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120
Billiongate secure computation with malicious adversaries
 In USENIX Security
, 2012
"... The goal of this paper is to assess the feasibility of twoparty secure computation in the presence of a malicious adversary. Prior work has shown the feasibility of billiongate circuits in the semihonest model, but only the 35kgate AES circuit in the malicious model, in part because security in ..."
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Cited by 66 (1 self)
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The goal of this paper is to assess the feasibility of twoparty secure computation in the presence of a malicious adversary. Prior work has shown the feasibility of billiongate circuits in the semihonest model, but only the 35kgate AES circuit in the malicious model, in part because security in the malicious model is much harder to achieve. We show that by incorporating the best known techniques and parallelizing almost all steps of the resulting protocol, evaluating billiongate circuits is feasible in the malicious model. Our results are in the standard model (i.e., no common reference strings or PKIs) and, in contrast to prior work, we do not use the random oracle model which has wellestablished theoretical shortcomings. 1
Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable computation
 In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2013
"... To instill greater confidence in computations outsourced to the cloud, clients should be able to verify the correctness of the results returned. To this end, we introduce Pinocchio, a built system for efficiently verifying general computations while relying only on cryptographic assumptions. With Pi ..."
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Cited by 64 (6 self)
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To instill greater confidence in computations outsourced to the cloud, clients should be able to verify the correctness of the results returned. To this end, we introduce Pinocchio, a built system for efficiently verifying general computations while relying only on cryptographic assumptions. With Pinocchio, the client creates a public evaluation key to describe her computation; this setup is proportional to evaluating the computation once. The worker then evaluates the computation on a particular input and uses the evaluation key to produce a proof of correctness. The proof is only 288 bytes, regardless of the computation performed or the size of the inputs and outputs. Anyone can use a public verification key to check the proof. Crucially, our evaluation on seven applications demonstrates that Pinocchio is efficient in practice too. Pinocchio’s verification time is typically 10ms: 57 orders of magnitude less than previous work; indeed Pinocchio is the first generalpurpose system to demonstrate verification cheaper than native execution (for some apps). Pinocchio also reduces the worker’s proof effort by an additional 1960×. As an additional feature, Pinocchio generalizes to zeroknowledge proofs at a negligible cost over the base protocol. Finally, to aid development, Pinocchio provides an endtoend toolchain that compiles a subset of C into programs that implement the verifiable computation protocol. 1
Homomorphic evaluation of the AES circuit
 In CRYPTO
, 2012
"... We describe a working implementation of leveled homomorphic encryption (without bootstrapping) that can evaluate the AES128 circuit in three different ways. One variant takes under over 36 hours to evaluate an entire AES encryption operation, using NTL (over GMP) as our underlying software platform ..."
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Cited by 63 (6 self)
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We describe a working implementation of leveled homomorphic encryption (without bootstrapping) that can evaluate the AES128 circuit in three different ways. One variant takes under over 36 hours to evaluate an entire AES encryption operation, using NTL (over GMP) as our underlying software platform, and running on a largememory machine. Using SIMD techniques, we can process over 54 blocks in each evaluation, yielding an amortized rate of just under 40 minutes per block. Another implementation takes just over two and a half days to evaluate the AES operation, but can process 720 blocks in each evaluation, yielding an amortized rate of just over five minutes per block. We also detail a third implementation, which theoretically could yield even better amortized complexity, but in practice turns out to be less competitive. For our implementations we develop both AESspecific optimizations as well as several “generic” tools for FHE evaluation. These last tools include (among others) a different variant of the BrakerskiVaikuntanathan keyswitching technique that does not require reducing the norm of the ciphertext vector, and a method of implementing the BrakerskiGentryVaikuntanathan modulusswitching transformation on ciphertexts in CRT representation.
Making argument systems for outsourced computation practical (sometimes
 In NDSS
, 2012
"... This paper describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of a system for performing verifiable outsourced computation. It has long been known that (1) this problem can be solved in theory using probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) coupled with modern cryptographic tools, and (2) these ..."
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Cited by 38 (7 self)
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This paper describes the design, implementation, and evaluation of a system for performing verifiable outsourced computation. It has long been known that (1) this problem can be solved in theory using probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) coupled with modern cryptographic tools, and (2) these solutions have wholly impractical performance, according to the conventional (and wellfounded) wisdom. Our goal is to challenge (2), with a built system that implements an argument system based on PCPs. We describe a generalpurpose system that builds on work of Ishai et al. (CCC ’07) and incorporates new theoretical work to improve performance by 20 orders of magnitude. The system is (arguably) practical in some cases, suggesting that, as a tool for building secure systems, PCPs are not a lost cause. 1
Efficient Garbling from a FixedKey Blockcipher
, 2013
"... Abstract. We advocate schemes based on fixedkey AES as the best route to highly efficient circuitgarbling. We provide such schemes making only one AES call per garbledgate evaluation. On the theoretical side, we justify the security of these methods in the randompermutation model, where parties h ..."
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Cited by 33 (3 self)
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Abstract. We advocate schemes based on fixedkey AES as the best route to highly efficient circuitgarbling. We provide such schemes making only one AES call per garbledgate evaluation. On the theoretical side, we justify the security of these methods in the randompermutation model, where parties have access to a public random permutation. On the practical side, we provide the JustGarble system, which implements our schemes. JustGarble evaluates moderatesized garbledcircuits at an
Taking proofbased verified computation a few steps closer to practicality
 In USENIX Security
, 2012
"... Abstract. We describe GINGER, a built system for unconditional, generalpurpose, and nearly practical verification of outsourced computation. GINGER is based on PEPPER, which uses the PCP theorem and cryptographic techniques to implement an efficient argument system (a kind of interactive protocol). ..."
