The Free Haven Project aims to deploy a system for distributed data storage which is robust against attempts by powerful adversaries to find and destroy stored data. Free Haven uses a mixnet for communication, and it emphasizes distributed, reliable, and anonymous storage over efficient retrieval. We provide an outline of a formal definition of anonymity, to help characterize the protection that Free Haven provides and to help compare related services. We also provide some background from case law about anonymous speech and anonymous publication, and examine some of the ethical and moral implications of an anonymous publishing service. In addition, we describe a variety of attacks on the system and ways of protecting against these attacks. Some of the problems Free Haven addresses include providing sufficient accountability without sacrificing anonymity, building trust between servers based entirely on their observed behavior, and providing user interfaces that will make the system easy for end-users.

We first provide an overview of the better known network approaches for assuring anonymity and privacy over networks. We then analyze possible attacks to these network based on traffic analysis techniques and discuss their implementation and design issues for network privacy. In the conclusion we discuss the results, indicating research opportunities in this domain.

Various MIX-based systems offering anonymity for near real-time traffic have been operational.

This paper discusses the tension between personalization and privacy in web-based applications. It outlines two avenues for reconciliation, and elaborates on one in which both users and the servers that host data about these users remain anonymous with respect to the personalized applications that utilize the data. A reference architecture for pseudonymous yet fully personalized interaction is presented which allows users to restrict data disclosure relative to their own roles and the type of application