate in turn should be 4 a function of the overall business climate. 9 II. Data Our first objective is to investigate how well the variables identified above explain observed changes in credit spreads. Here, we discuss the data used for estimating both credit spreads and proxies for the explanatory variables. Credit Spreads The corporate bond data are obtained from Lehman Brothers via the Fixed Income (or Warga) Database. We use only quotes on noncallable, nonputtable debt of industrial firms; quotes are discarded whenever a bond has less than four years to maturity. Monthly observations are used for the period July 1988 through December 1997. Only observations with actual quotes are used, since it has been shown by Sarig and Warga (1989) that matrix prices are problematic. 10 To determine the credit spread, CS i t , for bond i at month t, we use the Benchmark Treasury rates from Datastream for maturities of 3, 5, 7, 10, and 30 years, and then use a linear interpolation scheme to estimate the entire yield curve. Credit spreads are then defined as the difference between the yield of bondi and the associated yield of the Treasury curve at the same maturity. Treasury Rate Level We use Datastream's monthly series of 10year Benchmark Treasury rates, r 10 t . To capture potential nonlinear effects due to convexity, we also include the squared level of the term structure, (r 10 t ) 2 . Slope of Yield Curve We define the slope of the yield curve as the difference between Datastream's 10year and 2year Benchmark Treasury yields, slope t ≡ r 10 t − r 2 t . We interpret this proxy as both an indication of expectations of future short rates, and as an indication of overall economic health. Firm Leverage For each bond i, market values of firm equity from CRSP and book values of firm debt from COMPUSTAT are used to obtain leverage ratios, lev 5 Since debt levels are reported quarterly, linear interpolation is used to estimate monthly debt figures. We note that previous studies of yield changes have often used the firm's equity return to proxy for changes in the firm's health, rather than changes in leverage. For robustness, we also use each firm's monthly equity return, ret i t , obtained from CRSP, as an explanatory variable. Volatility In theory, changes in a firm's future volatility can be extracted from changes in implied volatilities of its publicly traded options. Unfortunately, most of the firms we investigate lack publicly traded options. 11 Thus, we are forced to use the best available substitute: changes in the VIX index, VIX t , which corresponds to a weighted average of eight implied volatilities of nearthemoney options on the OEX (S&P 100) index. 12 These data are provided by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. While use of VIX in place of firmspecific volatility assumes a strong positive correlation between the two, this assumption does not seem to affect our results significantly. Indeed, one of our main findings is that most of the credit spread innovation is unexplained, and that the residuals are highly correlated crosssectionally. Note that if changes in individual firm volatility and market volatility are not highly correlated, then our proxy should bias our results away from finding residuals which are so systematic. Jump Magnitudes and Probabilities Changes in the probability and magnitude of a large negative jump in firm value should have a significant effect on credit spreads. This factor is rather difficult to proxy because historical occurrences of such jumps are rare enough to be of little value in predicting future probabilities and magnitude of such jumps. Therefore, we approach the problem using a forwardlooking measure. In particular, we employ changes in the slope of the "smirk" of implied volatilities of options on S&P 500 futures to determine perceived changes in the probability of such jumps. Options and futures prices were obtained from Bridge. Our proxy is constructed from atand outofthe money puts, and atand inthemoney calls with the shortest maturity on the nearby S&P 500 futures contract. We first compute implied volatilities for each strike K using the standard Black and Scholes (1973) model. We then fit the linearquadratic regression σ(K) = a + bK + cK 2 , where K is the strike price. Our estimate of this slope, jump t , is defined via where F is the atthe money strike price, which equals the current futures price. We choose to look at the implied volatility at K = .9F because we do not want 6 to extrapolate the quadratic regression beyond the region where actual option prices are most typically observed. Note that if there is a nonnegligible probability of large negative jumps in firm value, then the appropriate hedging tool for corporate debt may not be the firm's equity, but rather deep outofthemoney puts on the firm's equity. Assuming large negative jumps in firm value are highly correlated with market crashes, we hope to capture systematic changes in the market's expectation of such events with this proxy. We expect that a steepening in the slope of the smirk will trigger an increase in credit spreads. Changes in Business Climate We use monthly S&P 500 returns, S&P t , as a proxy for the overall state of the economy. The data are obtained from CRSP. For ease of analysis, each bond is assigned to a leverage group based on the firm's average leverage ratio for those months where the bond has quotes available. In Panels II and III of INSERT In Maturity subsample results are also presented in Panels II and III of
Investor psychology and asset pricing
, 2001
"... The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant flux. The purely rational approach is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation. This survey sketches a framework for understa ..."
