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24
The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls
- Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper
, 2011
"... Abstract: In the past, non-practicing entities (NPEs) — firms that license patents without producing goods — have facilitated technology markets and increased rents for small inventors. Is this also true for today’s NPEs? Or are they “patent trolls ” who opportunistically litigate over software pat ..."
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Abstract: In the past, non-practicing entities (NPEs) — firms that license patents without producing goods — have facilitated technology markets and increased rents for small inventors. Is this also true for today’s NPEs? Or are they “patent trolls ” who opportunistically litigate over software patents with unpredictable boundaries? Using stock market event studies around patent lawsuit filings, we find that NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010, mostly from technology companies. Moreover, very little of this loss represents a transfer to small inventors. Instead, it implies reduced innovation incentives and a net loss of social welfare.
Property Rights and Invention
, 2008
"... Note: The Discussion Papers in this series are prepared by members of the Department of Economics, University of Essex, for private circulation to interested readers. They often represent preliminary reports on work in progress and should therefore be neither quoted nor referred to in published work ..."
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Note: The Discussion Papers in this series are prepared by members of the Department of Economics, University of Essex, for private circulation to interested readers. They often represent preliminary reports on work in progress and should therefore be neither quoted nor referred to in published work without the written consent of the author. Property Rights and Invention
Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by
- Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation. Illinois Law and Economics Papers Series Research Papers Series No
, 2009
"... are, of course, our own. ..."
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Estimates of Firms' Patent Rents from Firm Market Value
"... original: 7/2005 this: 7/2007 Abstract: The value of patent rents is an important quantity for policy analysis. However, estimates based on renewal behavior may be understated. I develop a simple model to make upper bound estimates using regressions on Tobin’s Q. I test this model on a sample of US ..."
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original: 7/2005 this: 7/2007 Abstract: The value of patent rents is an important quantity for policy analysis. However, estimates based on renewal behavior may be understated. I develop a simple model to make upper bound estimates using regressions on Tobin’s Q. I test this model on a sample of US firms and find it robust to a variety of considerations. My estimates correspond well with implied estimates derived from previous research and with estimates based on renewal behavior and other patentee behavior. I also find that chemical/pharmaceutical patents are much more valuable than others, likely accounting for a large share of aggregate patent value.
The market value of secrecy: evidence from a natural experiement. Available at http://www.funginstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Market%20Value%20of %20Secrecy.pdf Zaby, A
- Economics of Innovation and New Technology
, 2013
"... In order to invest in R&D, firms seek to protect the knowledge they create. While patenting is a frequently studied appropriability mechanism, little is known about secrecy. We estimate the value of employee non-compete agreements – widely used to protect trade secrets – by exploiting an inadver ..."
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In order to invest in R&D, firms seek to protect the knowledge they create. While patenting is a frequently studied appropriability mechanism, little is known about secrecy. We estimate the value of employee non-compete agreements – widely used to protect trade secrets – by exploiting an inadvertent Michigan policy reversal as a natural experiment. Tobin’s q grew by 25 % once firms were able to use noncompetes to capture value, primarily in sectors where secrecy is reportedly more important. The effect was eventually reversed, however, as firms ’ ability to create value was compromised. Evidence from patent records indicates that Michigan firms became increasingly myopic: R&D teams were less diverse, and projects were less broad technically and relied upon older prior art – consistent with the limited circulation of talent and ideas engendered by non-compete enforcement.
Evaluating and ranking patents using weighted citations
- In Proceedings of the 12th ACM/IEEE-CS joint conference on Digital Libraries
, 2012
"... ABSTRACT Citation counts have been widely used in a digital library for purposes such as ranking scientific publications and evaluating patents. This paper demonstrates that distinguishing different types of citations could rank better for these purposes. We differentiate patent citations along two ..."
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ABSTRACT Citation counts have been widely used in a digital library for purposes such as ranking scientific publications and evaluating patents. This paper demonstrates that distinguishing different types of citations could rank better for these purposes. We differentiate patent citations along two dimensions (assignees and technologies) into four types, and propose a weighted citation approach for assessing and ranking patents. We investigate five weight learning methods and compare their performance. Our weighted citation method performs consistently better than simple citation counts, in terms of rank correlations with patent renewal status. The estimated weights on different citations are consistent with economic insights on patent citations. Our study points to an interesting and promising research line on patent citation and network analysis that has not been explored.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
"... Permanent Link: The attached document may provide the author's accepted version of a published work. See Citation for details of the published work. 1 ..."
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Permanent Link: The attached document may provide the author's accepted version of a published work. See Citation for details of the published work. 1
zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum WirtschaftLeibniz Information Centre for Economics
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pirical studies on the private value of Finnish patents
"... Empirical studies on the private value of Finnish patents ..."
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"... Version 10/09 Abstract: In theory, property rights allow markets to achieve Pareto optimal allocations. But the literature on contracting largely ignores what happens when property rights are imperfectly defined and enforced. Although some models include weak enforcement or poorly defined rights or ..."
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Version 10/09 Abstract: In theory, property rights allow markets to achieve Pareto optimal allocations. But the literature on contracting largely ignores what happens when property rights are imperfectly defined and enforced. Although some models include weak enforcement or poorly defined rights or “anticommons, ” this paper develops a general model that includes all of these possibilities. I find that combinations matter: policy prescriptions to remedy individual imperfections are sometimes inappropriate under other conditions. For example, stronger penalties for violating rights can decrease Pareto efficiency, contrary to a common view. Also, collective rights organizations, such as patent pools, sometimes worsen problems of overlapping claims.
