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Information Credibility on Twitter
"... We analyze the information credibility of news propagated through Twitter, a popular microblogging service. Previous research has shown that most of the messages posted on Twitter are truthful, but the service is also used to spread misinformation and false rumors, often unintentionally. On this pap ..."
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We analyze the information credibility of news propagated through Twitter, a popular microblogging service. Previous research has shown that most of the messages posted on Twitter are truthful, but the service is also used to spread misinformation and false rumors, often unintentionally. On this paper we focus on automatic methods for assessing the credibility of a given set of tweets. Specifically, we analyze microblog postings related to “trending ” topics, and classify them as credible or not credible, based on features extracted from them. We use features from users ’ posting and re-posting (“re-tweeting”) behavior, from the text of the posts, and from citations to external sources. We evaluate our methods using a significant number of human assessments about the credibility of items on a recent sample of Twitter postings. Our results shows that there are measurable differences in the way messages propagate, that can be used to classify them automatically as credible or not credible, with precision and recall in the range of 70% to 80%.
Suspended Accounts In Retrospect: An Analysis of Twitter Spam
- In Proc. of 11th IMC
, 2011
"... In this study, we examine the abuse of online social networks at the hands of spammers through the lens of the tools, techniques, and support infrastructure they rely upon. To perform our analysis, we identify over 1.1 million accounts suspended by Twitter for disruptive activities over the course o ..."
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In this study, we examine the abuse of online social networks at the hands of spammers through the lens of the tools, techniques, and support infrastructure they rely upon. To perform our analysis, we identify over 1.1 million accounts suspended by Twitter for disruptive activities over the course of seven months. In the process, we collect a dataset of 1.8 billion tweets, 80 million of which belong to spam accounts. We use our dataset to characterize the behavior and lifetime of spam accounts, the campaigns they execute, and the wide-spread abuse of legitimate web services such as URL shorteners and free web hosting. We also identify an emerging marketplace of illegitimate programs operated by spammers that include Twitter account sellers, ad-based URL shorteners, and spam affiliate programs that help enable underground market diversification. Our results show that 77 % of spam accounts identified by Twitter are suspended within on day of their first tweet. Because of these pressures, less than 9 % of accounts form social relationships with regular Twitter users. Instead, 17 % of accounts rely on hijacking trends, while 52 % of accounts use unsolicited mentions to reach an audience. In spite of daily account attrition, we show how five spam campaigns controlling 145 thousand accounts combined are able to persist for months at a time, with each campaign enacting a unique spamming strategy. Surprisingly, three of these campaigns send spam directing visitors to reputable store fronts, blurring the line regarding what constitutes spam on social networks.
Design and Evaluation of a Real-Time URL Spam Filtering Service
"... On the heels of the widespread adoption of web services such as social networks and URL shorteners, scams, phishing, and malware have become regular threats. Despite extensive research, email-based spam filtering techniques generally fall short for protecting other web services. To better address th ..."
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Cited by 74 (7 self)
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On the heels of the widespread adoption of web services such as social networks and URL shorteners, scams, phishing, and malware have become regular threats. Despite extensive research, email-based spam filtering techniques generally fall short for protecting other web services. To better address this need, we present Monarch, a real-time system that crawls URLs as they are submitted to web services and determines whether the URLs direct to spam. We evaluate the viability of Monarch and the fundamental challenges that arise due to the diversity of web service spam. We show that Monarch can provide accurate, real-time protection, but that the underlying characteristics of spam do not generalize across web services. In particular, we find that spam targeting email qualitatively differs in significant ways from spam campaigns targeting Twitter. We explore the distinctions between email and Twitter spam, including the abuse of public web hosting and redirector services. Finally, we demonstrate Monarch’s scalability, showing our system could protect a service such as Twitter— which needs to process 15 million URLs/day—for a bit under $800/day.
Uncovering social network Sybils in the wild
- In Proceedings of the 11th ACM/USENIX Internet Measurement Conference (IMC’11
, 2011
"... Sybil accounts are fake identities created to unfairly increase the power or resources of a single user. Researchers have long known about the existence of Sybil accounts in online communities such as file-sharing systems, but have not been able to perform large scale measurements to detect them or ..."
