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Pervasive Computing: Vision and Challenges
- IEEE Personal Communications
, 2001
"... This paper discusses the challenges in computer systems research posed by the emerging field of pervasive computing. It first examines the relationship of this new field to its predecessors: distributed systems and mobile computing. It then identifies four new research thrusts: effective use of smar ..."
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Cited by 670 (20 self)
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This paper discusses the challenges in computer systems research posed by the emerging field of pervasive computing. It first examines the relationship of this new field to its predecessors: distributed systems and mobile computing. It then identifies four new research thrusts: effective use of smart spaces, invisibility, localized scalability, and masking uneven conditioning. Next, it sketches a couple of hypothetical pervasive computing scenarios, and uses them to identify key capabilities missing from today's systems. The paper closes with a discussion of the research necessary to develop these capabilities.
Secure Group Communications Using Key Graphs
, 1998
"... Many emerging applications (e.g., teleconference, real-time information services, pay per view, distributed interactive simulation, and collaborative work) are based upon a group communications model, i.e., they require packet delivery from one or more authorized senders to a very large number of au ..."
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Cited by 552 (17 self)
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Many emerging applications (e.g., teleconference, real-time information services, pay per view, distributed interactive simulation, and collaborative work) are based upon a group communications model, i.e., they require packet delivery from one or more authorized senders to a very large number of authorized receivers. As a result, securing group communications (i.e., providing confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of messages delivered between group members) will become a critical networking issue. In this paper, we present a novel solution to the scalability problem of group/multicast key management. We formalize the notion of a secure group as a triple (U; K;R) where U denotes a set of users, K a set of keys held by the users, and R a user-key relation. We then introduce key graphs to specify secure groups. For a special class of key graphs, we present three strategies for securely distributing rekey messages after a join/leave, and specify protocols for joining and leaving a...
Distributed Computing in Practice: The Condor Experience
- Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
, 2005
"... Since 1984, the Condor project has enabled ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational grid. In this chapter, we provide the history ..."
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Cited by 542 (7 self)
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Since 1984, the Condor project has enabled ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational grid. In this chapter, we provide the history and philosophy of the Condor project and describe how it has interacted with other projects and evolved along with the field of distributed computing. We outline the core components of the Condor system and describe how the technology of computing must correspond to social structures. Throughout, we reflect on the lessons of experience and chart the course traveled by research ideas as they grow into production systems.
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols Secure Against Dictionary Attacks
- IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON RESEARCH IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY
, 1992
"... Classical cryptographic protocols based on user-chosen keys allow an attacker to mount password-guessing attacks. We introduce a novel combination of asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric (secret-key) cryptography that allow two parties sharing a common password to exchange confidential and authenti ..."
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Cited by 431 (5 self)
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Classical cryptographic protocols based on user-chosen keys allow an attacker to mount password-guessing attacks. We introduce a novel combination of asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric (secret-key) cryptography that allow two parties sharing a common password to exchange confidential and authenticated information over an insecure network. These protocols are secure against active attacks, and have the property that the password is protected against off-line "dictionary" attacks. There are a number of other useful applications as well, including secure public telephones.
The S/KEY One-Time Password System
- In Proceedings of the Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems
, 1994
"... Computing systems have been under increasingly sophisticated attack over the Internet and by using dial-up access ports. One form of attack is eavesdropping on network connections to obtain login id's and passwords of legitimate users. This information is used at a later time to attack the syst ..."
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Cited by 254 (1 self)
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Computing systems have been under increasingly sophisticated attack over the Internet and by using dial-up access ports. One form of attack is eavesdropping on network connections to obtain login id's and passwords of legitimate users. This information is used at a later time to attack the system. We have developed a prototype software system, the S/KEY TM one-time password system, to counter this type of attack and have been using it experimentally for external access to a research computer complex at Bellcore. The S/KEY system has several advantages compared with other one-time or multi-use authentication systems. The user's secret password never crosses the network during login or when executing other commands requiring authentication such as the UNIX passwd (change password) or su (change privilege) commands. No secret information is stored anywhere, including on the host being protected, and the underlying algorithm may be made public. The remote end (client) of this system can...
