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113
Language-Based Information-Flow Security
- IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS
, 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
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Cited by 827 (57 self)
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Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.
Information flow inference for ML
- ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst
"... This paper presents a type-based information flow analysis for a call-by-value λ-calculus equipped with references, exceptions and let-polymorphism, which we refer to as Core ML. The type system is constraint-based and has decidable type inference. Its noninterference proof is reasonably light-weigh ..."
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Cited by 259 (4 self)
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This paper presents a type-based information flow analysis for a call-by-value λ-calculus equipped with references, exceptions and let-polymorphism, which we refer to as Core ML. The type system is constraint-based and has decidable type inference. Its noninterference proof is reasonably light-weight, thanks to the use of a number of orthogonal techniques. First, a syntactic segregation between values and expressions allows a lighter formulation of the type system. Second, noninterference is reduced to subject reduction for a nonstandard language extension. Lastly, a semi-syntactic approach to type soundness allows dealing with constraint-based polymorphism separately.
Securing Web Application Code by Static Analysis and Runtime Protection
, 2004
"... Security remains a major roadblock to universal acceptance of the Web for many kinds of transactions, especially since the recent sharp increase in remotely exploitable vulnerabilities has been attributed to Web application bugs. Many verification tools are discovering previously unknown vulnerabili ..."
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Cited by 234 (2 self)
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Security remains a major roadblock to universal acceptance of the Web for many kinds of transactions, especially since the recent sharp increase in remotely exploitable vulnerabilities has been attributed to Web application bugs. Many verification tools are discovering previously unknown vulnerabilities in legacy C programs, raising hopes that the same success can be achieved with Web applications. In this paper, we describe a sound and holistic approach to ensuring Web application security. Viewing Web application vulnerabilities as a secure information flow problem, we created a lattice-based static analysis algorithm derived from type systems and typestate, and addressed its soundness. During the analysis, sections of code considered vulnerable are instrumented with runtime guards, thus securing Web applications in the absence of user intervention. With sufficient annotations, runtime overhead can be reduced to zero. We also created a tool named WebSSARI (Web application Security by Static Analysis and Runtime Inspection) to test our algorithm, and used it to verify 230 open-source Web application projects on SourceForge.net, which were selected to represent projects of different maturity, popularity, and scale. 69 contained vulnerabilities and their developers were notified. 38 projects acknowledged our findings and stated their plans to provide patches. Our statistics also show that static analysis reduced potential runtime overhead by 98.4%.
Robust Declassification
- in Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 2001
"... Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems ..."
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Cited by 165 (26 self)
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Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems that control information flow often include mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information; however, declassification can easily result in the unexpected release of confidential information.
Simple Relational Correctness Proofs for Static Analyses and Program Transformations
, 2004
"... We show how some classical static analyses for imperative programs, and the optimizing transformations which they enable, may be expressed and proved correct using elementary logical and denotational techniques. The key ingredients are an interpretation of program properties as relations, rather tha ..."
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Cited by 107 (9 self)
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We show how some classical static analyses for imperative programs, and the optimizing transformations which they enable, may be expressed and proved correct using elementary logical and denotational techniques. The key ingredients are an interpretation of program properties as relations, rather than predicates, and a realization that although many program analyses are traditionally formulated in very intensional terms, the associated transformations are actually enabled by more liberal extensional properties.
Stack-based Access Control and Secure Information Flow
, 2003
"... Access control mechanisms are often used with the intent of enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but few rigorous connections have been made between information flow and runtime access control. The Java virtual machine and the .NET runtime system provide a dynamic access control mechani ..."
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Cited by 98 (18 self)
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Access control mechanisms are often used with the intent of enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but few rigorous connections have been made between information flow and runtime access control. The Java virtual machine and the .NET runtime system provide a dynamic access control mechanism in which permissions are granted to program units and a runtime mechanism checks permissions of code in the calling chain. We investigate a design pattern by which this mechanism can be used to achieve confidentiality and integrity goals: a single interface serves callers of more than one security level and dynamic access control prevents release of high information to low callers. Programs fitting this pattern would be rejected by previous flow analyses. We give a static analysis that admits them, using permission-dependent security types. The analysis is given for a class-based object-oriented language with features including inheritance, dynamic binding, dynamically allocated mutable objects, type casts and recursive types. The analysis is shown to ensure a noninterference property formalizing confidentiality and integrity.
Downgrading policies and relaxed noninterference
- SIGPLAN Not
, 2005
"... In traditional information-flow type systems, the security policy is often formalized as noninterference properties. However, noninterference alone is too strong to express security properties useful in practice. If we allow downgrading in such systems, it is challenging to formalize the security po ..."
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Cited by 97 (12 self)
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In traditional information-flow type systems, the security policy is often formalized as noninterference properties. However, noninterference alone is too strong to express security properties useful in practice. If we allow downgrading in such systems, it is challenging to formalize the security policy as an extensional property of the system. This paper presents a generalized framework of downgrading policies. Such policies can be specified in a simple and tractable language and can be statically enforced by mechanisms such as type systems. The security guarantee is then formalized as a concise extensional property using program equivalences. This relaxed noninterference generalizes traditional pure noninterference and precisely characterizes the information released due to downgrading.
A Model for Delimited Information Release
- In Proc. International Symp. on Software Security (ISSS’03), volume 3233 of LNCS
, 2004
"... Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. Howe ..."
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Cited by 82 (17 self)
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Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. However, many intuitively secure programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). Noninterference fails to recognize such programs as secure. In this respect, many security type systems enforcing noninterference are impractical.
Observational determinism for concurrent program security
- In Proceedings of 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, CSFW’03
, 2000
"... endorsement of any of the University of Pennsylvania's products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution m ..."
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Cited by 79 (9 self)
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endorsement of any of the University of Pennsylvania's products or services. Internal or personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution must be obtained from the IEEE by writing to pubs-permissions@ieee.org. By choosing to view this document, you agree to all provisions of the copyright laws protecting it.
Ownership Confinement Ensures Representation Independence for Object-Oriented Programs
, 2004
"... Representation independence or relational parametricity formally characterizes the encapsulation provided by language constructs for data abstraction and justifies reasoning by simulation. Representation independence has been shown for a variety of languages and constructs but not for shared refere ..."
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Cited by 69 (29 self)
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Representation independence or relational parametricity formally characterizes the encapsulation provided by language constructs for data abstraction and justifies reasoning by simulation. Representation independence has been shown for a variety of languages and constructs but not for shared references to mutable state; indeed it fails in general for such languages. This paper formulates representation independence for classes, in an imperative, object-oriented language with pointers, subclassing and dynamic dispatch, class oriented visibility control, recursive types and methods, and a simple form of module. An instance of a class is considered to implement an abstraction using private fields and so-called representation objects. Encapsulation of representation objects is expressed by a restriction, called confinement, on aliasing. Representation independence is proved for programs satisfying the confinement condition. A static analysis is given for confinement that accepts common designs such as the observer and factory patterns. The formalization takes into account not only the usual interface between a client and a class that provides an abstraction but
