Two connectionist models of attention in associative learning, previously used to model human category learning, are shown to have special cases that are essentially equivalent to N. J. Mackintosh's (1975, Psychological Review, 82, 276 298) classic model of attention in animal learning. The models unify formulas for associative weight change with formulas for attentional change, under a common goal of error reduction. Error-driven attentional shifting accelerates learning of new associations but also protects previously learned associations from retroactive interference. The models are fit to data from a recent experiment in human associative learning (J. K. Kruschke 6 N. J. Blair, 2000, Psychonomic Bulletin 6 Review, 7, 636 645), which shows that blocking of learning involves learned inattention. The approach also provides a novel and unifying theory of latent inhibition (the preexposure effect) in terms of blocking. The discussion summarizes how the approach accounts for a variety of other ``irrational' ' phenomena in associative learning, including base rate effects, perseveration of attention through relevance

A fundamental question is whether people have available one category learning system, or many. Most multiple systems advocates postulate one explicit and one implicit system. Although there is much agreement about the nature of the explicit system, there is less agreement about the nature of the implicit system. In this article, we review a dual systems theory of category learning called competition between verbal and implicit systems (COVIS) developed by Ashby et al. (1998). The explicit system dominates the learning of verbalizable, rule-based category structures and is mediated by frontal brain areas such as the anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex (PFC), and head of the caudate nucleus. The implicit system, which uses procedural learning, dominates the learning of non-verbalizable, information-integration category structures, and is mediated by the tail of the caudate nucleus and a dopamine-mediated reward signal. We review nine studies that test six a priori predictions from COVIS, each of which is supported by the data.

predictions of exemplar models and that supported prototype models. In the authors ’ view, this evidence confounded the issue of the nature of the category representation with the type of response rule (probabilistic vs. deterministic) that was used. Also, their designs did not test whether the prototype models correctly predicted generalization performance. The present work demonstrates that an exemplar model that includes a response-scaling mechanism provides a natural account of all of Smith et al.’s experimental results. Furthermore, the exemplar model predicts classification performance better than the prototype models when novel transfer stimuli are included in the experimental designs. A classic issue in cognitive psychology concerns the manner in which people represent categories in memory. According to prototype models (Homa, 1984; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972), people represent categories by forming a summary representation that is a central tendency of all of the experienced members of a

There is strong evidence that face processing in the brain is localized. The double dissociation between prosopagnosia, a face recognition deficit occurring after brain damage, and visual object agnosia, difficulty recognizing other kinds of complex objects, indicates that face and non-face object recognition may be served by partially independent neural mechanisms. In this paper, we use computational models to show how the face processing specialization apparently underlying prosopagnosia and visual object agnosia could be attributed to (1) a relatively simple competitive selection mechanism that, during development, devotes neural resources to the tasks they are best at performing, (2) the developing infant's need to perform subordinate classification (identification) of faces early on, and (3) the infant's low visual acuity at birth. Inspired by de Schonen, Mancini and Liegeois' arguments (1998) [de Schonen, S., Mancini, J., Liegeois, F. (1998). About functional cortical specializat...

conducted. Forty years of research has assumed that category learning often involves learning to selectively attend to only those stimulus dimensions useful for classification. We confirmed that participants learned to allocate their attention optimally. We also found that learners tend to fixate all stimulus dimensions early in learning. This result obtained despite evidence that participants were also testing one-dimensional rules during this period. Finally, the restriction of eye movements to only relevant dimensions tended to occur only after errors were largely (or completely) eliminated. We interpret these findings as consistent with multiple-systems theories of learning which maximize information input in order to maximize the number of learning modules involved, and which focus solely on relevant information only after one module has solved the learning problem.

Categorization is a critical skill that every organism must possess in at least a rudimentary form, because it allows organisms to respond differently, for example, to nutrients and poisons and to predators and prey. There is much recent

Abstract not found

rule-based but not information-integration

Over more than a half century of experience in research on learning, memory, and decision, I have come to believe that the most substantial and enduring advances have not been in the accumulation of empirical facts or the construction of models, but in the production of fruitful interactions between models and experimental research. Most experimental facts require continual reinterpretation and most models drop by the wayside like autumn leaves, but the results of interactions between models and experiments constitute most of our generalizable knowledge. Success in the interactive research effort depends not only on clearly formulated models and well-conducted experiments, but, just as importantly, on sound interpretations of the results of applying the models to the experiments. This interpretive phase of the effort is in some respects the most difficult, and I take as my main task in this article an account of some of the issues that have to be resolved and some of the traps that have to be avoided in order for the process to run to a successful conclusion. As a preliminary, I turn to a review of the basic concept of applying a model to data as it has evolved since its first rudimentary instantiation in the literature of memory and decision more than a century ago. Applying Models to Experiments Details of techniques for fitting curves, or, more broadly, formal models, whether mathematical or computer imple-This article presents in substance the author’s Governing Board Keynote

A model of memory retrieval is described. The model embodies 4 main claims: (a) temporal memory— traces of items are represented in memory partly in terms of their temporal distance from the present; (b) scale-similarity—similar mechanisms govern retrieval from memory over many different timescales; (c) local distinctiveness—performance on a range of memory tasks is determined by interference from near psychological neighbors; and (d) interference-based forgetting—all memory loss is due to interference and not trace decay. The model is applied to data on free recall and serial recall. The account emphasizes qualitative similarity in the retrieval principles involved in memory performance at all timescales, contrary to models that emphasize distinctions between short-term and long-term memory.