This paper develops a model in which the effectiveness of the board's monitoring of the CEO depends on the board's structure or composition. The independence of new directors is determined through a bargaining process between the existing directors and the CEO. The CEO's bargaining position, and thus his influence over the board-selection process, depends on an updated estimate of the CEO's ability based on his prior performance. Many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena in this model. We also explore the implications of this model for proposed regulations of corporate governance structures.

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We survey the evidence on the relationship between board composition and firm performance. Boards of directors of American public companies that have a majority of independent directors behave differently, in a number of ways, than boards without such a majority. Some of these differences appear to increase firm value; others may decrease firm value. Overall, within the range of board compositions present today in large public companies, there is no convincing evidence that greater board independence correlates with greater firm profitability or faster growth. In particular, there is no empirical support for current proposals that firms should have "supermajority-independent boards " with only one or two inside directors. To the contrary, there is some evidence that firms with supermajority-independent boards are less profitable than other firms. This suggests that it may be useful for firms to have a moderate number of inside directors (say three to five on an average-sized eleven member board). We offer some possible explanations for these results, based on board dynamics, the informational advantages possessed by inside (and, often, affiliated) directors, and the value of interaction between different types of directors who bring different strengths to the board. published in

We explore behavioral explanations for sub-optimal corporate investment decisions. Focusing on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, we argue that personal characteristics of chief executive officers, in particular overconfidence, can account for this widespread and persistent investment distortion. Overconfident CEOs overestimate the quality of their investment projects and view external finance as unduly costly. As a result, they invest more when they have internal funds at their disposal. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of CEOs in Forbes 500 companies. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they repeatedly fail to exercise options that are highly in the money, or if they habitually acquire stock of their own company. The main result is that investment is significantly more responsive to cash flow if the CEO displays overconfidence. In addition, we identify personal characteristics other than overconfidence (education, employment background, cohort, military service, and status in the company) that strongly affect the correlation between investment and cash flow. We are indebted to Brian Hall and David Yermack for providing us with the data. We are very grateful to Jeremy Stein for his invaluable support and comments. We also would like to thank Philippe Aghion, George

We report evidence on chief executive officer ~CEO! turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. STOCKHOLDERS RELY ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL monitoring mechanisms to help resolve agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations. Boards of directors and blockholders are important internal control mechanisms whereas the takeover market is a major source of external control. Both academicians and practitioners have

We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest. Stock price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO is involved in director selection. Our evidence may illuminate a mechanism used by CEOs to reduce pressure from active monitoring, and we find a recent trend of companies removing CEOs from involvement in director selection. A BOARD OF DIRECTORS SERVES AS THE PIVOTAL mechanism for monitoring the managers of a public corporation. Directors are voted into office by stockholders and have a fiduciary responsibility to protect stockholders ’ interests. Along with their legal duties of reviewing the corporation’s major plans and actions, directors are charged with selecting, compensating, evaluating, and, when appropriate, dismissing top managers.

We examine the equity ownership structure and board composition of a sample of 583 "rms over the ten-year period 1983}1992. Our evidence suggests that a substantial fraction of "rms exhibit large changes in ownership and board structure in any given year. These changes are correlated with one another and are not reversed in subsequent years. Ownership and board changes are strongly related to top executive turnover, prior stock price performance, and corporate control threats, but only weakly related to changes in "rm-speci"c determinants of ownership and board structure. Furthermore, large ownership changes are typically preceded by economic shocks and followed by asset restructurings. � 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

Many firms deploy takeover defenses at the time of their IPOs, although at significantly lower rates than for seasoned corporations. We find that IPO managers deploy takeover defenses particularly when their compensation is high, shareholdings are small, and the oversight from non-managerial shareholders is weak. We also find that the presence of a takeover defense in IPO firms is negatively related to acquisition likelihood, yet has no impact on takeover premiums for those firms that are acquired. Together, these results suggest that shareholders ’ marginal costs of takeover defenses exceed the benefits. Takeover Defenses at IPO Firms 1.

Abstract: We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to turnover, and improve subsequently. Relative performance improvements are positively related to institutional shareholdings and are greater when successor CEOs are hired from outside the firm than when they are insiders. We find also that turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns. Moreover, turnover announcement abnormal stock returns are significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors typically view turnover announcements as good news because they anticipate that turnover will prompt performance improvements, on average.

Commission, and conferences at Georgia Tech and Vanderbilt University for helpful comments and suggestions. Gregg Bell and Bin Huangfu provided able research assistance. Agrawal acknowledges financial support from the Powell Chair in Finance. Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals This paper empirically examines whether certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the probability of a company restating its earnings. We examine a sample of 159 U.S. public companies that restated earnings and an industrysize matched sample of control firms. We have assembled a novel, hand-collected dataset measuring corporate governance characteristics of these 318 firms. We find that several key governance characteristics are unrelated to the probability of a company restating earnings. These include the independence of boards and audit committees, and the provision of non-audit services by outside auditors. We find that the probability of restatement is lower in companies whose boards or audit committees have an independent director with a background in accounting or finance. This relation is statistically significant, large in magnitude, and robust to alternative specifications. Our findings are