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Cited by 29 (6 self)
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Abstract. We describe GINGER, a built system for unconditional, generalpurpose, and nearly practical verification of outsourced computation. GINGER is based on PEPPER, which uses the PCP theorem and cryptographic techniques to implement an efficient argument system (a kind of interactive protocol). GINGER slashes the query size and costs via theoretical refinements that are of independent interest; broadens the computational model to include (primitive) floatingpoint fractions, inequality comparisons, logical operations, and conditional control flow; and includes a parallel GPUbased implementation that dramatically reduces latency. 1
QuidProQuotocols: Strengthening SemiHonest Protocols with Dual Execution
"... Abstract—Known protocols for secure twoparty computation that are designed to provide full security against malicious behavior are significantly less efficient than protocols intended only to thwart semihonest adversaries. We present a concrete design and implementation of protocols achieving secu ..."
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Cited by 27 (5 self)
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Abstract—Known protocols for secure twoparty computation that are designed to provide full security against malicious behavior are significantly less efficient than protocols intended only to thwart semihonest adversaries. We present a concrete design and implementation of protocols achieving security guarantees that are much stronger than are possible with semihonest protocols, at minimal extra cost. Specifically, we consider protocols in which a malicious adversary may learn a single (arbitrary) bit of additional information about the honest party’s input. Correctness of the honest party’s output is still guaranteed. Adapting prior work of Mohassel and Franklin, the basic idea in our protocols is to conduct two separate runs of a (specific) semihonest, garbledcircuit protocol, with the parties swapping roles, followed by an inexpensive secure equality test. We provide a rigorous definition and prove that this protocol leaks no more than one additional bit against a malicious adversary. In addition, we propose some heuristic enhancements to reduce the overall information a cheating adversary learns. Our experiments show that protocols meeting this security level can be implemented at cost very close to that of protocols that only achieve semihonest security. Our results indicate that this model enables the largescale, practical applications possible within the semihonest security model, while providing dramatically stronger security guarantees. Keywordssecure twoparty computation, privacypreserving protocols. I.
A hybrid architecture for interactive verifiable computation
 In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2013
"... Abstract—We consider interactive, proofbased verifiable computation: how can a client machine specify a computation to a server, receive an answer, and then engage the server in an interactive protocol that convinces the client that the answer is correct, with less work for the client than executin ..."
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Cited by 26 (4 self)
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Abstract—We consider interactive, proofbased verifiable computation: how can a client machine specify a computation to a server, receive an answer, and then engage the server in an interactive protocol that convinces the client that the answer is correct, with less work for the client than executing the computation in the first place? Complexity theory and cryptography offer solutions in principle, but if implemented naively, they are ludicrously expensive. Recently, however, several strands of work have refined this theory and implemented the resulting protocols in actual systems. This work is promising but suffers from one of two problems: either it relies on expensive cryptography, or else it applies to a restricted class of computations. Worse, it is not always clear which protocol will perform better for a given problem. We describe a system that (a) extends optimized refinements of the noncryptographic protocols to a much broader class of computations, (b) uses static analysis to fail over to the cryptographic ones when the noncryptographic ones would be more expensive, and (c) incorporates this core into a built system that includes a compiler for a highlevel language, a distributed server, and GPU acceleration. Experimental results indicate that our system performs better and applies more widely than the best in the literature. 1
More efficient oblivious transfer and extensions for faster secure computation
, 2013
"... Protocols for secure computation enable parties to compute a joint function on their private inputs without revealing anything but the result. A foundation for secure computation is oblivious transfer (OT), which traditionally requires expensive public key cryptography. A more efficient way to perf ..."
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Cited by 25 (4 self)
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Protocols for secure computation enable parties to compute a joint function on their private inputs without revealing anything but the result. A foundation for secure computation is oblivious transfer (OT), which traditionally requires expensive public key cryptography. A more efficient way to perform many OTs is to extend a small number of base OTs using OT extensions based on symmetric cryptography. In this work we present optimizations and efficient implementations of OT and OT extensions in the semihonest model. We propose a novel OT protocol with security in the standard model and improve OT extensions with respect to communication complexity, computation complexity, and scalability. We also provide specific optimizations of OT extensions that are tailored to the secure computation protocols of Yao and GoldreichMicaliWigderson and reduce the communication complexity even further. We experimentally verify the efficiency gains of our protocols and optimizations. By applying our implementation to current secure computation frameworks, we can securely compute a Levenshtein distance circuit with 1.29 billion AND gates at a rate of 1.2 million AND gates per second. Moreover, we demonstrate the importance of correctly implementing OT within secure computation protocols by presenting an attack on the FastGC framework.
Vmcrypt  modular software architecture for scalable secure computation
, 2010
"... Garbled circuits play a key role in secure computation. Unlike previous work, which focused mainly on efficiency and automation aspects of secure computation, in this paper we focus on software modularity and scalability, considering very large circuits. Our main contribution is a virtual machine th ..."
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Cited by 22 (3 self)
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Garbled circuits play a key role in secure computation. Unlike previous work, which focused mainly on efficiency and automation aspects of secure computation, in this paper we focus on software modularity and scalability, considering very large circuits. Our main contribution is a virtual machine that dynamically loads hardware descriptions into memory and destructs them as soon as they are done computing. Our software also introduces a new technique for parallel evaluation of garbled circuits. The software is designed in a completely modular fashion, allowing developers to integrate garbled circuits through an API (Abstract Programming Interface), without having to modify the base code. We measure the performance of this architecture on several circuits with hundreds of millions of gates. To the best of our knowledge, these are the largest scalable secure computations done to date.