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Game-Theoretic Security Patrolling with Dynamic Execution Uncertainty and a Case Study on a Real Transit System
"... Attacker-Defender Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have emerged as an important research area in multi-agent systems. However, existing SSGs models yield fixed, static, schedules which fail in dynamic domains where defenders face execution uncertainty, i.e., in domains where defenders may face unan ..."
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Attacker-Defender Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have emerged as an important research area in multi-agent systems. However, existing SSGs models yield fixed, static, schedules which fail in dynamic domains where defenders face execution uncertainty, i.e., in domains where defenders may face unanticipated disruptions of their schedules. A concrete example is an application involving checking fares on trains, where a defender’s schedule is frequently interrupted by fare evaders, making static schedules useless. To address this shortcoming, this paper provides four main contributions. First, we present a novel general Bayesian Stackelberg game model for security resource allocation in dynamic uncertain domains. In this new model, execution uncertainty is handled by using a Markov decision process (MDP) for generating defender policies. Second, we study the problem of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium for this game and exploit problem structure to reduce it to a polynomial-sized optimization problem. Shifting to evaluation, our third contribution shows, in simulation, that our MDP-based policies overcome the failures of previous SSG algorithms. In so doing, we can now build a complete system, that enables handling of schedule interruptions and, consequently, to conduct some of the first controlled experiments on SSGs in the field. Hence, as our final contribution, we present results from a real-world experiment on Metro trains in Los Angeles validating our MDP-based model, and most importantly, concretely measuring the benefits of SSGs for security resource allocation. 1.
Efficient Solutions for Joint Activity Based Security Games: Fast Algorithms, Results and a Field Experiment on a Transit System
"... In recent years, several security agencies have been deploying scheduling systems based on algorithmic advances in Stackelberg security games (SSGs). Unfortunately, none of the existing algorithms can scale up to domains where benefits are accrued from multiple defender resources performing jointly ..."
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In recent years, several security agencies have been deploying scheduling systems based on algorithmic advances in Stackelberg security games (SSGs). Unfortunately, none of the existing algorithms can scale up to domains where benefits are accrued from multiple defender resources performing jointly coordinated activities. Yet in many domains, including port patrolling where SSGs are in use, enabling multiple defender resources to perform jointly coordinated activities would significantly enhance the effectiveness of the patrols. To address this challenge, this paper presents four contributions. First, we present Smart (Security games with Multiple coordinated Activities and Resources that are Time-dependent), a novel SSG model that explicitly represents jointly coordinated activities between defender’s resources. Second,
Multi-Robot Adversarial Patrolling: Facing Coordinated Attacks
, 2014
"... The use of robot teams is common for performing patrol tasks, in which the robots are required to repeatedly visit a target area (perimeter, in our case) controlled by an adversary, in order to detect penetrations. Previous work has focused on determining the optimal patrol algorithm when facing a g ..."
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The use of robot teams is common for performing patrol tasks, in which the robots are required to repeatedly visit a target area (perimeter, in our case) controlled by an adversary, in order to detect penetrations. Previous work has focused on determining the optimal patrol algorithm when facing a general adversary that tries to penetrate once through the patrol path. There, the robots’ goal is to detect penetrations, i.e., the robots do not change their behavior once a penetration is detected. Requiring the robots to physically inspect penetration attempts can have far reaching consequences on the performance of the patrol algorithm. Specifically, it creates vulnerability points along the patrol path that a knowledgeable adversary can take advantage of. In this work we investigate the problem of coordinated attacks, in which the adversary initiates two attacks in order to maximize its chances of successful penetration, assuming a robot from the team will be sent to examine a penetration attempt. We suggest an algorithm that computes the optimal robot strategy for handling such coordinated attacks, and show that despite its exponential time complexity, practical run time of the algorithm can be significantly reduced without harming the optimality of the strategy.
Markovian Agents
"... I wish to thank all my thesis committee members for their valuable feedback and suggestions. I also wish to thank all members of the Learning ..."
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I wish to thank all my thesis committee members for their valuable feedback and suggestions. I also wish to thank all members of the Learning
Article Multi-Robot Item Delivery and Foraging: Two Sides of a Coin
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Astrophysics, Optics and Electronics
"... Adversarial patrolling games (APGs) can be modeled as Stackelberg games where a patroller and an intruder com-pete. The former moves with the aim of detecting an intru-sion, while the latter tries to intrude without being detected. In this paper, we introduce alarms in APGs, namely devices that can ..."
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Adversarial patrolling games (APGs) can be modeled as Stackelberg games where a patroller and an intruder com-pete. The former moves with the aim of detecting an intru-sion, while the latter tries to intrude without being detected. In this paper, we introduce alarms in APGs, namely devices that can remotely inform the patroller about the presence of the intruder at some location. We introduce a basic model, provide an extended formulation of the problem and show how it can be cast as partially observable stochastic game. We then introduce the general resolution approach.
Decentralized
"... strategy to ensure information propagation in area monitoring missions with a team of UAVs under limited communications ..."
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strategy to ensure information propagation in area monitoring missions with a team of UAVs under limited communications
Cooperative
"... perimeter surveillance with a team of mobile robots under communication constraints ..."
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perimeter surveillance with a team of mobile robots under communication constraints
