This paper explores the ability of conditional versions of the CAPM and the consumption CAPM—jointly the (C)CAPM—to explain the cross section of average stock returns. Central to our approach is the use of the log consumption–wealth ratio as a conditioning variable. We demonstrate that such conditional models perform far better than unconditional specifications and about as well as the Fama-French three-factor model on portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market characteristics. The conditional consumption CAPM can account for the difference in returns between low-book-to-market and high-bookto-market portfolios and exhibits little evidence of residual size or book-to-market effects. We are grateful to Eugene Fama and Kenneth French for graciously providing the

This paper surveys the field of asset pricing. The emphasis is on the interplay between theory and empirical work and on the trade-off between risk and return. Modern research seeks to understand the behavior of the stochastic discount factor ~SDF! that prices all assets in the economy. The behavior of the term structure of real interest rates restricts the conditional mean of the SDF, whereas patterns of risk premia restrict its conditional volatility and factor structure. Stylized facts about interest rates, aggregate stock prices, and cross-sectional patterns in stock returns have stimulated new research on optimal portfolio choice, intertemporal equilibrium models, and behavioral finance. This paper surveys the field of asset pricing. The emphasis is on the interplay between theory and empirical work. Theorists develop models with testable predictions; empirical researchers document “puzzles”—stylized facts that fail to fit established theories—and this stimulates the development of new theories. Such a process is part of the normal development of any science. Asset pricing, like the rest of economics, faces the special challenge that data are generated naturally rather than experimentally, and so researchers cannot control the quantity of data or the random shocks that affect the data. A particularly interesting characteristic of the asset pricing field is that these random shocks are also the subject matter of the theory. As Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay ~1997, Chap. 1, p. 3! put it: What distinguishes financial economics is the central role that uncertainty plays in both financial theory and its empirical implementation. The starting point for every financial model is the uncertainty facing investors, and the substance of every financial model involves the impact of uncertainty on the behavior of investors and, ultimately, on mar-* Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

We use Bayesian model averaging to analyze the sample evidence on return predictability in the presence of model uncertainty. The analysis reveals in-sample and out-of-sample predictability, and shows that the out-of-sample performance of the Bayesian approach is superior to that of model selection criteria. We find that term and market premia are robust predictors. Moreover, small-cap value stocks appear more predictable than large-cap growth stocks. We also investigate the implications of model uncertainty from investment management perspectives. We show that model uncertainty is more important than estimation risk, and investors who discard model uncertainty face large utility losses.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium production economy to explicitly link expected stock returns to firm characteristics such as firm size and the book-to-market ratio. Stock returns in the model are completely characterized by a conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Size and book-to-market are correlated with the true conditional market beta and therefore appear to predict stock returns. The cross-sectional relations between firm characteristics and returns can subsist even after one controls for typical empirical estimates of beta. These findings suggest that the empirical success of size and book-to-market can be consistent with a single-factor conditional CAPM model. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Andy Abel, Jonathan Berk, Michael

We propose a dynamic risk-based model that captures the value premium. Firms are modeled as long-lived assets distinguished by the timing of cash flows. The stochastic discount factor is specified so that shocks to aggregate dividends are priced, but shocks to the discount rate are not. The model implies that growth firms covary more with the discount rate than do value firms, which covary more with cash flows. When calibrated to explain aggregate stock market behavior, the model accounts for the observed value premium, the high Sharpe ratios on value firms, and the poor performance of the CAPM. THIS PAPER PROPOSES A DYNAMIC RISK-BASED MODEL that captures both the high expected returns on value stocks relative to growth stocks, and the failure of the capital asset pricing model to explain these expected returns. The value premium, first noted by Graham and Dodd (1934), is the finding that assets with a high ratio of price to fundamentals (growth stocks) have low expected returns relative to assets with a low ratio of price to fundamentals (value stocks). This

We review extensive evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and prices. Systematic mispricing probably causes substantial resource misallocation. We argue that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity about the strategic incentives of informed market participants. However, individuals as political participants remain subject to the biases and self-interest they exhibit in private settings. Indeed, correcting contemporaneous market pricing errors is probably not government’s relative advantage. Government and private planners should establish rules ex ante to improve choices and efficiency, including disclosure, reporting, advertising, and default-option-setting regulations. Especially

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Firms in more concentrated industries earn lower returns, even after controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, and other return determinants. Explanations based on chance, measurement error, capital structure, and persistent in-sample cash flow shocks do not explain this finding. Drawing on work in industrial organization, we posit that either barriers to entry in highly concentrated industries insulate firms from undiversifiable distress risk, or firms in highly concentrated industries are less risky because they engage in less innovation, and thereby command lower expected returns. Additional time-series tests support these risk-based interpretations.

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