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Special Interests and the Media: Theory and an Application to Climate Change’. NBER Working Paper
, 2014
"... A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests ’ claims to the voter. In equili ..."
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A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests ’ claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence.
Incentive-Compatible Inference from Subjective Opinions Without Common Belief Systems
"... Abstract Peer-prediction mechanisms elicit information about unverifiable or subjective states of the world. Existing mechanisms in the class are designed so participants maximize their expected payments when reporting honestly. However, these mechanisms do not account for participants desiring inf ..."
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Abstract Peer-prediction mechanisms elicit information about unverifiable or subjective states of the world. Existing mechanisms in the class are designed so participants maximize their expected payments when reporting honestly. However, these mechanisms do not account for participants desiring influence over how reports are used. When participants want the conclusions drawn from reports to reflect their own opinion, the inference procedure must be subjected to incentive-compatibility constraints to ensure honesty. In this paper, I develop mechanisms without payments for discerning the true answer to a binary question, even in the presence of a false consensus. I first characterize all continuous, neutral, and anonymous mechanisms in this setting that can be implemented in interim-rationalizable strategies. Using this representation, I optimize across the class of mechanisms for accuracy in distinguishing the true state. Because the mechanism does not require knowledge of the distribution of agent types and is neutral between both outcomes, it can serve as a test for bias in the surveyed population.
Subgame Perfect Implementation under Perfect and Almost Perfect Information: An Empirical Test
"... Abstract In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of unce ..."
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Abstract In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good's value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. This failure to implement truth telling is due to beliefs about the irrationality of one's trading partner. Deviations from truth-telling become more frequent and more persistent when agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good's value. Our results suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of Moore-Repullo mechanisms in practice.
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation- An Empirical Investigation
, 2015
"... In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regardi ..."
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In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good’s value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. This failure to implement truth-telling is due to beliefs about the irrationality of one’s trading partner. Therefore, although the mechanism should — in theory — provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their expected monetary payoff by lying. The deviations from truth-telling become significantly more frequent and more persistent when agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good’s value. Our results thus suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of Moore-Repullo mechanisms in practice.
Securely Implementable Social Choice Rules with Partially Honest Agents
, 2014
"... We dene secure implementation with partially honest agents in a social choice model and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition for it. This result offers a behavioral foundation for rectangularity; and it remains valid even with only one partially honest agent. We ap ..."
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We dene secure implementation with partially honest agents in a social choice model and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition for it. This result offers a behavioral foundation for rectangularity; and it remains valid even with only one partially honest agent. We apply the concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes the family of augmented representative voter schemes. JEL Codes: C72, D03, D71, D82. Key-words: Secure implementation; partial honesty; strategy-proofness; single-
