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527
Lattice-Based Access Control Models
, 1993
"... The objective of this article is to give a tutorial on lattice-based access control models for computer security. The paper begins with a review of Denning's axioms for information flow policies, which provide a theoretical foundation for these models. The structure of security labels in the ..."
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Cited by 1512 (60 self)
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The objective of this article is to give a tutorial on lattice-based access control models for computer security. The paper begins with a review of Denning's axioms for information flow policies, which provide a theoretical foundation for these models. The structure of security labels in the military and government sectors, and the resulting lattice is discussed. This is followed by a review of the Bell-LaPadula model, which enforces information flow policies by means of its simple-security and *-properties. It is noted that information flow through covert channels is beyond the scope of such access controls. Variations of the Bell-LaPadula model are considered. The paper next discusses the Biba integrity model, examining its relationship to the Bell-LaPadula model. The paper then reviews the Chinese Wall policy, which arises in a segment of the commercial sector. It is shown how this policy can be enforced in a lattice framework.
Language-Based Information-Flow Security
- IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS
, 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
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Cited by 827 (57 self)
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Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.
The protection of information in computer systems
"... This tutorial paper explores the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification. It concentrates on those architectural structures--whether hardware or software--that are necessary to support information protection. The paper develops in three main sectio ..."
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Cited by 819 (2 self)
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This tutorial paper explores the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification. It concentrates on those architectural structures--whether hardware or software--that are necessary to support information protection. The paper develops in three main sections. Section I describes desired functions, design principles, and examples of elementary protection and authentication mechanisms. Any reader familiar with computers should find the first section to be reasonably accessible. Section II requires some familiarity with descriptor-based computer architecture. It examines in depth the principles of modern protection architectures and the relation between capability systems and access control list systems, and ends with a brief analysis of protected subsystems and protected objects. The reader who is dismayed by either the prerequisites or the level of detail in the second section may wish to skip to Section III, which reviews the state of the art and current research projects and provides suggestions for further reading. Glossary The following glossary provides, for reference, brief definitions for several terms as used in this paper in the context of protecting information in computers. Access The ability to make use of information stored in a computer system. Used frequently as a verb, to the horror of grammarians. Access control list A list of principals that are authorized to have access to some object. Authenticate To verify the identity of a person (or other agent external to the protection system) making a request.
A lattice model of secure information flow,”
- Communications of the ACM,
, 1976
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Data Security
, 1979
"... The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system and ..."
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Cited by 613 (3 self)
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The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system and subsequently whmh data sets an active user may read or wrote. Flow controls regulate the dissemination of values among the data sets accessible to a user. Inference controls protect statistical databases by preventing questioners from deducing confidential information by posing carefully designed sequences of statistical queries and correlating the responses. Statlstmal data banks are much less secure than most people beheve. Data encryption attempts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information in transit or m storage. This paper describes the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds of problems they can and cannot solve, and their inherent limitations and weaknesses. The paper is intended for a general audience with little background in the area.
Jflow: Practical mostly-static information flow control.
- In Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages,
, 1999
"... Abstract A promising technique for protecting privacy and integrity of sensitive data is to statically check information flow within programs that manipulate the data. While previous work has proposed programming language extensions to allow this static checking, the resulting languages are too res ..."
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Cited by 583 (33 self)
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Abstract A promising technique for protecting privacy and integrity of sensitive data is to statically check information flow within programs that manipulate the data. While previous work has proposed programming language extensions to allow this static checking, the resulting languages are too restrictive for practical use and have not been implemented. In this paper, we describe the new language JFlow, an extension to the Java language that adds statically-checked information flow annotations. JFlow provides several new features that make information flow checking more flexible and convenient than in previous models: a decentralized label model, label polymorphism, run-time label checking, and automatic label inference. JFlow also supports many language features that have never been integrated successfully with static information flow control, including objects, subclassing, dynamic type tests, access control, and exceptions. This paper defines the JFlow language and presents formal rules that are used to check JFlow programs for correctness. Because most checking is static, there is little code space, data space, or run-time overhead in the JFlow implementation.
Certification of Programs for Secure Information Flow
, 1977
"... This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing c ..."
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Cited by 490 (1 self)
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This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing compilers. Appropriate semantics are presented and proved correct. An important application is the confinement problem: The mechanism can prove that a program cannot cause supposedly nonconfidential results to depend on confidential input data.
Information Hiding -- A Survey
, 1999
"... Information hiding techniques have recently become important in a number of application areas. Digital audio, video, and pictures are increasingly furnished with distinguishing but imperceptible marks, which may contain a hidden copyright notice or serial number or even help to prevent unauthorised ..."
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Cited by 291 (0 self)
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Information hiding techniques have recently become important in a number of application areas. Digital audio, video, and pictures are increasingly furnished with distinguishing but imperceptible marks, which may contain a hidden copyright notice or serial number or even help to prevent unauthorised copying directly. Military communications systems make increasing use of traffic security techniques which, rather than merely concealing the content of a message using encryption, seek to conceal its sender, its receiver or its very existence. Similar techniques are used in some mobile phone systems and schemes proposed for digital elections. Criminals try to use whatever traffic security properties are provided intentionally or otherwise in the available communications systems, and police forces try to restrict their use. However, many of the techniques proposed in this young and rapidly evolving field can trace their history back to antiquity; and many of them are surprisingly easy to circumvent. In this article, we try to give an overview of the field; of what we know, what works, what does not, and what are the interesting topics for research.
Backtracking intrusions
, 2003
"... Analyzing intrusions today is an arduous, largely manual task because system administrators lack the information and tools needed to understand easily the sequence of steps that occurred in an attack. The goal of BackTracker is to identify automatically potential sequences of steps that occurred in ..."
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Cited by 239 (11 self)
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Analyzing intrusions today is an arduous, largely manual task because system administrators lack the information and tools needed to understand easily the sequence of steps that occurred in an attack. The goal of BackTracker is to identify automatically potential sequences of steps that occurred in an intrusion. Starting with a single detection point (e.g., a suspicious file), BackTracker identifies files and processes that could have affected that detection point and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. We use BackTracker to analyze several real attacks against computers that we set up as honeypots. In each case, BackTracker is able to highlight effectively the entry point used to gain access to the system and the sequence of steps from that entry point to the point at which we noticed the intrusion. The logging required to support BackTracker added 9 % overhead in running time and generated 1.2 GB per day of log data for an operating-system intensive workload.
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
- IN PROC. ACM SYMP. ON PRINCIPLES OF PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES
, 1998
"... Previously, we developed a type system to ensure secure information flow in a sequential, imperative programming language [VSI96]. Program variables are classified as either high or low security; intuitively, we wish to prevent information from flowing from high variables to low variables. Here, we ..."
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Cited by 239 (8 self)
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Previously, we developed a type system to ensure secure information flow in a sequential, imperative programming language [VSI96]. Program variables are classified as either high or low security; intuitively, we wish to prevent information from flowing from high variables to low variables. Here, we extend the analysis to deal with a multithreaded language. We show that the previous type system is insufficient to ensure a desirable security property called noninterference. Noninterference basically means that the final values of low variables are independent of the initial values of high variables. By modifying the sequential type system, we are able to guarantee noninterference for concurrent programs. Crucial to this result, however, is the use of purely nondeterministic thread scheduling. Since implementing such scheduling is problematic, we also show how a more restrictive type system can guarantee noninterference, given a more deterministic (and easily implementable) scheduling policy, such as round-robin time slicing. Finally, we consider the consequences of adding a clock to the language.