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Cited by 49 (14 self)
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Sybil accounts are fake identities created to unfairly increase the power or resources of a single user. Researchers have long known about the existence of Sybil accounts in online communities such as file-sharing systems, but have not been able to perform large scale measurements to detect them or measure their activities. In this paper, we describe our efforts to detect, characterize and understand Sybil account activity in the Renren online social network (OSN). We use ground truth provided by Renren Inc. to build measurement based Sybil account detectors, and deploy them on Renren to detect over 100,000 Sybil accounts. We study these Sybil accounts, as well as an additional 560,000 Sybil accounts caught by Renren, and analyze their link creation behavior. Most interestingly, we find that contrary to prior conjecture, Sybil accounts in OSNs do not form tight-knit communities. Instead, they integrate into the social graph just like normal users. Using link creation timestamps, we verify that the large majority of links between Sybil accounts are created accidentally, unbeknownst to the attacker. Overall, only a very small portion of Sybil accounts are connected to other Sybils with social links. Our study shows that existing Sybil defenses are unlikely to succeed in today’s OSNs, and we must design new techniques to effectively detect and defend against Sybil attacks. Categories and Subject Descriptors C.2 [General]: Security and protection (e.g., firewalls); J.4 [Computer
Understanding and Combating Link Farming in the Twitter Social Network
"... Recently, Twitter has emerged as a popular platform for discovering real-time information on the Web, such as news stories and people’s reaction tothem. Like theWeb, Twitter has become a target for link farming, where users, especially spammers, try to acquire large numbers of follower links in the ..."
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Cited by 46 (2 self)
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Recently, Twitter has emerged as a popular platform for discovering real-time information on the Web, such as news stories and people’s reaction tothem. Like theWeb, Twitter has become a target for link farming, where users, especially spammers, try to acquire large numbers of follower links in the social network. Acquiring followers not only increases the size of a user’s direct audience, but also contributes to the perceived influence of the user, which in turn impacts the ranking of the user’s tweets by search engines. In this paper, we first investigate link farming in the Twitter network and then explore mechanisms to discourage the activity. To this end, we conducted a detailed analysis of links acquired by over 40,000 spammer accounts suspended by Twitter. We find that link farming is wide spread and that a majority of spammers ’ links are farmed from a small fraction of Twitter users, the social capitalists, who are themselves seeking to amass social capital and links by following back anyone who follows them. Our findings shed light on the social dynamics that are at the root of the link farming problem in Twitter network and they have important implications for future designs of link spam defenses. In particular, we show that a simple user ranking scheme that penalizes users for connecting to spammers can effectively address the problem by disincentivizing users from linking with other users simply to gain influence. Categories andSubject Descriptors H.3.5 [Online Information Services]: Web-based services;
Serf and Turf: Crowdturfing for Fun and Profit
"... Popular Internet services in recent years have shown that remarkable things can be achieved by harnessing the power of the masses using crowd-sourcing systems. However, crowd-sourcing systems can also pose a real challenge to existing security mechanisms deployed to protect Internet services. Many o ..."
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Cited by 38 (7 self)
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Popular Internet services in recent years have shown that remarkable things can be achieved by harnessing the power of the masses using crowd-sourcing systems. However, crowd-sourcing systems can also pose a real challenge to existing security mechanisms deployed to protect Internet services. Many of these security techniques rely on the assumption that malicious activity is generated automatically by automated programs. Thus they would perform poorly or be easily bypassed when attacks are generated by real users working in a crowd-sourcing system. Through measurements, we have found surprising evidence showing that not only do malicious crowd-sourcing systems exist, but they are rapidly growing in both user base and total revenue. We describe in this paper a significant effort to study and understand these crowdturfing systems in today’s Internet. We use detailed crawls to extract data about the size and operational structure of these crowdturfing systems. We analyze details of campaigns offered and performed in these sites, and evaluate their end-to-end effectiveness by running active, benign campaigns of our own. Finally, we study and compare the source of workers on crowdturfing sites in different countries. Our results suggest that campaigns on these systems are highly effective at reaching users, and their continuing growth poses a concrete threat to online communities both in the US and elsewhere.