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Cited by 420 (27 self)
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The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant flux. The purely rational approach is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation. This survey sketches a framework for understanding decision biases, evaluates the a priori arguments and the capital market evidence bearing on the importance of investor psychology for security prices, and reviews recent models.
Asset Pricing in Production Economies,”
 Journal of Monetary Economics,
, 1998
"... Abstract This paper studies asset returns in different versions of the onesector real business cycle model. We show that a model with habit formation preferences and capital adjustment costs can explain the historical equity premium and the average riskfree return while replicating the salient bu ..."
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Cited by 354 (10 self)
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Abstract This paper studies asset returns in different versions of the onesector real business cycle model. We show that a model with habit formation preferences and capital adjustment costs can explain the historical equity premium and the average riskfree return while replicating the salient business cycle properties. The paper also applies a solution technique that combines loglinear methods with lognormal asset pricing formulae. 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G12; C63; E22
Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests
 Journal of Finance
, 2000
"... If asset returns have systematic skewness, expected returns should include rewards for accepting this risk. We formalize this intuition with an asset pricing model that incorporates conditional skewness. Our results show that conditional skewness helps explain the crosssectional variation of expect ..."
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Cited by 342 (6 self)
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If asset returns have systematic skewness, expected returns should include rewards for accepting this risk. We formalize this intuition with an asset pricing model that incorporates conditional skewness. Our results show that conditional skewness helps explain the crosssectional variation of expected returns across assets and is significant even when factors based on size and booktomarket are included. Systematic skewness is economically important and commands a risk premium, on average, of 3.60 percent per year. Our results suggest that the momentum effect is related to systematic skewness. The low expected return momentum portfolios have higher skewness than high expected return portfolios. THE SINGLE FACTOR CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL ~CAPM! of Sharpe ~1964! and Lintner ~1965! has come under recent scrutiny. Tests indicate that the crossasset variation in expected returns cannot be explained by the market beta alone. For example, a growing number of studies show that “fundamental” variables such as size, booktomarket value, and price to earnings ratios
Efficient Capital Market: II” ,
 Journal of Finance, No
, 1991
"... SEQUELS ARE RARELY AS good as the originals, so I approach this review of the market efflciency literature with trepidation. The task is thornier than it was 20 years ago, when work on efficiency was rather new. The literature is now so large that a full review is impossible, and is not attempted h ..."
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Cited by 337 (0 self)
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SEQUELS ARE RARELY AS good as the originals, so I approach this review of the market efflciency literature with trepidation. The task is thornier than it was 20 years ago, when work on efficiency was rather new. The literature is now so large that a full review is impossible, and is not attempted here. Instead, I discuss the work that I find most interesting, and I offer my views on what we have learned from the research on market efficiency. I. The Theme I take the market efficiency hypothesis to be the simple statement that security prices fully reflect all available information. A precondition for this strong version of the hypothesis is that information and trading costs, the costs of getting prices to reflect information, are always 0 (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). A weaker and economically more sensible version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen (1978)). Since there are surely positive information and trading costs, the extreme version of the market efficiency hypothesis is surely false. Its advantage, however, is that it is a clean benchmark that allows me to sidestep the messy problem of deciding what are reasonable information and trading costs. I can focus instead on the more interesting task of laying out the evidence on the adjustment of prices to various kinds of information. Each reader is then free to judge the scenarios where market efficiency is a good approximation (that is, deviations from the extreme version of the efficiency hypothesis are within information and trading costs) and those where some other model is a better simplifying view of the world. Ambiguity about information and trading costs is not, however, the main obstacle to inferences about market efficiency. The jointhypothesis problem is more serious. Thus, market efficiency per se is not testable. It must be