Separating key management from file system security
, 1999
"... No secure network file system has ever grown to span the In-ternet. Existing systems all lack adequate key management for security at a global scale. Given the diversity of the In-ternet, any particular mechanism a file system employs to manage keys will fail to support many types of use. We propose ..."
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Cited by 232 (28 self)
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No secure network file system has ever grown to span the In-ternet. Existing systems all lack adequate key management for security at a global scale. Given the diversity of the In-ternet, any particular mechanism a file system employs to manage keys will fail to support many types of use. We propose separating key management from file system security, letting the world share a single global file system no matter how individuals manage keys. We present SFS, a se-cure file system that avoids internal key management. While other file systems need key management to map file names to encryption keys, SFS file names effectively contain public keys, making them self-certifying pathnames. Key manage-ment in SFS occurs outside of the file system, in whatever procedure users choose to generate file names. Self-certifying pathnames free SFS clients from any notion of administrative realm, making inter-realm file sharing triv-ial. They let users authenticate servers through a number of different techniques. The file namespace doubles as a key certification namespace, so that people can realize many key management schemes using only standard file utilities. Fi-nally, with self-certifying pathnames, people can bootstrap one key management mechanism using another. These prop-erties make SFS more versatile than any file system with built-in key management.
Experiences with the amoeba distributed operating system
- Communications of the ACM
, 1990
"... The Amoeba distributed operating system has been in development and use for over eight years now. In this paper we describe the present system and our experience with it—what we did right, but also what we did wrong. Among the things done right were basing the system on objects, using a single unifo ..."
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Cited by 229 (20 self)
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The Amoeba distributed operating system has been in development and use for over eight years now. In this paper we describe the present system and our experience with it—what we did right, but also what we did wrong. Among the things done right were basing the system on objects, using a single uniform mechanism (capabilities) for naming and protecting them in a location independent way, and designing a completely new, and very fast file system. Among the things done wrong were having threads not be pre-emptable, initially building our own homebrew window system, and not having a multicast facility at the outset.
OCB: A Block-Cipher Mode of Operation for Efficient Authenticated Encryption
, 2001
"... We describe a parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encrypts-and-authenticates a nonempty string M # {0, 1} # using #|M |/n# + 2 block-cipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional ov ..."
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Cited by 204 (24 self)
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We describe a parallelizable block-cipher mode of operation that simultaneously provides privacy and authenticity. OCB encrypts-and-authenticates a nonempty string M # {0, 1} # using #|M |/n# + 2 block-cipher invocations, where n is the block length of the underlying block cipher. Additional overhead is small. OCB refines a scheme, IAPM, suggested by Jutla [20]. Desirable properties of OCB include: the ability to encrypt a bit string of arbitrary length into a ciphertext of minimal length; cheap o#set calculations; cheap session setup, a single underlying cryptographic key; no extended-precision addition; a nearly optimal number of block-cipher calls; and no requirement for a random IV. We prove OCB secure, quantifying the adversary's ability to violate privacy or authenticity in terms of the quality of the block cipher as a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) or as a strong PRP, respectively. Keywords: AES, authenticity, block ciphers, cryptography, encryption, integrity, modes of operation, provable security, standards . # Department of Computer Science, Eng. II Building, University of California at Davis, Davis, California 95616 USA; and Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Science, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai 50200 Thailand. e-mail: rogaway@cs.ucdavis.edu web: www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway + Department of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093 USA. e-mail: mihir@cs.ucsd.edu web: www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir # Department of Computer Science, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada 89557 USA. e-mail: jrb@cs.unr.edu web: www.cs.unr.edu/~jrb Digital Fountain, 600 Alabama Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 USA. e-mail: tdk@acm.org 1
The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5
, 1993
"... draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-00.txt ..."
