Results 1 - 10
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28
Games on graphs
- EMS Surveys in Mathematical Sciences. 2014; 1(1):113–151. doi: 10.4171/EMSS/3
"... Abstract. Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The trajectories and outcomes of evolutionary processes depend on the structure of the population. Evolutionary graph theory is a powerful approach to studying the consequences of spatial or social population structure. The verti ..."
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Abstract. Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The trajectories and outcomes of evolutionary processes depend on the structure of the population. Evolutionary graph theory is a powerful approach to studying the consequences of spatial or social population structure. The vertices of the graph represent individuals. The edges determine who interacts with whom for game payoff and who competes with whom for reproduction. Interaction and competition can be governed by the same graph or by two different graphs. In this paper, we review the basic approach for evolutionary games on graphs and provide new proofs for key results. We formalize the method of identity by descent to derive conditions for strategy selection on finite, weighted graphs. We generalize our results to nonzero mutation rates, and to the case where the interaction and competition graphs do not coincide. We conclude with a perspective of open problems and future directions. Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). 91A22; 92B05, 60J20.
How natural selection can create both selfand other-regarding preferences, and networked minds.
- Sci. Rep.
, 2013
"... Biological competition is widely believed to result in the evolution of selfish preferences. The related concept of the 'homo economicus' is at the core of mainstream economics. However, there is also experimental and empirical evidence for other-regarding preferences. Here we present a t ..."
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Biological competition is widely believed to result in the evolution of selfish preferences. The related concept of the 'homo economicus' is at the core of mainstream economics. However, there is also experimental and empirical evidence for other-regarding preferences. Here we present a theory that explains both, self-regarding and other-regarding preferences. Assuming conditions promoting non-cooperative behaviour, we demonstrate that intergenerational migration determines whether evolutionary competition results in a 'homo economicus' (showing self-regarding preferences) or a 'homo socialis' (having other-regarding preferences). Our model assumes spatially interacting agents playing prisoner's dilemmas, who inherit a trait determining 'friendliness', but mutations tend to undermine it. Reproduction is ruled by fitness-based selection without a cultural modification of reproduction rates. Our model calls for a complementary economic theory for 'networked minds' (the 'homo socialis') and lays the foundations for an evolutionarily grounded theory of other-regarding agents, explaining individually different utility functions as well as conditional cooperation.
The Effects of Finite Populations and Selection on the Emergence of Signaling
"... In the research described here we examine the emergence of signaling from non-communicative origins, using the Sir Philip Sidney Game as a framework for our analysis. This game is known to exhibit a number of interesting dynamics. In our study, we quantify the difficulty of reaching multiple types o ..."
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In the research described here we examine the emergence of signaling from non-communicative origins, using the Sir Philip Sidney Game as a framework for our analysis. This game is known to exhibit a number of interesting dynamics. In our study, we quantify the difficulty of reaching multiple types of equilibria from initially non-communicative populations with an infinite population model. We then compare the ability of finite populations with typical tournament selection to approximate the behaviors observed in infinite populations. Our findings suggest that honest signaling equilibria are difficult to reach from non-communicative origins. In the second part of the paper, we show that the finite model fails to model dynamics that permit deceptive signaling under typical evolutionary conditions, where infinite populations exhibit spiraling behavior between honest and deceptive signaling.
COORDINATION ON EGALITARIAN NETWORKS FROM ASYMMETRIC RELATIONS IN A SOCIAL GAME OF CHICKEN
, 2013
"... We present a model of social interaction in which actors choose their partners and play the Chicken Game with them. In contrast to most previous models of the coevolution of games and networks, we assume that the actors can employ different actions against dif-ferent partners. This allows us to deri ..."
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We present a model of social interaction in which actors choose their partners and play the Chicken Game with them. In contrast to most previous models of the coevolution of games and networks, we assume that the actors can employ different actions against dif-ferent partners. This allows us to derive two different solutions to the coordination and asymmetry problems in the game: egalitarian stationary conventions (based on indirect reciprocity at the network level) and alternating conventions (based on direct reciprocity in dyads). We derive predictions on the occurrence of the possible convention structures and test our theoretical findings in a computerized experiment. The experimental results indicate that the egalitarian conventions indeed emerge and persist and that the alter-nating conventions are much more likely than the stationary ones. However, although egalitarian in terms of payoffs, the convention structures tend to have hierarchical action distributions.
Social and strategic imitation: the way to consensus
- Sci. Rep. 2012; 2: 686. PMID: 23008751
"... Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between ..."
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Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and social imitative behavior in a coordination problem on a social network. We observe that for interactions on 1D and 2D lattices any amount of social imitation prevents the freezing of the network in domains with different conventions, thus leading to global consensus. For interactions on complex networks, the interplay of social and strategic imitation also drives the system towards global consensus while neither dynamics alone does. We find an optimum value for the combination of imitative behaviors to reach consensus in a minimum time, and two different dynamical regimes to approach it: exponential when social imitation predominates, power-law when strategic considerations prevail. W hen facing a choice, it is often the case that people do not make the optimal decision A very similar question has been also considered from a different perspective. From a sociological viewpoint, there have been many attempts to uncover the mechanisms underlying the adoption by people of new technologies, the acceptance and spreading of rumors or in general of new information
Evolution of coordination in social networks: A numerical study
- International Journal of Modern Physics C
, 2010
"... Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behav-ior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pu ..."
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Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behav-ior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with re-spect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes. 1
Crowd computing as a cooperation problem: an evolutionary approach
- Journal of Statistical Physics
, 2013
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Coveting thy neighbors fitness as a means to resolve social dilemmas
- J. Theor. Biol
, 2011
"... a b s t r a c t In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators is gloomy. While network reciprocity promo ..."
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a b s t r a c t In spatial evolutionary games the fitness of each individual is traditionally determined by the payoffs it obtains upon playing the game with its neighbors. Since defection yields the highest individual benefits, the outlook for cooperators is gloomy. While network reciprocity promotes collaborative efforts, chances of averting the impending social decline are slim if the temptation to defect is strong. It is, therefore, of interest to identify viable mechanisms that provide additional support for the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by the fact that the environment may be just as important as inheritance for individual development, we introduce a simple switch that allows a player to either keep its original payoff or use the average payoff of all its neighbors. Depending on which payoff is higher, the influence of either option can be tuned by means of a single parameter. We show that, in general, taking into account the environment promotes cooperation. Yet coveting the fitness of one's neighbors too strongly is not optimal. In fact, cooperation thrives best only if the influence of payoffs obtained in the traditional way is equal to that of the average payoff of the neighborhood. We present results for the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game, for different levels of uncertainty governing the strategy adoption process, and for different neighborhood sizes. Our approach outlines a viable route to increased levels of cooperative behavior in structured populations, but one that requires a thoughtful implementation.
