Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems that control information flow often include mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information; however, declassification can easily result in the unexpected release of confidential information.

We present a probability-sensitive confidentiality specification -- a form of probabilistic noninterference -- for a small multi-threaded programming language with dynamic thread creation. Probabilistic covert channels arise from a scheduler which is probabilistic. Since scheduling policy is typically outside the language specification for multithreaded languages, we describe how to generalise the security condition in order to define robust security with respect to a wide class of schedulers, not excluding the possibility of deterministic (e.g., round-robin) schedulers and program-controlled thread priorities. The formulation is based on an adaptation of Larsen and Skou's notion of probabilistic bisimulation. We show how the security condition satisfies compositionality properties which facilitate straightforward proofs of correctness for, e.g., security type systems. We illustrate this by defining a security type system which improves on previous multi-threaded systems, and by proving it correct with respect to our stronger scheduler-independent security condition.

Sharing and transfer of references is difficult to control in object-oriented languages. As information security is increasingly becoming software dependent, this difficulty poses serious problems for writing secure components. In this paper, we present a set of inexpensive syntactic constraints that strengthen encapsulation in object-oriented programs and facilitate the implementation of secure systems. We introduce two mechanisms: con ned types to impose static scoping on dynamic object references and anonymous methods which do not reveal the identity of the current instance (this). Confined types protect objects from use by untrusted code, while anonymous methods allow standard classes to be reused from con ned classes. We have implemented a verifier which performs a modular analysis of Java programs and provides a static guarantee that confinement is respected. We present security related programming examples.

We consider a sequential object-oriented language with pointers and mutable state, private fields and classbased visibility, dynamic binding and inheritance, recursive classes, casts and type tests, and recursive methods. Programs are annotated with security levels, constrained by security typing rules. A noninterference theorem shows how the rules ensure pointer confinement and secure information flow.

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In [15], we give a type system that guarantees that well-typed multi-threaded programs are possibilistically noninterfering. If thread scheduling is probabilistic, however, then well-typed programs may have probabilistic timing channels. We describe how they can be eliminated without making the type system more restrictive. We show that well-typed concurrent programs are probabilistically noninterfering if every total command with a high guard executes atomically. The proof uses the concept of a probabilistic state of a computation, following the work of Kozen [10].

This paper proposes an extensional semantics-based formal specification of secure information-flow properties in sequential programs based on representing degrees of security by partial equivalence relations (pers). The specification clarifies and unifies a number of specific correctness arguments in the literature and connections to other forms of program analysis. The approach is inspired by (and in the deterministic case equivalent to) the use of partial equivalence relations in specifying binding-time analysis, and is thus able to specify security properties of higher-order functions and "partially confidential data". We also show how the per approach can handle nondeterminism for a first-order language, by using powerdomain semantics and show how probabilistic security properties can be formalised by using probabilistic powerdomain semantics. We illustrate the usefulness of the compositional nature of the security specifications by presenting a straightforward correctness proof for a simple type-based security analysis.

The \pi-calculus is a formalism of computing in which we can compositionally represent dynamics of major programming constructs by decomposing them into a single communication primitive, the name passing. This work reports our experience in using a linear/affine typed \pi-calculus for the analysis and development of type systems of programming languages, focussing on secure information flow analysis. After presenting a basic typed calculus for secrecy, we demonstrate its usage by a sound embedding of the dependency core calculus (DCC) and by the development of a novel type discipline for imperative programs which extends both a secure multi-threaded imperative language by Smith and Volpano and (a call-by-value version of) DCC. In each case, the embedding gives a simple proof of noninterference.

. We present a partially-typed semantics for Dp, a distributed p-calculus. The semantics is designed for mobile agents in open distributed systems in which some sites may harbor malicious intentions. Nonetheless, the semantics guarantees traditional type-safety properties at good locations by using a mixture of static and dynamic type-checking. We show how the semantics can be extended to allow trust between sites, improving performance and expressiveness without compromising type-safety. 1 Introduction In [12] we presented a type system for controlling the use of resources in a distributed system, or network. The type system guarantees two properties: resource access is always safe, e.g. integer resources are always accessed with integers and string resources are always accessed with strings, and resource access is always authorized, i.e. resources may only be accessed by agents that have been granted permission to do so. While these properties are desirable, they are properti...

Bytecode verification is a crucial security component for Java applets, on the Web and on embedded devices such as smart cards. This paper reviews the various bytecode verification algorithms that have been proposed, recasts them in a common framework of dataflow analysis, and surveys the use of proof assistants to specify bytecode verification and prove its correctness.