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453
The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems
- JOURNAL OF FINANCE
, 1993
"... Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increaing average ( ..."
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Cited by 972 (6 self)
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Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increaing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings
- Journal of Financial Economics
, 1999
"... NBER. Tim Opler also holds an appointment at Deutsche Morgan Grenfell. We thank ..."
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Cited by 346 (15 self)
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NBER. Tim Opler also holds an appointment at Deutsche Morgan Grenfell. We thank
Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, And Corporate Diversification
, 1995
"... Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification by documenting three principal findings. First, there is a strong negative relation between the extent of diversification and managerial equity ownership ..."
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Cited by 188 (6 self)
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Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification by documenting three principal findings. First, there is a strong negative relation between the extent of diversification and managerial equity ownership after controlling for other factors related to diversification. Second, there is a weak negative relation between the value loss from diversification and managerial ownership. Third, decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend towards increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces. 3 Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification Several recent studies examine the valuation consequences ...
2003, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more
- Journal of Financial Economics
"... At the end of 1997, the foreign companies listed in the U.S. have a Tobin’s q ratio that exceeds by 16.5 % the q ratio of firms from the same country that are not listed in the U.S. The valuation difference is statistically significant and largest for exchange-listed firms, where it reaches 37%. The ..."
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Cited by 174 (16 self)
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At the end of 1997, the foreign companies listed in the U.S. have a Tobin’s q ratio that exceeds by 16.5 % the q ratio of firms from the same country that are not listed in the U.S. The valuation difference is statistically significant and largest for exchange-listed firms, where it reaches 37%. The difference persists even after controlling for a number of firm and country characteristics. We propose a theory that explains this valuation difference. We hypothesize that controlling shareholders of firms listed in the U.S. cannot extract as many private benefits from control compared to controlling shareholders of firms not listed in the U.S., but that their firms are better able to take advantage of growth opportunities. Consequently, the cross-listed firms should be those firms where the interests of the controlling shareholder are better aligned with the interests of other shareholders. The growth opportunities of cross-listed firms will be more highly valued than those of firms not listed in the U.S. both because cross-listed firms are better able to take advantage of these opportunities and because a smaller fraction of the cash flow of these firms is expropriated by controlling shareholders. We find that our theory explains the greater valuation of cross-listed firms. In particular, we find expected sales growth is valued more highly for firms listed in the U.S. and that this effect is greater for firms from countries with poorer investor rights. 1.
The limits of financial globalization
- Journal of Finance
, 2005
"... Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activ-ity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision-making because of “twin agency problems ” th ..."
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Cited by 147 (10 self)
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Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activ-ity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision-making because of “twin agency problems ” that arise because rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outside investors. When these twin agency problems are significant, diffuse ownership is inefficient and cor-porate insiders must co-invest with other investors, retaining substantial equity. The resulting ownership concentration limits economic growth, financial development, and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization. AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II, the financial markets of most countries were closed to cross-border trade in financial assets. Since then, many countries have sharply reduced such barriers. The liberalization of trade in financial assets is often called “financial globalization.” In neoclassical models, financial globalization generates major economic ben-