Construal level theory proposes that temporal distance changes people’s responses to future events by changing the way people mentally represent those events. The greater the temporal distance, the more likely are events to be represented in terms of a few abstract features that convey the perceived essence of the events (high-level construals) rather than in terms of more concrete and incidental details of the events (low-level construals). The informational and evaluative implications of high-level construals, compared with those of low-level construals, should therefore have more impact on responses to distant-future events than near-future events. This article explores the implications of construal level theory for temporal changes in evaluation, prediction, and choice. The authors suggest that construal level underlies a broad range of evaluative and behavioral consequences of psychological distance from events.

We examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment. Participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task, first under a non-competitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme. Although there are no gender differences in performance, men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance. While seventy-three percent of the men select the tournament only thirty-five percent of the women make this choice. This gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only play a negligible role. Instead the tournament-entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition. The result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it.

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In this article I review studies of resistance to change and advocate new research based on a reconceptualization of individual responses to change as multidimensional attitudes. A challenging question for research and practice arises: How can we balance the organizational need to ioster ambivalent attitudes toward change and the individual need to minimize the potentially debilitating effects of ambivalence? I conclude by highlighting the importance of examining the evolution of employee responses to change over time and the need to understand responses to change proposals that emerge from bottom-up, egalitarian change processes.

The covariation component of everyday causal inference has been depicted, in both cognitive and social psychology as well as in philosophy, as heterogeneous and prone to biases. The models and biases discussed in these domains are analyzed with respect to focal sets: contextually determined sets of events over which covariation is computed. Moreover, these models are compared to our probabilistic contrast model, which specifies causes as first and higher order contrasts computed over events in a focal set. Contrary to the previous depiction of covariation computation, the present assessment indicates that a single normative mechanism—the computation of probabilis-tic contrasts—underlies this essential component of natural causal induction both in everyday and in scientific situations. We do not perceive the visual world as a two-dimensional mosaic of bits of light patches. Instead, these data from the retina are processed by our central visual system to yield a coherent perception of the world, reflecting its visual and spa-tial structures. Similarly, we do not perceive our lives or the world beyond as a stream of unconnected elemental events.

Competitive high ranking positions are largely occupied by men, and women remain scarce in engineering and sciences. Explanations for these occupational differences focus on discrimination and preferences for work hours and field of study. We explore an additional explanation, namely that women and men may differ in their selection into competitive environments. Men and women in a laboratory experiment perform a real task under a non-competitive piece rate and a competitive tournament scheme. Although there are no gender differences in performance under either of these compensations, there is a substantial gender difference when participants subsequently choose the scheme they want to apply to their next performance. Twice as many men as women choose the tournament over the piece rate. This gender gap in tournament entry is neither explained by performance before nor after the entry decision. Furthermore, while men are more optimistic about their relative performance, differences in beliefs only explain a small share of the gap in tournament entry. In a final task, we find that women are less likely to select tournament compensations even when they select it for past performance. In predicting tournament entry we use the compensation choice for past performance as a control for non-tournament specific gender differences (such as risk aversion, general feedback aversion and overconfidence), and we find a large residual gender effect.

accuracy issues more directly. Moreover, this research attracts a great deal of attention because of what many take to be its dismal implications for the accuracy of human social reasoning. These implications are illusory, however, because an error is not the same thing as a "mistake. " An error is a judgment of an experimental stimulus that departs from a model of the judgment process. If this model is normative, then the error can be said to represent an incorrect judgment. A mistake, by contrast, is an incorrect judgment of a real-world stimulus and therefore more difficult to determine. Although errors can be highly informative about the process of judgment in general, they are not necessarily relevant to the content or accuracy of particular judgments, because errors in a laboratory may not be mistakes with respect to a broader, more realistic frame of reference and the processes that produce such errors might lead to correct decisions and adaptive outcomes in real life. Several examples are described in this article. Accuracy issues cannot be addressed by research that concentrates on demonstrating error in relation to artificial stimuli, but only by research that uses external, realistic criteria for accuracy. These criteria might include the degree to which judgments agree with each other and yield valid predictions of behavior. The accuracy of human social judgment is a topic of obvious

Jones and Nisbett proposed that actors are inclined to attribute their behavior to situational causes, while observers of the same behavior are inclined to attribute it to dispositional qualities—stable attitudes and traits—of the actor. Some demonstrational studies consistent with this hypothesis were described. College student observers were found to (a) assume that actors would behave in the future in ways similar to those they had just witnessed (while actors themselves did not share this assumption); (b) describe their best friend's choices of girlfriend and college major in terms referring to dispositional qualities of their best friend (while more often describing their own similar choices in terms of properties of the girlfriend or major); and (c) ascribe more personality traits to other people than to themselves. The fact that different individuals often have very different views of the causes of a given person's behavior is a frequent theme of world literature. The diverse perspectives on the behavior of the central figure held by the central figure himself, the people whom he af-fects, the author, and the reader play an im-portant role in works as varied as Rashomon, Huckleberry Finn, the "Grand Inquisitor"

The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theoretical analysis employing J. H. Davis's (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that the relative magnitude of individual and group bias depends upon several factors, including group size, initial individual judgment, the magnitude of bias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that there can be no simple answer to the question, "Which are more biased, individuals or groups?, " but the SDS model offers a framework for specifying some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups. A great deal of research in social and cognitive psychology has been devoted to demonstrating what is probably an uncontroversial proposition: that human judgment is imperfect. What makes this work interesting and useful is that such imperfections often constitute more than random fluctuations around "rational, " prescribed, or ideal judgments. Rather, humans consistently exhibit systematic biases in their judgments. Some of

The authors propose that need for closure (NFC) leads attributors to respond to an ambiguous social event by increasing reliance on implicit theories received from acculturation. Hence, the influence of NFC should be shaped by chronically accessible knowledge structures ina culture, and, likewise, the influence of culture should be moderated by epistemic motives uch as NFC. The specific hypotheses drew on past findings that North American and Chinese attributors possess differing implicit social theories, North Americans conceiving of individuals as autonomous agents and Chinese conceiving of groups as autonomous. The present studies found the predicted pattern that among North American participants, NFC increased attributions to personal but not group dispositions. Among Chinese participants, NFC increased attributions to group but not personal dispositions. The findings are discussed in light of an emerging dynamic account of culture and cognition. Cross-cultural research on dispositionist social thinking has found that the bias toward personal dispositions long observed by researchers working in Western individualistic ultures is less prevalent among participants in East Asian cultures (Morris & Peng, 1994). In East Asian cultures influenced by Confucianism,