A.: Democrats, Republicans and Starbucks Afficionados
- In: Proceedings of KDD 2011
"... More and more technologies are taking advantage of the explosion of social media (Web search, content recommendation services, marketing, ad targeting, etc.). This paper focuses on the problem of automatically constructing user profiles, which can significantly benefit such technologies. We describe ..."
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Cited by 38 (0 self)
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More and more technologies are taking advantage of the explosion of social media (Web search, content recommendation services, marketing, ad targeting, etc.). This paper focuses on the problem of automatically constructing user profiles, which can significantly benefit such technologies. We describe a general and robust machine learning framework for large-scale classification of social media users according to dimensions of interest. We report encouraging experimental results on 3 tasks with different characteristics: political affiliation detection, ethnicity identification and detecting affinity for a particular business.
Die free or live hard? empirical evaluation and new design for fighting evolving twitter spammers (extended version
, 2011
"... Abstract. Due to the significance and indispensability of detecting and suspending Twitter spammers, many researchers along with the engineers inTwitter Corporation havedevotedthemselvestokeepingTwitter as spam-free online communities. Meanwhile, Twitter spammers are also evolving to evade existing ..."
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Cited by 37 (5 self)
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Abstract. Due to the significance and indispensability of detecting and suspending Twitter spammers, many researchers along with the engineers inTwitter Corporation havedevotedthemselvestokeepingTwitter as spam-free online communities. Meanwhile, Twitter spammers are also evolving to evade existing detection techniques. In this paper, we make an empirical analysis of the evasion tactics utilized by Twitter spammers, and then design several new and robust features to detect Twitter spammers. Finally, we formalize the robustness of 24 detection features that are commonly utilized in the literature as well as our proposed ones. Through our experiments, we show that our new designed features are effective to detect Twitter spammers, achieving a much higher detection rate than three state-of-the-art approaches [35,32,34] while keeping an even lower false positive rate. 1
Seven months with the devils: a long-term study of content polluters on Twitter
- In AAAI Int’l Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM
, 2011
"... The rise in popularity of social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook has been paralleled by the rise of unwanted, disruptive entities on these networks—including spammers, malware disseminators, and other content polluters. Inspired by sociologists working to ensure the success of commons ..."
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Cited by 31 (7 self)
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The rise in popularity of social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook has been paralleled by the rise of unwanted, disruptive entities on these networks—including spammers, malware disseminators, and other content polluters. Inspired by sociologists working to ensure the success of commons and criminologists focused on deterring vandalism and preventing crime, we present the first long-term study of social honeypots for tempting, profiling, and filtering content polluters in social media. Concretely, we report on our experiences via a seven-month deployment of 60 honeypots on Twitter that resulted in the harvesting of 36,000 candidate content polluters. As part of our study, we (i) examine the harvested Twitter users, including an analysis of link payloads, user behavior over time, and followers/following network dynamics and (ii) evaluate a wide range of features to investigate the effectiveness of automatic content polluter identification.
Trafficking Fraudulent Accounts: The Role of the Underground Market in Twitter Spam and Abuse
"... As web services such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Yahoo now dominate the daily activities of Internet users, cyber criminals have adapted their monetization strategies to engage users within these walled gardens. To facilitate access to these sites, an underground market has emerged where fraud ..."
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Cited by 23 (4 self)
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As web services such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Yahoo now dominate the daily activities of Internet users, cyber criminals have adapted their monetization strategies to engage users within these walled gardens. To facilitate access to these sites, an underground market has emerged where fraudulent accounts – automatically generated credentials used to perpetrate scams, phishing, and malware – are sold in bulk by the thousands. In order to understand this shadowy economy, we investigate the market for fraudulent Twitter accounts to monitor prices, availability, and fraud perpetrated by 27 merchants over the course of a 10-month period. We use our insights to develop a classifier to retroactively detect several million fraudulent accounts sold via this marketplace, 95% of which we disable with Twitter’s help. During active months, the 27 merchants we monitor appeared responsible for registering 10–20 % of all accounts later flagged for spam by Twitter, generating $127–459K for their efforts. 1
