Good news, bad news: representation theorems and applications.

"... We analyze the consequences of the board’s dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more in ..."

Abstract - Cited by 198 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart

We analyze the consequences of the board’s dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade-off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice; however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management-friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis. Too much emphasis on monitoring tends to create a rift between non-executive and executive directors, whereas the more traditional job of forming strategy requires close collaboration. In both activities, though, independent directors face the same problem: they depend largely on the chief executive and the company’s management for information. (The Economist [February 10, 2001, p. 68], describing a survey by PriceWater-houseCoopers of British boards.)

The effect of information on product quality: Evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards

by Ginger Zhe Jin, Phillip Leslie - JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS , 2003

"... This study examines the effect of an increase in product quality information to consumers on firms’ choices of product quality. In 1998, Los Angeles County introduced hygiene quality grade cards to be displayed in restaurant windows. We show that the grade cards cause (i) restaurant health inspectio ..."

Abstract - Cited by 156 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart

This study examines the effect of an increase in product quality information to consumers on firms’ choices of product quality. In 1998, Los Angeles County introduced hygiene quality grade cards to be displayed in restaurant windows. We show that the grade cards cause (i) restaurant health inspection scores to increase, (ii) consumer demand to become sensitive to changes in restaurants ’ hygiene quality, and (iii) the number of foodborne illness hospitalizations to decrease. We also provide evidence that this improvement in health outcomes is not fully explained by consumers substituting from poor hygiene restaurants to good hygiene restaurants. These results imply the grade cards cause restaurants to make hygiene quality improvements.

Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets

by Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson , 2005

"... Following Becker (1957) we ask whether competition eliminates the effects of behavioral biases. We study products with add-ons. In competitive markets with costless communication, Bayesian consumers infer that hidden prices are likely to be high prices. Hence, firms choose not to shroud information. ..."

Abstract - Cited by 154 (15 self) - Add to MetaCart

Following Becker (1957) we ask whether competition eliminates the effects of behavioral biases. We study products with add-ons. In competitive markets with costless communication, Bayesian consumers infer that hidden prices are likely to be high prices. Hence, firms choose not to shroud information. However, information shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic consumers. Such shrouding creates an inefficiency. Sometimes firms have an incentive to eliminate this inefficiency by educating their competitors’ myopic consumers. However, if add-ons have close substitutes, a “curse of debiasing” arises, and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add-ons. In equilibrium, two kinds of exploitation coexist. Optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons. In turn, sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes. It is

(Show Context)

Fundamental Concepts of Qualitative Probabilistic Networks

by Michael P. Wellman - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE , 1990

"... Graphical representations for probabilistic relationships have recently received considerable attention in A1. Qualitative probabilistic networks abstract from the usual numeric representations by encoding only qualitative relationships, which are inequality constraints on the joint probability dist ..."

Abstract - Cited by 154 (9 self) - Add to MetaCart

Graphical representations for probabilistic relationships have recently received considerable attention in A1. Qualitative probabilistic networks abstract from the usual numeric representations by encoding only qualitative relationships, which are inequality constraints on the joint probability distribution over the variables. Although these constraints are insufficient to determine probabilities uniquely, they are designed to justify the deduction of a class of relative likelihood conclusions that imply useful decision-making properties. Two types of qualitative relationship are defined, each a probabilistic form of monotonicity constraint over a group of variables. Qualitative influences describe the direction of the relationship between two variables. Qualitative synergies describe interactions among influences. The probabilistic definitions chosen justify sound and efficient inference procedures based on graphical manipulations of the network. These procedures answer queries about qualitative relationships among variables separated in the network and determine structural properties of optimal assignments to decision variables.

Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting

by David Hirshleifer, et al. , 2002

"... ..."

Abstract - Cited by 115 (18 self) - Add to MetaCart

Abstract not found

(Show Context)

Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

by Philip A. Haile, Han Hong, Matthew Shum , 2003

"... We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods ..."

Abstract - Cited by 105 (13 self) - Add to MetaCart

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder’s conditional expectation of the value of winning the auction. Equilibrium behavior implies that in a private values auction these expectations are invariant to the number of opponents each bidder faces, while with common values they are decreasing in the number of opponents. This distinction forms the basis of our tests. We consider both exogenous and endogenous variation in the number of bidders. Monte Carlo experiments show that our tests can perform well in samples of moderate sizes. We apply our tests to two different types of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. For unit-price (“scaled”) sales often argued to fit a private values model, our tests consistently fail to find evidence of common values. For “lumpsum” sales, where aprioriarguments for common values appear stronger, our tests yield mixed evidence against the private values hypothesis.

Investor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications

by Kent Daniel , David Hirshleifer , Siew Hong Teoh , 2002

"... We review extensive evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and prices. Systematic mispricing probably causes substantial resource misallocation. We argue that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity about the strategic incentives of informed market par ..."

Abstract - Cited by 98 (21 self) - Add to MetaCart

We review extensive evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and prices. Systematic mispricing probably causes substantial resource misallocation. We argue that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity about the strategic incentives of informed market participants. However, individuals as political participants remain subject to the biases and self-interest they exhibit in private settings. Indeed, correcting contemporaneous market pricing errors is probably not government’s relative advantage. Government and private planners should establish rules ex ante to improve choices and efficiency, including disclosure, reporting, advertising, and default-option-setting regulations. Especially

Economic analysis of law

by Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell , 1999

"... This is a survey of the field of economic analysis of law, focusing on the work of economists. The survey covers the three central areas of civil law — liability for accidents (tort law), property law, and contracts — as well as the litigation process and public enforcement of ..."

Abstract - Cited by 81 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart

This is a survey of the field of economic analysis of law, focusing on the work of economists. The survey covers the three central areas of civil law — liability for accidents (tort law), property law, and contracts — as well as the litigation process and public enforcement of

Good news, bad news: representation theorems and applications. (1981)

Tools